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Editor’s Note
During this Presidential cycle in the United States, a number of prominent politicians
have consistently injected religion into politics. Michelle Bachmann may have been the
first to do so, but she has been followed by Rick Santorum, Rick Perry, Newt Gingrich,
and others.
According to the great theoretician Max Weber, the scientist and the politician are
separated by a very wide gulf, yet they are inextricably dependent upon each other. The
politician, Weber wrote, must have passion, a feeling of responsibility, and a sense of
proportion, “values.” 1 The scientist, on the other hand, seeks to clarify and determine
knowledge of interrelated facts. He or she must put on blinders and be intoxicated with
making the correct conjecture on a passage in a document.
Weber then goes on to assert that the separation between value and fact is
aimed not only at clearly defining the logical essence of the two types of activity, their
respective spheres and, consequently, the kind of problems each is capable of solving
with the means peculiar to it, but also at enabling them to collaborate more successfully,
because their very separateness will have eliminated confusions that would only have
hampered them both. 2

Some world leaders from various civilizations have been able to bridge this gap,
crossing in their lives between the two zones. Shortly after David Ben Gurion became
Prime Minister of Israel, he expressed a great interest in Asia and in the Asian
philosophies. Ben Gurion said that “to get to know the moods and patterns of thought of
the people of Asia, I sought to acquaint myself more intimately with the works of the
man who had left the greatest imprint upon their minds. And so I began studying the
writing of the Buddha, and I was quickly impressed with the extraordinary greatness of
the man, a man of immense wisdom and immense courage.” 3
His teachings were all on the rational and moral plane: what path should a man choose
in life, for the good of himself and of all living creatures? 4

The Prime Minister then compared Buddhism to Judaism. He said that even though
Buddha denied the existence of God, his doctrine on moral behavior was similar to that
of the Hebrew prophets. “The preaching of love of fellow man, for example, was very
much the doctrine of the Hebrew Sages of old and of the prophets who lived in the ninth
and eight centuries B.C.
‘Love they neighbor as thyself,’ indeed, appears in Leviticus (19:18). The Prophets
Elijah and Elisha lived in the ninth century, B.C., Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, and Micah in
the eighth – before the Buddha … But I made the special point that the utterances of the
Buddha were made five centuries before Jesus, because of the popular belief that the
doctrine of love had been launched upon the world by Jesus, and because the form in
which the Buddha said it was so like the form which appears in the New Testament.5
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Unlike many leaders who seek to point out the differences between religions, and thus
incite hostility amongst the public, here was a politician who brought out the similarity
between religions. Could it be done again, and was he right?
Max Weber taught us that although there are impediments to comparing civilizations
and religions outright, we should try to systematically compare and classify them. He
believed that research is unending and that scientific data is constantly liable to
correction. Moreover, the scientist has to make clear that he is hypothesizing with due
regard both for the possibility of other interpretations and for the development of
scientific knowledge.
Weber asserted in his famous essay, The Social Psychology of the World Religions, that
“Neither religions nor men are open books. They have been historical rather than
logical or even psychological constructions without contradiction. Often they have
borne within themselves a series of motives, each of which, if separately and
consistently followed through, would have stood in the way of the others or run against
them head on. In religious matters ‘consistency’ has been the exception and not the
rule.” 6 Further, he stated that:
“In no respect can one simply integrate various world religions into a chain of types,
each of them signifying a new ‘stage.’ All the great religions are historical
individualities of a highly complex nature. Taken all together, they exhaust only a few
of the possible combinations that could conceivably be formed from the very numerous
individual factors to be considered in such historical combinations.”7

Moreover, comparing foundational religions is not easy, Weber would maintain. In an
impressive opening footnote to his book Ancient Judaism, a great masterpiece, Weber
writes that it would require more than a lifetime of study “to acquire a true mastery of
the literature concerning the religion of Israel and Jewry, especially since this literature
is of exceptionally high quality.” 8
Weber warned against allowing value judgments to interfere with detached analysis. He
sought to compare relationships between economic ethics and religions, for instance,
and not to compare entire civilizations outright. 9 Further, we must take care to restrict
ourselves to objective investigation; any attempt to weigh the moral precepts or
practices of Judaism in the balance with Buddhism, for example, and say which is better
must be avoided at all costs by the social scientist.
One can only investigate how rational the development of a religion is from its given
premises, what options were available on the basis of the premises, and, perhaps, what
options are the most rational. As he notes in his beautiful intellectual swan song,
Science As A Vocation, “I do not know how one might wish to decide ‘scientifically’ the
value of French and German culture; for here, too, different gods struggle with one
another, now and for all times to come.” 10
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Weber proposed the construction of historical “ideal typical” models. As he writes in
the beginning of his article entitled Religious Rejections of the World and their
Directions, “the constructed scheme, of course, only serves the purpose of offering an
ideal typical means of orientation. It does not teach a philosophy of its own.”
The theoretically constructed types of conflicting ‘life orders’ are merely intended to
show that at certain points such and such internal conflicts are possible and ‘adequate.’
They are not intended to show that there is no standpoint from which the conflicts
would not be held to be resolved in a higher synthesis. As will readily be seen, the
individual spheres of values are prepared with a rational consistency which is rarely
found in reality. But they can appear thus in reality and in historically important ways,
and they have.
Such constructions make it possible to determine the typological locus of a historical
phenomenon. They enable us to see if, in particular traits or in their total character, the
phenomena approximate one of our constructions: to determine the degree of
approximation of the historical phenomenon to the theoretically constructed type. 11

Thus, as the late Harvard sociologist Talcott Parsons would maintain, the ideal type is
used as a device for differentiating the cultural variances from a model for the purpose
of comparison. 12
I believe that there are considerable intellectual impedimenta to providing a complete
parallel between Judaism and Buddhism. One is obvious: Judaism is a rationalistic,
legalistic, inner world religion, perhaps something like Chinese Confucianism. This is
clearly the attitude that Werner Sombart takes in his book The Jews and Modern
Capitalism. It is the anthropological character of the Jewish people which has remained
consistent over thousands of years, Sombart says. The Jewish native rationalism is the
characteristic trait of capitalism, he says, and hence, Jews have been successful carriers
of capitalism. 13
Buddhism, on the other hand, is the opposite sort of religion. It is a religion of
conviction oriented to salvation and generally hostile to the world. Life is viewed by the
followers of Theravada Buddhism as having little significance in its own right; they seek
inner repose, not “good deeds.” Weber would find that Buddhism is based on ritual
ceremonies of mysticism with an aim of seeking salvation through “incarnating the
supra-sensible being.” 14
He would add that Buddhism is the archetype of a religion of other-worldly mysticism,
while Judaism is inner-worldly and ascetic. Western man seeks to justify himself before
God. Eastern man, on the other hand, looks to understand the “meaning” of the world.
And unlike Judaism and Protestantism, Buddhism has “had to reintroduce cults of
saints, heroes, or functional gods in order to accommodate itself to the needs of the
masses.” That is, while Buddhism has its Bodhisattvas, Judaism has no little Moseses.
What is more, we might note, there is no supernatural being, no God, in Buddhism.
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Finally, in India, the parallel to Jewish civilization might be found among merchants
who are of the Parsi community or who are Jains, but not the Buddhists.
So must Ben Gurion’s comparison and finding of similarity falter? I think not. A more
refined glance into Judaism and Buddhism could begin by observing that parallels ought
to be drawn between Buddhism and Judaism from a civilizational perspective, as what
Weber called “leagues with a common cult,” rather than as simply religions. These are
not religions such as Calvinism and Lutheranism, sprouting from the same general
garden, now growing on their own. They are instead constituent elements of separate
civilizations.
Hinduism, as we know, developed as early as Mohenjo-Daro and the Harappan culture.
We believe that Shiva, followed by Agni, Indra and Varuna, may have been worshipped
as far back as 2500 B.C. As a report by the Indologist John Grayzel indicates elsewhere
in this issue, the Indo-European Aryans took control of the subcontinent, suppressing
the Dravidians, who had a superior culture. It was during this process that they wrote
the Vedas, the sacred works of the Hindu faith. There followed the Brahmanas, the
Upanishads, the Mahabharata, and the Ramayana.
Buddhism began as a revolt, a breakthrough, against the priests and the rituals which the
Hindu culture had developed. As one author has put it:
…it is too often not understood that the distinction between Buddhism and Hinduism
was, fundamentally, in India at least, only sectarian. Some of the basic ideas of
Hinduism were accepted by this reform movement, such as maya (illusion), rebirth, etc.,
and the Buddha was regarded as a Hindu saint. 15

Although Weber saw Buddhism as one of the world’s great civilization-religions, the
Buddhism of East and Southeast Asia is not the Buddhism of Gautama, the Buddha.
Buddhism became, over the centuries and across wide geographic regions, in Weber’s
terms, both a heterodox “sect” and a “church.” One could maintain that it was a sect
which, especially with its establishment under Asoka, became a church.
Judaism has to be seen in a similar light. Given its religious unity by Moses after the
flight from Egyptian slavery, Judaism was for centuries a priestly-run religion of the
Hebrew people in Palestine. Weber, in Ancient Judaism, chronicles the development of
the tribes into a nation; originally a tribal confederacy following the commands of a war
god, the Jewish nation gradually developed cities, aristocratic and intellectual elites,
social classes and social problems, Weber writes. But, he notes, they did not develop
what we would call today Oriental Despotism.
Prophets arose, claiming to communicate directly with God, in solitude, challenging the
authorities. Unlike the religious, “church” specialists, the Levites, the prophets were
freewheeling. The resulting demystified, rationalized civilization of the Jews saw the
proliferation of sects.
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So, from a Weberian perspective, I believe, Judaism and Buddhism were not parallel
civilizations at their respective inception periods. Judaism in ancient days more closely
paralleled Hinduism. With the rise of sects centering on the later prophets, the Essenes
and others whose writings we know of from the Dead Sea scrolls, with the Pharisees (as
opposed to the Sadducees), we see parallels emerging to the Buddhism of Theravada
days. And Buddhism of the popular acceptance becomes parallel to Judaism because it,
too, becomes a consciousness, a civilization of its own.
Further, even though clearly Judaism and Hinduism do provide the most obvious
civilizational parallels, yet “sect” Judaism is to Theravada Buddhism as ancient
“church” Judaism is to Mahayana “church” Buddhism. Of course, this is a non-historic
comparison, since Theravada arose first, while Jewish sects did not. To arrive at our
conclusion, we must break down Buddhism into pre-Asoka “cult” Theravada; postAsoka “church” Theravada; and “exilic” “church” Mahayana, now “church” Buddhism.
Then the parallels become more obvious.
Now we can find emerging and enormous parallels between Buddhism and Judaism.
The social settings of the two faiths are clearly similar. Heterodoxy flourished as
Buddhism appeared, as the Upanishad sages were teaching Vedic values and while there
was a revolt underway by non-Vedic teachers. The old tribal structure was
disintegrating, small regional kingdoms were appearing and there arose other types of
small units which preserved some of the tribal structures and are generally referred to as
“republics.” 16
This setting is analogous to developments in what Weber called the “Syrian-Palestinian
mountainland,” exposed as it was by turns to Mesopotamian and to Egyptian
influences. 17 As Weber writes, “because the nature of military and administrative
technology of the time precluded it, before the seventeenth century, B.C., a lasting
political conquest was impossible for either of the great cultural centers.” 18 Diplomatic
and commercial relations occurred with neighbors, the intellectual influence from the
cultures affected the region, and the ties with Mesopotamia remained even during
periods of Egyptian domination.
To Weber new religious conceptions rarely originate in the respective centers of rational
culture. 19 Perry Anderson, the English Marxist, pointed out that England never
developed a vibrant sociology because there was no interlacing of civilizations, no
cross-cultural fertilization, while the reverse was true for the Western European
continent. So, too, I believe that it can be shown that the civilizations of Buddhism and
Ancient Judaism both sprang from fertile, cross-cultural bases. Both grew out of areas
seething in inter-civilizational conflicts in Uttar Pradesh and Palestine, unlike
Confucianism of the later Chou period, which had developed only after internal wars
ceased, or Zoroastrianism. 20 It can clearly be argued that the increasing formation of
“sects” in ancient Israel and in the land of Buddhism’s origins relates to the continuous
cross-cultural fertilization of Palestine and Southeast Asia.
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In addition, both Buddhism and Judaism developed in a clan, “sib” setting. Again,
Weber notes that in India “not only the formation of castes, but the heightened
significance of the sib belongs to the fundamental traits of Indian society; the Hindu
social order, to a larger extent than anywhere else in the world, is organized in terms of
clan charisma.” 21
Meanwhile, amidst the confederacy of ancient Israel, which had no really permanent
political institution, social life centered on the interrelationships of the tribes and the
lack of even religious cohesion. Thus, quoting Stade, Weber says that “the tribal tattoo
of the Kenites was no mere tribal badge but rather a primary sign of the cult community.
The Indian badges of sect would represent the analogous phenomena.” 22
During the period of Buddhist ascendancy in India, interestingly, merchants prospered.
The republics existed across northern India. Whatever the real importance of these
republics, it is clear that Buddhist periods and areas of rule in India saw far less of what
Wittfogel would call “hydraulic” Oriental Despotism -- overweening governmental,
bureaucratic interference with daily life -- than was the case under early Hinduism.
Clearly, the social import of the republics parallels that of the clan arrangements of
Jewish-occupied Palestine. 23
Additionally, both Judaism and Buddhism began in a foreign religious setting. Both
arose at one moment with a “personal call” being felt by a prophet, not a priest. Both
founders began religions in which the focus was to be on their doctrine, not on their
person, as would be the case with religions founded by Jesus, Mohammed and
Zoroaster. Moreover, both Moses, the prince of Egypt, and Buddha, noble son of a
Kshatriya chief of a hill tribe, the Shakyas, were from privileged backgrounds. Yet both
called for a break with the established order, giving the opportunity for a religious and
cultural breakthrough. Both exerted power simply by virtue of personal gifts. Unlike
the magician, the prophet claims definite revelation, and the core of both of these men’s
doctrines was non-magical.
Furthermore, both Buddha and Moses got inspiration by retreating into solitary
meditation, away from their people. Both men left permanently the background in
which they had grown up. Both received their mission from no human agency, but
rather seized it. Both were to use Weberian terms, aisymnetes, which is to say,
personages who, in the given case, were assigned the responsibility of systematically
codifying or reconstituting the law. Buddha, unlike Hindu reformers of religion like
Shankar or Ramanuja, was a genuine prophet; the others did not claim to be offering
substantively new revelations or speaking in the name of a special divine injunction.
Another religious parallel can be found in the attitude toward death. There is no eternal
life in either faith nor is there compensation in the hereafter, which is found in both
Egyptian and Zoroastrian religions. And, as Weber points out, “the conflict between the
social claims based on God’s promises and the actual conditions of dishonor among
which Jews lived precluded any possibility for finding ease in this life.” 24 What could
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol66/iss66/20
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be closer to Buddhism?
One can argue that Nirvana, the “blowing out” of the
Buddhists, and the “dust to dust, ashes to ashes” of the Jewish belief are, in practical
terms, similar. And you can compare the Buddhist theodicy of life as “meaning” over
the long haul, becoming part of Nirvana, with the Jewish theodicy of a messianic age for
all men. In general, we can argue that the consciousnesses of Buddhism and Judaism
were both more rationalistic and liberal than would have been expected from the
environments that nurtured them.
There are many other points which could be examined and argued. For example,
consider the constitution of the Buddhist order, in which each monastery is virtually a
law unto itself, deciding major issues after free discussion amongst assembled monks;
this implies a democracy. That does not differ greatly from Judaism, which has no
religious hierarchy; anyone may be called to the Torah to read. Both stand for equality
and both reject both religious and secular structures of inequality. Intellectuals and
teachers, writers and thinkers, artists and those who create or advance high culture are
valued in Judaism and in Buddhism. Both religions early on did away with the magical
forces predominant in their mother cultures.
But I would like to conclude by asking whether or not the Jews and the Buddhists share
the special distinction of being “pariah” civilizations. To Weber, a pariah people are “a
distinctive hereditary social group lacking autonomous political organization and
characterized by prohibitions against commensality and intermarriage originally
founded upon magic, tabooistic, and ritual injunctions.” Two additional traits are
political and social disprivilege and a far-reaching distinctiveness in economic
functioning. 25
For Weber the Jews are the pariah people par excellence. Buddhism, particularly in its
Theravada form, would appear to meet few of the conditions Weber set forth.
Nevertheless, if we refine the definition a bit, we will see that both religions are
cosmopolitan, international and for the most part they have been wandering for centuries
from their homeland. A few Jews lived on in Palestine, and some Buddhists held on in
India.
Mainly, however, the religions were practiced by ideological descendants of the
founders, far afield from where the prophetic pronouncements had been made. Both
were carried by essentially urban practitioners on their home territory, Palestine or
India, during their heyday; it was therefore more likely that they could migrate. Both
were religions in which intellectuals played the significant role. And both had been at
one time official state religions, “churches,” with developed philosophies of moral
meaning and theodicy, which subsequently lost their official status in their home
territory. Today, Jews are considered pariahs by millions, if not billions, of people in
this world; many Buddhists, especially the Tibetan Buddhists, are similarly pariahs.
Even given great differences between the two, it is remarkable that both, two great
world religious civilizations, wandered. They were for a period of time integral parts of
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2012
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and then were separated from their homelands – a place where they had gone from
outsider status to establishment status and back to outsider status once again. After Bar
Kokhba, the vast majority of Jews who lived resided outside of the Holy Land
altogether; they were forbidden by law from entering large tracts of Judea and their
capital city’s name was changed completed, Judaism expurgated. After the Maurya
Dynasty terminated, Buddhism developed elsewhere into a great world religion. But
although it grew in many countries, its presence in India diminished and almost totally
disappeared. While force of ejection was not overwhelming in Buddhism’s case, as it
was in the Jewish instance, the final result (until the recreation of Israel in 1948) was
more or less the same.
Overall, I think that Ben Gurion was on to something. It is not surprising that trips to
spiritual India have now replaced visits to America as a designation of choice for young
Israelis who have completed their military obligations. Nor is it surprising that the Dalai
Lama finds tremendous popularity today in Israel and Buddhism is filled with Jewish
practitioners. One could predict safely that these two ancient religious civilizations,
given their common origins in Prophetic leadership, will continue to find common cause
in a world where evidently priests, and not ethics, “churches” and not “sects”, law and
not innovation, permanent and not mobile, seem to be relatively more popular among
politicians and publics worldwide.
Joseph Drew
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What is the Difference between Culture and Civilization?
Two Hundred Fifty Years of Confusion
Thorsten Botz-Bornstein

thorstenbotz@hotmail.com
Abstract: The distinction between culture and civilization is not well embedded in the
English language but has remained relatively meaningful in both other European and
non-European languages. Edward B. Tylor designed an idea of civilization that covers
both culture and civilization. Similar attempts had been made in late 18th Century
Germany. Though it is sometimes stated that Tylor’s relativist concept of culture harks
back to Herder, the latter’s cultural relativism differs from Tylor’s civilizational
relativism. Tylor’s holistic definition of civilization-culture has created an amount of
confusion that can still be felt today.
European totalitarianism is often called “civilization” because many people would work
in the service of an expansionist tendency of colonizing groups. On the other hand,
European racism, such as that which occurred in 20th Century Germany, profited from
the creation of a totally mystical culture that included a pseudo-biological notion in the
concept of culture (Master Race). This component had not been present in the
Enlightenment or in Herder’s Counter-Enlightenment discourses.
Civilization-based racism thrived not only in the colonies but also in the United States,
where Beard’s purist and radically culture-less idea of civilization could create a
suitable background. In Nazi Germany, anti-Jewish racism was based on a naturalized
idea of culture; in European colonies and in the United States, anti-black racism was
based on the idea that Black people are unable to attain civilization by nature.
Introduction
The distinction between culture and civilization is not well embedded in the English
language, but has remained relatively meaningful in other European and in nonEuropean languages which adopted these concepts from French and German scholars. In
the English-speaking world, a century-old confusing play of name switching and
revisions has made the distinction between culture and civilization difficult. The
fogginess of the distinction has been reinforced when powerful streams of Englishspeaking anthropologists suggested that both concepts are identical.
“Culture” (from Latin cultura) is the older term and corresponds to the Latin form also
in its content; the term civilization (from Latin civis) was coined later, in 18th Century
France and later also in England. However, German scholars preferred culture, with its
complex of meanings. One can draw a more or less distinctive line between civilization
and culture by stating that the former refers more to material, technical, economic, and
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol66/iss66/20
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social facts while the latter refers to spiritual, intellectual and artistic phenomena. The
German usage of Zivilisation has always alluded to a utilitarian, outer aspect of human
existence subordinated to Kultur, which was perceived as the “real” essence of humans,
society, and their achievements.
Unfortunately, things are not always that simple because there are cases where the two
notions are not clearly distinguished. For example, both culture and civilization can be
applied for analyses of religions. Another example is one of the most famous critiques
of civilization, Freud’s Unbehagen in der Kultur, which uses the word culture, although
Freud clearly means civilization. Consequently, the book has been translated into
English and into French as Civilization and its Discontents.
E. B. Tylor
In the English speaking world, the idea of civilization has developed autonomously,
without reference to the term culture. This is because of the particularity of British
anthropological approaches (strongly influenced by “Victorian evolutionists” and
Edward B. Tylor), which would find no useful applications for the German-French
distinction. Tylor’s notion of civilization covers both culture and civilization. It adds to
the confusion that Tylor, although defining civilization as more than culture, nonetheless
used both terms interchangeably.
Tylor abandoned the distinction between culture and civilization because the angle from
which he was looking at culture made this distinction unnecessary. His intention was to
examine social expressions that are measurable, such as customs. By declaring culture
to be “merely” civilization (though calling it culture), Tylor freed culture from its elitist
connotations through the work of his contemporary Matthew Arnold, who saw culture
as a high art inaccessible to “common people.” 1 This elitist stance had never been part
of the German concept of culture.
Tylor also wanted civilization to embrace those elements that the Germans would call
culture but would approach them in a way that make them measurable. In Primitive
Culture (1872), Tylor designs a comprehensive concept of culture-civilization as a
“complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, law, morals, custom, and any
other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society.” 2
Tylor’s holistic definition of civilization-culture has created an amount of confusion that
can still be felt today. Even extremely systematic works such as those of Kroeber and
Kluckhohn, who established six categories 3 and 161 separate definitions of culture,
could not do more than reinforce the chaotic perspective initiated by Tylor’s fusion of
culture and civilization.
Tylor “naturalized” culture by redefining it as a large pool of customs and skills in need
of systematization. That is, he redefined human history as a purely natural
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phenomenon, postulating that “history of mankind is part and parcel of the history of
nature, [and] that our thought, wills, and actions accord with laws as definite as those
which govern the motion of waves….” 4
Once the distinction between cultural and civilizational phenomena was removed, Tylor
could submit the description of civilization to scientific standards: “Thus, in examining
weapons, they are to be classed under spear, club, sling, bow and arrow, and so forth;
textile arts are to be ranged as matting, netting, and several grades of making and
weaving threads; myths are divided under such headings as myths of sunrise and sunset,
eclipse-myths, earthquake-myths, local myths….” 5
Whatever Tylor’s influences, his step is in keeping with a tendency inherent in
civilization itself, because civilization as a concept has always had an “expansive”
character. Norbert Elias found that civilization describes a process that refers to
something which is constantly in motion and is constantly moving forward. Civilization
is generalizing, and it plays down differences, which is one of the reasons why this
concept has been so successful since the Enlightenment. 6
Civilization works towards an increasing extension, referring to and denoting more and
more things. Furthermore, civilization is a convenient conceptual tool because its
abstract originality remains distinct and recognizable even when it is made to include a
large number of individual phenomena. Although Tylor’s civilization embraces all of
the world’s mechanical, scientific, and artistic achievements, his terminology remains
conceptually meaningful. This is not the case for culture, which fulfils the opposite
function because it delimits and exists only through this delimitation.
The definition of culture has an increasing intension as it depends on the concrete sense
or the connotation of phenomena. Allan Bloom holds that “there must be as many
different kinds of mind as there are cultures.” 7 Being the expression of a people’s
characteristics, the term culture is conceptually powerful only as long as it excludes
most phenomena from itself. Any extremely liberal idea of culture is useless. This is
why the definition of culture became increasingly narrow through history. The French
began to use the word culture as a synonym for everything that can be acquired through
education (manners, arts, and sciences, for example) and designed civilisation in more
and more general and supra-national terms, while the Germans cut it down to more
personal and individual expressions linked to art and philosophy.
The German notion of culture has been developed within a cultural context of political
fragmentation, where it would increasingly be used as an instrument to provide unity of
culture where no political unity existed. Culture is particularistic and “slow” as it
establishes differences between more or less stagnant phenomena that are not involved
in overly speedy developments. Its identity function would even be radicalized outside
the German borders. Petr Struve, a 19th- century Russian economist with Slavophile
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tendencies, selected the German word “Kultur” as one of the basic terms in his
analytical vocabulary. There it was supposed to signify “the conscious creation of an
environment assuring the individual’s and the society’s unrestrained search for
identity.” 8
Tylor’s original purpose had been to overcome the paradigm of culture as a “primitive”
phenomenon, as opposed to civilization as a more advanced stage of humanity. By
fusing culture and civilization, he sought to make culture more democratic. This
combated the elitist paradigm, but at the same time, he wiped out a dialectical tradition
as interesting as the one that evolved around the opposition of the Platonic and the
Aristotelian, or around Taoism and Confucianism.
After Tylor
In the English-speaking world, Tylor’s notion of civilization would be accepted as solid
enough for the study of “real” societies and his supposedly value-neutral, democratic
and relativist concept of culture became the standard in the social sciences. Although
Tylor had been inconsistent in his terminology, Bagby would state in the 1950s that
“after Tylor, ‘culture’ came to be the preferred word in America.” 9 Of course, one needs
to keep in mind that, from a non-Anglophone point of view, what Tylor meant was
rather civilization, even though cultural components were included.
Very often, Tylor’s concept would be radicalized in an American context by eliminating
all remnants of individual expressions that were still reminiscent of the older ideas of
culture. This was, of course, against Tylor’s initial intention, because he had sought to
improve the concept by making it broader. The historian and enthusiastic technologist
Charles Beard, in his Towards Civilization, castigates European aesthetes for stubbornly
refusing to recognize a fact that he deems self-evident: “What is called Western
Civilization, as distinguished from other cultures, is in reality a technological
civilization, resting at bottom on science and machinery.” 10
For Beard, civilization should be reduced to the fact that engineers provide the
necessary means to acquire consumer goods for the entire population. 11 Forty years after
Arnold’s outbursts against philistine reductions of civilization, Beard offers the
materialist definition of civilization that Arnold had feared most. Never again would
civilization be defined in Beard’s radically materialist way.
The opposition of culture and civilization would flare up in the context of Lévi-Strauss’
anthropology (1949), where it gained another dimension. Lévi-Strauss identifies
civilization with modern societies distinguished by tensions and social conflicts, which
he contrasts with cultures in the sense of “primitive” societies, which, from a modern
point of view, are “settled” as they lack both history and progress. This distinction
became important for most French anthropologists.
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Apocalyptic accounts of modern civilization were soon to come, most famously
delivered in the 1960s by Jacques Ellul, who criticized modern civilization as being
determined by a reductive concept of technique and industrialization: “Death,
procreation, birth – all must submit to technical efficiency and systematization.”12
Civilization as technique is due to “a coupling of rationalistic thinking, [of] one
particular mythic model of the scientific method, and a specific cultural value of
efficiency.”
Retrospectively, the American contrast between culture and civilization, as it had been
constructed by Beard, might look like a debate opposing the culture of Old Europe to
the civilization of the New World. In the late 1920s and 1930s, many traditional
humanists would see American civilization, with its mass-culture, hedonism, and
technology, as the collapse of “Western” traditional values. 13
The “Continental depth” sought by many Americans in the past, including “obscure
longings and search for the elusive grounds of all things,” 14 was part of the discourse
opposing culture to civilization. In the end, however, also in America, purely materialist
definitions would not catch on, because the complete withdrawal of culture in favor of
technological civilization appears to be artificial. The 1960 Sourcebook Introduction to
Contemporary Civilization in the West 15 does not only mention historical and
economical facts, but also the history of philosophy and the arts – and this has become
the standard.
For some time, one felt the necessity to disguise, in the historical sciences, culture
“under other names, such as ‘currents of ideas’, ‘customs’, mores, values, national
character, local color, Geist and even sometimes Volk.” 16 This means that in the postTylorian world that Bagby describes, culture remains distinguished from civilization.
The problem is that it is not distinguished clearly enough and everyday language
maintains a blurred awareness of overlaps and interferences of culture and civilization.
Tylor’s broad view can be detected today in the most abstract definitions of culture, for
example, in the recent offering by the Chinese anthropologist Godwin C. Chu, who in
his work on Chinese political culture defines culture “conceptually as consisting of the
self’s relationship with (1) significant others in his/her life; (2) the material world within
which those significant others play an indispensable role; and (3) the values, beliefs and
attitudes that govern both.” 17
In general, the most purist definitions of civilization would survive in anthropology
because there, civilization continues to have a central position. American anthropology
remains the discipline most determined by a positivist methodology that spawns
mechanical models of civilization sometimes tuned with Darwinian ideas of evolution.
Suffering a brief lull during the temporary dominance of Franz Boas’ empiricist
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anthropology, evolutionism would be resurrected around 1940. Since then, attempts to
formulate rival anthropological, historical, or philosophical camps that continued
particularistic, value- and ideas-oriented traditions in the humanities have often been
fought off by mainstream science.
The main cause of the false dichotomy that opposes “evolution” to “relativism” or to
“historical particularism” (the latter most often ascribed to Franz Boas and his disciples)
is the failure to distinguish between culture and civilization. In reality there is no reason
to suppose that absolute empiricism (avoiding value statements by definition), and a
theory of evolution that establishes civilization in terms of “bad, better, best,” are the
only options.
Particularists are right in saying that culture cannot be reduced to chemical or
mathematical formulae or forced into the straitjacket of general theories; however, they
fail to see that culture is an element that communicates with civilization. It is absurd to
reduce culture to a random accumulation of customs, skills, and information transmitted
in social groupings independent of any and all extraneous variables. But it is equally
absurd to measure culture with the progressive yardsticks of civilization.
Tylor was right in saying that civilization has been a “gradual development from an
earlier, simpler, and ruder state of life;” but even within such an evolutionary scheme,
intentional structures of culture can subsist. There is simply no reason to replace all
those intensional structures with extentional structures of civilization. Culture is too
close to art: it is without purpose, playful, and inward-turned, and it constantly develops
its own standards.
It might be possible to trace Western music from Gregorian chants to Bach, Haydn,
Mozart, and Bartok in an upward movement of evolution disclosing increasing
sophistication. However, any statement that holds that Haydn’s music is “better” than
Bach’s misses the point. Is Haydn more creative, more sensitive or more profound than
Bach? At some point comparisons become meaningless. It is also true that Ernst
Gombrich has traced art’s evolution “upward” starting with schematic primitivism
typical of non-western cultures. Still it is possible to admire “less evolved” art in its own
right.
Civilization, on the other hand, often does manifest evolutionary advancements from
inferior structures to more modern ones. Relativism provides the right perspective on
both primitive and elitist culture. On the one hand, there is no need to praise
primitivism. On the other hand, skepticism towards evolution in culture is also
reasonable. This skepticism is evinced through culturist, relativist, and particularist
stances. The resulting ironical attitude, ambiguity - as well as the metaphoric
displacement of signification - often results from a simultaneous apprehension of culture
and civilization. Postmodernism does certainly owe a lot to this constellation.
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The same goes for another relativism that establishes culture as a quality emptied of any
essence: such as “the drug culture, the rock culture [or] the street-gang culture.” 18 This
cultural relativism has been found in Stuart Hall’s cultural materialism concentrating on
working class or youth culture. It has been taken up by cultural studies ever since.
However, even if one dislikes this, there is no reason to suppose that the only alternative
is a cultural elitism à la Matthew Arnold. Again, the false dichotomy flows out of the
neglect of the distinction between culture and civilization. Norbert Elias, for example,
believed that culture can very well belong to class and that, at the same time, all citizens
of a country do share the same civilization.
Samuel Huntington attempted to talk away, on three pages of his The Clash of
Civilizations, the distinction between culture and civilization by insisting that “the
efforts to distinguish culture and civilization … have not caught on, and, outside
Germany, there is overwhelming agreement … that it is delusory to wish in the German
way to separate culture from its foundation civilization.” 19
Without mentioning Tylor, Huntington adheres to the latter’s idea of civilization as “a
culture writ large” (ibid) and generalizes this concept even further in order to define it as
a worldview of a particular people. Throughout the book Huntington uses civilization as
if he were writing about culture (e.g. “Italian civilization”). Huntington produces brief
quotes from Wallerstein, Dawson, Mauss, Durkheim and even Braudel and Spengler
(the latter two entirely out of context) in order to reestablish a Tylorian anti-elitist idea
of civilization. Still, put into the context of his own discussion, Huntington’s casual
dismissal of the conceptual value of a “German” idea of culture appears as extremely
strange when considering that the culture-civilization distinction remains of utmost
importance in contemporary, not only German, debates on globalization and
modernization.
In 1961, Paul Ricœur launched a debate on the cross fertilization between rooted culture
and universal civilization, 20 pointing to ideas of regionalism that would become eminent
in the future. Since then, the culture-civilization debate has become important in the
context of postmodern situations of fragmentation. Ibrahim Abu-Rabi, in his study of
Middle Eastern political culture, for example, points to the “frequently expressed view
that there is an Islamic civilization and not just culture or cultures” in the modern
Muslim world. According to him, “the political and economic elite in the Arab or
Muslim worlds, regardless of their culture, are true participants in the civilization of
capitalism. True, there is an Arab or Muslim culture, but it is currently dominated by the
larger capitalist civilization.” 21 Abu-Rabi claims that because the Muslim world has
failed to develop its capitalist system in the modern period and has become dependent
on the world capitalist system, “the Muslim world has culture but lacks civilization.”22
Just like Elias, Abu-Rabi perceives civilization as a progressive development of
humanity to which he opposes culture as a national form of self-consciousness. Also,
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Terry Eagleton takes the culture-civilization distinction for granted, especially when it
comes to a characterization of the global situation: “The line runs between civilization
(in the sense of universality, autonomy, individuality, rational speculation, etc.) and
culture if we understand by this all those unreflected loyalties and spontaneous
convictions.” 23
Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment
When Tylor decided to define culture in terms of civilization, more or less positivistic
definitions of civilization were not new. Similar attempts had been made in late 18th
Century Germany by Johan Christoph Adelung and Gustav Klemm (1843-52) in his
massive Allgemeine Kulturgeschichte der Menschheit. He suggests an idea of culture as
a complex of beliefs and customs had been Tylor’s inspirational source. 24 Here culture
gains for the first time the status of a normative concept. As a matter of fact, all these
positivistic approaches continue central ideas from the Enlightenment.
Denis Diderot had insisted in his Le neveu de Rameau (written in 1760, although not
published during his lifetime) that “civilization” and not culture is the counterpart of
nature, and that civilization had made possible the progress that characterizes European
culture. This comes indeed very close to Beard’s much later ideas. Enlightenment
defines civilization as perfection, progress, style, and refinement. However, it is against
these optimistic and conquering connotations that many French and German authors felt
the need to oppose culture as a concept able to grasp more “inward” turned values like
soul and spirit.
Norbert Elias mentions Kant’s discursive remark in the Idea on a Universal History
from the Point of view of Cosmopolitanism (1784) where Kant describes the difference
between culture and civilization as that between deceptive and external “courtesy” and
true “virtue.” 25 Looking closer, we see that Kant identifies exactly this virtuous, anticivilizational value as culture:
We are civilized – perhaps too much for our own good – in all sorts of social grace and
decorum. But to consider ourselves as having reached morality – for that, much is
lacking. The ideal of morality belongs to culture; its use for some simulacrum of
morality in the love of honor and outward decorum constitutes mere civilization.26

Kant is the first philosopher to use “culture” in the modern sense. 27 Of course, Kant’s
approach echoes Rousseau’s distinction between civilizational values such as politeness,
decorum, fashion, and ceremony and nature. In his Discours sur les arts et les sciences
(1750), Rousseau (who never uses the word civilization) regrets that “there governs in
our customs a vile and deceptive uniformity and all minds seem to be thrown into the
same mold. Politics requires constantly that we follow the rules of polite society;
constantly we follow customs but never our own spirit.” 28
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Rousseau’s rejection of civilization was eccentric during his time (although it was
preceded by Giambattista Vico), but it represented a reaction against the current French
idea of civilization as a progressive, measurable, cumulative human achievement able to
accomplish the project of Enlightenment. Strangely, Rousseau does not name his
alternative, anti-civilizational model “culture” (as does Kant), but “nature.”
In intellectual history, the echoes of this culture/nature impulse will reverberate for a
long time. One generation after Rousseau, Fichte and Schiller (the latter in his Aesthetic
Education) “change culture from denoting something [that is] antithetical to nature to
what could restore us.” 29 Allan Bloom has noted that the “interesting response to the
nature-society tension,” which is much more fertile than the return to, or nostalgia for,
nature, can be summed up by the word “culture.” Bloom finds that this idea of culture
“is almost never used pejoratively, as are “society,” “state,” “nation,” or even
‘”civilization.” … Culture restores the lost wholeness of first man on a higher level,
where his faculties can be fully developed without contradiction between the desires of
nature and the moral imperatives of his social life.” 30
Further echoes of a civilization-nature opposition (in which confusions about nature and
culture are implicit) can be perceived in Freud’s criticisms of civilization. Also this
criticism can be seen as a sequel of the Counter-Enlightenment movement. Freud, who
obstinately refused to distinguish between culture and civilization, believed that “every
individual is virtually an enemy of civilization.” Every individual must feel “as a heavy
burden the sacrifices which civilization expects of them in order to make a communal
life possible.” 31 For Freud, civilization is built up on coercion and renunciation of
instinct as it is imposed on a resisting majority by a minority:
If [civilization] has succeeded in making the majority of mankind happy, in comforting
them, in reconciling them to life and in making them into vehicles of civilization, no one
would dream to alter the existing conditions. But what do we see instead? We see that an
appalling large number of people are dissatisfied with civilization and unhappy in it, and
feel it as a yoke that must be shaken off; and that these people either do everything in their
power to change that civilization, or else go so far in their hostility to it that they will have
nothing to do with civilization or with a restriction of instinct. 32

Despite his refusal to effectuate a final distinction between culture and civilization,
Freud admits the existence of a “back to nature” impulse able to oppose the alienating
power of civilization. And this impulse functions through art and culture: “As we
discovered long since, art offers substitutive satisfactions for the oldest and still most
deeply felt cultural renunciations, and for that reason it serves as nothing else than to
reconcile a man to the sacrifices he has made on behalf of civilization.” 33 Despite
Freud’s inconsistent switching between the terms civilization and culture, in this
particular case it is clear that culture (in the form of art) is supposed to represent an
ersatz for nature. Religious consolation has the same function though religion is also –
rather confusingly – part of the package of a civilizing process.
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In Rousseau’s and Kant’s time, the search for and refinement of the concept of culture
was accelerated by the contemporary need to find a substitute for waning religious
vigor. After the French Revolution, civilization would indeed be sacralized by
Condorcet, Michelet, and Victor Hugo. 34 Here France would submit to the influence of
the German notion of Kultur as something intimate, local and personal (the French word
“culture” is since then marked off by this meaning).
In Germany, Johann Gottfried Herder, who is sometimes referred to as a representative
of Counter-Enlightenment, opposed all generalizing forces of civilization. In his Yet
another Philosophy of History for the Purpose of Educating Mankind (1774), Herder
makes the distinction between culture and civilization very explicit by equating
civilization with the most alienating forms of industrialization. Some of his most
radically relativistic eulogies of supposedly “dark” and uncivilized phases of mankind
represent the pinnacles of the German anti-civilizational agenda:
What has become of those virtues and dispositions to honor and freedom, love and
courage, courtesy and word of honor? We have become shallow and barren and are
building on sand! However this may be, give us our piety and superstition, your darkness
and your ignorance, your turmoil and crudeness and, in exchange, take out “light” and
skepticism, our frigidity and elegance, our philosophical enervation and our human
misery. 35

Most famously, Herder postulated that “every nation has its center of happiness within
itself” 36 and that it is not “up to us to be their judge, to evaluate or condemn their
customs by our own standards.” 37 This anticipates the culturist, relativist, and
particularist stances of Boas and his school. And Emerson, in his essay on culture and
civilization, rephrases the same thought as such: “Each nation grows after its own
genius, and has a civilization of its own.” 38
Although it is sometimes stated that Tylor’s relativist concept of culture harks back to
Herder, 39 in reality both authors are opposed to each other. Herder’s cultural relativism
is incompatible with Tylor’s civilizational and analytical relativism that remains
strongly embedded in a value-neutral anthropology. Herder believed, just as did Tylor,
that a particular way of life (through which are implemented certain meanings and
values) is manifest not only in art (most broadly construed) and scholarly productions,
but also in the ordinary behavior of people as well as in their institutional achievements.
Therefore, Herder’s view of culture must be seen as foundational for a scientifically
minded cultural anthropology distinct from classical, “aesthetic” philosophies of which
Arnold is the most lucid representative. 40
The difference between Herder and Tylor is anchored in both authors’ relationship with
culture and civilization. Tylor had declared that all cultures are the same because they
are not more than civilizations whereas Herder held that every culture is different and
that we should not judge any culture by using a common civilizational standard. The
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only points that both thinkers have in common is, apart from being opposed to
Arnoldian “elitist” or “culturalist” definitions of culture, their affirmation that culture
cannot be found only in Western civilizations.
Around 1880, a consistent opposition of civilization and culture was firmly established
in German philosophy. However, it was also at that time that the opposition begins to
lose its distinctive rigor. Nietzsche took over from his philosophical predecessors the
idea of culture but he saw it more as a general “framework within which to account for
what is specifically human in man.” 41
German Romanticism developed an idealist notion of Kultur as something “foggy,”
ungraspable, or “dreamy” (reinforced on the French side through the writings of Mme
de Staël), while in France, the term civilisation would adopt more and more general and
supra-national connotations. Culture becomes a mystic entity evoking soul, freedom,
and art. Following earlier strains initiated by Vico and Rousseau, civilization was
classified by Nietzsche and also by Max Weber as moral decay.
The German Notion of Culture
During the First World War, while the French interpreted civilization in an increasingly
supra-national sense, Germans begin to see “culture” more and more as an expression of
their national spirit. The use of culture for this purpose was not random but was
inscribed in the historical profile attached to the term culture. While the French began to
use the word culture as a synonym for everything that can be acquired through
education, the Germans cut down “culture” to more personal and individual expressions
linked to art and philosophy. In the long run, the involvement of “culture” in
nationalism would become unavoidable.
In 1920, Thomas Mann defines culture as “national” and civilization as “the liquidation
of nationalism” 42 making the distinction between culture and civilization coincide with
the differences between German and French/English national characteristics. Here is
what follows from some pages of his text, which he provocatively entitles
“Considerations of an Unpolitical Man:”
Germany
Culture
Art is poetry and music
Protestantism
Burgher
National
Pessimism
Life
Irony
Reverence

France and Britain
Civilization
Art is literature and prose
Universalism
Bourgeois
Feeling humanitarianism
Progressivism
Society
Radicalism
Enlightenment
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Inwardness
People
Aristocracy
Ethics

21

France and Britain
Reason
Class and mass
Democracy
Politics

A Romantic stance that sees everything “official” as challenged by the power of the
intellect leads Mann, to the opposition of the intellect and politics, which overlaps, once
again, with the difference between culture and civilization: “The difference between
intellect and politics includes that of culture and civilization, of soul and society, of
freedom and voting rights, of art, and literature; and German tradition is culture, soul,
freedom, art and not civilization, society, voting rights and literature.” 43 The result is the
opposition of democratic universalism of civilization vs. cultural particularism.
While the English and the French participated in a competition about “who has the best
civilization,” which spurred both participants to reach higher levels of refinement,
Germans saw no reason to join this race because their concept of culture as something
purely subjective and unique made such competitions redundant by definition. Ever
since Germany was invaded by Louis XIV and by Napoleon, it fully recognized the
value of French civilization but perceived it as alien and incompatible with German
Kultur.
For Mann, culture included everything German, especially music, the interest in morals
and “inner experience,” while civilization is represented by what is typically French,
that is, political thought and a pronounced interest in social problems. German culture
needed to be protected from civilization otherwise democratic enlightenment and
bourgeois rhetoric would dissolve the German spirit of culture. This is why Richard
Wagner once declared that “civilization disappears before music, like mist before the
sun.” 44
It remains to say that in a global context, the French-German civilization-culture
distinction can sometimes be foisted on a model that opposes America to Europe. As
Bloom has noted, “a phenomenon such as Wagner’s Gesamtkunstwerk, a high work of
art which is meant to be wholly German, of Germans and by Germans, and is an
expression of collective consciousness, in inconceivable to Americans.” 45 For
Americans, civilization is general and Dante, Shakespeare, and Goethe belong to
everyone. The mentioned political fragmentation of Germany, on the other hand, had
asked for definitions of national identities.
Oswald Spengler
Shortly before the Nazi debacle, the culture vs. civilization discussion was reopened by
Oswald Spengler who often reflected upon the difference between “inward turned
cultural energy” and “outward turned civilizational exposure.” 46 On the one hand,
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Spengler’s ideas were in the air as they fit well into an era of emerging grand narratives
of civilization. It is also true that Spengler’s critique of civilization is interesting if read
as a critique of a fake, “civilizational” reality that we can penetrate only through
constant questioning. This reading makes his book very contemporary.
On the other hand, Spengler uses a great deal of Tönniesian communitarian thought that
had perhaps been valued for the last time a century earlier by the Slavophiles.
Spengler’s strongly identitarian discourse seems to be strangely out of touch with the
modern environment within which he was writing. At first sight, Spengler seems to take
over the civilization-culture distinction current since Rousseau, Kant, and Herder,
propagating a culturalist approach that speaks up against modernization. His conclusion
that civilization is “imperialism unadulterated” overlaps with Norbert Elias’s insights
and sounds neither politically incorrect nor eccentric.
A reading of ten pages in Spengler’s The Decline of the Occident, in which the author
develops the difference between culture and civilization, yields a pattern that plays out
modernity against tradition in a fashion similar to Pan-Slavism, Pan-Asianism and other
contemporary conservative political movements. Largely, Spengler suggests the
following oppositions:
Culture
Home
Reverence for tradition and age
The older religion of the heart
Natural
Fruitful earth and primitive values
Folk
Primitive instincts and conditions

Civilization
The world city
Cold matter-of-fact attitude
Scientific irreligion
Heart-earned rights
Money as an inorganic and abstract magnitude
Mass
Wage disputes and football-grounds

Despite the fact that some of the scheme’s points might have already appeared at
Spengler’s time as a consecution of platitudes, it cannot be denied that Spengler also
added something new to the culture-civilization bipartition. He described world history
as a necessary development from culture to civilization. Within this system, civilization
is seen as decadent and as representing the last phase of culture. For Spengler, passing
from culture to civilization means to pass from life to death.
According to him, “civilizations are the most external and artificial states of which a
species of developed humanity is capable. They are the conclusion, they are ‘the
inevitable destiny of culture.’” 47 No theory of civilization is more directly opposed to
Tylor’s evolutionary optimism than Spengler’s. Through an unexplainable mechanism,
the inward energy of culture will be directed towards the outward oriented civilization
from which it will evaporate into nothing: “Pure civilization, as a historical process,
consists in a progressive taking-down of forms that have become inorganic or dead.” 48
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Spengler explains that the transition from culture to civilization had been accomplished
for the classical world in the 4th century and for the Western world in the 19th century.
This is why we are now living at the age of civilization and why “Cecil Rhodes is the
first man of a new age.” 49 The enthusiasm for civilization that pops up in Spengler’s
book is only difficult to coordinate with his negative evaluation of civilization as such,
unless it will be interpreted as the fatalistic acceptance of decadence. This is how
Spengler views the relationship between culture and civilization:
Culture
Becoming
Life
Expansion
Natural
Internal
Organic
Creative
Genuine
Traditional
Concrete
Spontaneous
Warm
Community
Spiritual
Rooted

Civilization
Become
Death
Rigidity
Artificial
External
Mechanic
Rational
Fake
Modern
Abstract
Calculated
Cold
State
Material
Superficial

However, as if fighting off fatalism, Spengler does not hesitate to involve himself into
contradictions by attributing to cultures the capacity to resist civilizations. In the very
end, cultures turn out to be the stronger element. By depriving civilizations of their
dynamism and by condemning colonial empires to civilizational death, Spengler equips
cultures with a self-sufficient force that is more powerful than anything the decadent
world of civilization is able to offer. Civilizations die while cultures survive, although
on a modest level as a sort of “countercultures.” Spengler explains that this is the reason
why Europe still has “culture cities” like Florence, Nürnberg, Salamanca, Bruges and
Prague, which “manage to survive as provincial towns and continue their fight against
civilizational world cities.” 50
Spengler’s concrete choices when it comes to the fleshing out of his theory (cultural
Doric versus civilizational Gothic; Greek soul versus Roman intellect) have been
criticized as much as ridiculed. Still it must be pointed out that his nihilistic and
deterministic vision of human development puts civilization into a completely new light.
In the end, cultures are not condemned to degenerate into decadent civilizations, but are
able to lead a resistant underground existence.
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Totalitarian Notions of Civilization and Culture
European totalitarianism is frequently attributed to the often mentioned supra-national
connotation of the term “civilization,” because so often “civilization” could work to
promote an “expansionist tendency of colonizing groups.” 51 In the colonies, it was
believed that “if the Negro is not careful he will drink in all the poison of modern
civilization and die from the effects of it” (Marcus Garvey). 52 However, this is only true
for colonialism. Internal European racism such as that which occurred in 20th Century
Germany (a country with almost no colonies) profited, in the first place, from
glamorizing its own culture by inserting a biological component into the concept of
culture.
This component had not been present in the Enlightenment or in Herder’s CounterEnlightenment discourses, although one can detect its implicit presence when
considering the eminent parallelism that exists (since Rousseau and Kant) between the
concept of culture and nature. Spengler’s insistence on the identification of the cultural
with the natural, the organic, the genuine, and the concrete, to which he opposes an
“artificial” civilization, spells out what had been contained in German thought ever
since it had decided to see Zivilisation as the attribute of decadent aristocracy.
The culture of the “common people” was not only deemed to be more ethical but also
more natural. Utopian naturist movements that are typical for German culture have their
origin in the same philosophy. When civilization is declared to be “artificial” and
“unreal,” everything that is not civilization can be classified as either cultural or natural.
In an atmosphere of intellectual sloppiness, the two overlap. When this happens, culture
gets “naturalized.”
It is along these lines that the Nazi Kreisleiter (District Leader) of Innsbruck, Hans
Hanak, writes that culture “can’t be acquired by education. Culture is in the blood. The
best proof of this today is the Jews, who cannot do more than appropriate our
civilization but never our culture.” 53
Those who point to the cultural basis of racism and believe that civilization is the
remedy will be disappointed. Civilization-based racism thrived not only in European
colonies, but also in the United States where Beard’s purist and radically culture-less
idea of civilization could create a suitable background. In the end, Tylor’s culturecivilization scheme could not avoid the three cardinal beliefs of the 19th Century:
professionalism, racism, and the concept of progress. 54 Such civilization-based theories
of race would sometimes even be supported by African Americans, as demonstrated by
Jeffrey Louis Decker’s description of racist patterns in post-slavery America:
Without an Anglicized culture, it was understood that Africans also lacked the means for
racial uplift and were destined for extinction. Even black nationalists who advocated
separatism were usually staunch civilizationists. The key, as technocrat Booker T.
Washington understood it, was to imitate white institutions within the black community. 55
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The ideas of Washington’s rival, W.E.B. Du Bois, on the other hand, are “culturalist” as
they emphasize the importance of identity and the necessity of the “Conservation of
Races.” Du Bois spoke of an African American Volksgeist as the unique spiritual
message of race that can be detected with the help of human sciences (history and
sociology) and not the natural sciences. According to Du Bois, one “needs to invoke
‘subtle forces’ of history, law, habits of thought, the end of human striving, and religion
to account for the distinctive spiritual lives of racial groups.” 56
Conclusion
The distinction between civilization and culture has been subjected to various attacks for
more than 250 years. It remains relevant in a world where cultures (both local and
global), tradition, and modernity collide. In the past, most of the time, neither the
understanding of culture nor that of civilization could lead to a better understanding of
the other.
In Nazi Germany, anti-Jewish racism was based on a naturalized idea of culture; in
European colonies and in the United States, anti-black racism was based on the idea that
African Americans were unable to attain civilization by nature. Neither culture nor
civilization has been able to help overcome value-biased dismissals of that which is
foreign or which is simply different.
Idealized in isolation, both culture and civilization can even lead to totalitarianism
because, at bottom, both culture and civilization are highly egocentric terms. China
might have been proud of its 4000-year-old culture and “the West” might have been
proud of its civilization that embraces manners, technology and scientific knowledge.
However, in both cases what one called “culture” or “civilization” was only homemade.
The Chinese were well aware that Europeans had culture, but did not recognize them as
such because that culture was not Chinese. The West was informed of the Chinese level
of technology and science, but refused to consider these achievements as a form of
civilization equal to its own. Clashes of local cultures as well as invasive civilizations
should be re-thought by borrowing from the rich heritage that has reflected upon the
differences and interactions of culture and civilization.
In the contemporary world, culture and civilization are in conflict, which means
basically two things: First, Western and non-Western identity politics or even radical
religious movements (Islamic or Christian fundamentalism) claim to be predominantly
cultural in character and see as their enemies those who attempt to impose a universal or
alien civilization upon them. The deduction makes sense in its most basic terms because,
traditionally, culture or cultivation tended to be understood by Christian authors as
“worship” (Oxford English Dictionary).
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However, as the further historical development of culture and civilization has shown,
there is no culture without civilization. This is what must be held against those who are
culturalist in a fundamentalist sense.
Second, there are those who believe that mutual cultural understanding represents the
most efficient reconciliatory power able to establish continuities and stability and to
promote East-West understanding. These people are equally naïve because culture as a
locally lived experience is always mediated through civilization (otherwise it would be a
dead culture stuffed away in a museum or a theme park). In parallel, civilization in itself
is a purely abstract universal and becomes concrete only through cultural enactment.
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A New Orleans Connection: The Feibleman-Toynbee Interface
James B. Sullivan

James.Sullivan@utb.edu
Introduction
This essay shows how facets of James K. Feibleman’s (1904-1987) reciprocal
relationship with Arnold J. Toynbee (1889-1975) may have influenced each thinker in
their overlapping fields, respectively of philosophy and history. Toynbee remains a giant
among world historians, and thanks to his able biographer and fellow world historian,
William H. McNeill, his life and career are well known. By contrast, the American,
Feibleman, despite a mammoth bibliography, remains relatively unknown outside of the
states of America’s south and west.
Toynbee’s history made a major impact on Feibleman’s philosophy of culture, and there
is ample evidence that Feibleman, either individually or collectively with other critics,
made Toynbee reconsider his coverage of philosophy and science. In the final volume of
Toynbee’s mammoth A Study of History, entitled “Reconsiderations”, Feibleman is cited
over twenty-five times.
Background
Given the first encounter between these two, the probability of any ensuing relationship
seemed highly unlikely. When they first corresponded in 1939, Arnold J. Toynbee was
already a distinguished historian, but he had not achieved the reputation which would
follow full publication of his classic work. By contrast in 1934, when our story begins,
his early reader and future critic James K. Feibleman was a virtually unknown Southern
writer.
He was the scion of a New Orleans, German-Jewish immigrant family that sold their dry
goods emporium, “Feibleman’s House of Values” on Canal Street to Sears and Roebuck
for two and a half million dollars just before the Great Depression struck in 1929. After
graduating from Horace Mann preparatory school in New York City in 1924 and
spending an abbreviated year at the University of Virginia plagued by illness,
Feibleman’s formal education was over.
He then worked for his father for five years selling shirts. Now he had an almost
Aladdin-like opportunity to do whatever he wished, and he opened an office in
downtown New Orleans with the modest name plate: “James Feibleman: Poet,” sure to
keep solicitors away. 1

1

James K. Feibleman, The Way of a Man: An Autobiography (New York, 1969), 181.
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He had first begun his writing career as a youthful poet contributing poetry to a local
little magazine, The Double Dealer. His interests progressed to philosophy. Unable to
find an American publisher for his first book, he sought out one in London during a
vacation in Europe. Upon returning to America with a contract signed with Allen and
Unwin to publish Science and the Spirit of Man (1933), he received a letter from his cowriter Julius Friend, a fellow New Orleans business man and holder of a B.A. from
Yale. Their American book agent had released them from any legal commitment and
Friend condescendingly wrote,
Personally, Science and the Spirit of Man intrigues me as much as a bowl of black-eyed
peas, but these Allen and Unwin bimbos seem determined to write the title---apparently
with one eye on the religious caterpillars and another on the popular scientific audience,
the “Fun with Chemistry”---the homemade telescope boys. 2

This first book was a curious lament about the threat to traditional values posed by the
juggernaut of business, science and technology in the 1920s. Their sense of malaise did
not last long. There was little in that first youthful book that previewed what was to
come. Subsequently, tracing back the historical origins of modern business to
technology, the new writers finally arrived at the original fount in Greek science and
philosophy. They were also particularly influenced by the writings of the American
philosopher and physical scientist, Charles Sanders Peirce.
Under this influence, Feibleman became a lifelong advocate of science, and a
philosopher who hoped others might increasingly employ more science in their
philosophical writings. Peirce saw scientific truths as asymptotic and never quite beyond
doubt. To guard against absolutist claims, Peirce elevated the watch-dog principle of
uncertainty in science, which he termed fallibilism 3, to a philosophical principle. It
became a gyroscope for Feibleman’s philosophy.
First Encounter, 1934
A quick stop at the Oxford bookstore, near the hotel where he and his wife were staying
before embarking on their voyage home, first brought James Feibleman into contact
with what would become Arnold J. Toynbee’s magnum opus. However, the budding
philosopher was familiar with neither the author nor A Study of History. Only the
philosophies of Charles S. Peirce and later the British logician and mathematician turned
Harvard metaphysician, Alfred N. Whitehead, impacted Feibleman’s philosophy so
deeply.
2

Letter Julius Friend to James K. Feibleman, 132/48/9, Jun. 23, 1933 (excerpt from Herbert Cohn note)
Special Collections, Morris Library, Southern Illinois University (all manuscript citations are from this
site).
3
Charles S. Peirce denied that final truth in the natural sciences was possible and adopted the term
“fallibalism” in his philosophy to emphasize that limitation. See Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (ed.)
Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, I, 1.8, 1.13. Similarly, Karl Popper in The Logic of Scientific
Discovery also imposes limits on scientific truth claims with his “falsifiability” criterion.
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In reading the first three volumes of Toynbee’s work, Feibleman experienced a breathtaking introduction to the kind of history he found most enlightening. Toynbee’s world
perspective exhibited the cultural history Feibleman believed historians should spend
more time focusing on instead of rehashing every moment of the American Civil War,
as was most typical history in his native South. Although knowledgeable of Oswald
Spengler’s The Decline of the West (1926), and later the Russian, Nikolay Danilevsky’s
Russia and Europe (1869), he clearly preferred Toynbee’s early volumes of A Study of
History.
A Query to Toynbee, 1939
Almost four months after the Nazi invasion of Poland, Feibleman and his co-author,
Friend, wrote Toynbee a letter concerning eight separate items from A Study of History.
For example, they questioned whether Toynbee’s “challenge and response” mechanism
was intended to assume predictive powers.
Toynbee very graciously responded denying that history could ever predict the future.
He concluded that under the most favorable circumstances for a given challenge to elicit
the anticipated response certainty cannot be anticipated. This is true because the
response must come from a ‘spiritual personality’ and … ‘spiritual forces’ are not, I
believe, subject to scientific measurement.” 4 They were also chagrined by the short
shrift manner Toynbee treated philosophy.
The New Orleans duo questioned Toynbee’s pessimism: “If there is nothing good in the
world except otherworldliness, then is the growth of civilization only a necessary evil in
order to terminate in the disintegration which gives rise to religion?
If it is agreed that, “Except the Lord keep the city, the watchman waketh but in vain,”
then if the Lord keeps the city, what need is there for the watchman?” 5
In ending their letter, the two hastened to assure Toynbee that they were not seeking
flaws in his work but only to better understand it. 6
Feibleman, raised in the Reformed tradition of Judaism, left the synagogue after the
deaths of his parents and never returned. Ever wary of absolutism in any field of
knowledge and transparent in his honesty about the limits of all knowledge, he wrote in
Ontology: 7

4

Letter, Arnold J. Toynbee to James K. Feibleman, Jan. 16, 1940, 132/86/5.
Letter, Feibleman and Friend to Toynbee (copy), Dec. 18, 1939, 132/86/5.
6
Ibid.
7
Ontology is the complex philosophical study of being and becoming and seeks to understand what exists
in the world and the nature of reality in its most general sense.
5

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2012

35

Comparative Civilizations Review, Vol. 66 [2012], No. 66, Art. 20

32

Number 66, Spring 2012
For the human race is doomed to this paradox: that men are destined to speculate about
ultimate questions such as the nature of God, immortality and the justification of evil in
the world; and they are equally destined evidently not to find the answers to these
questions… [thus,] the prime factor in knowledge is ignorance. We must teach people
not how much we know but how little. 8

Feibleman’s Review of 1940 in the T’ien Hsia9 Monthly and A Response
Their initial query was not followed up until 1940 when Feibleman reviewed the first
six volumes of Toynbee’s monumental study in the Hong Kong journal, T’ien Hsia
Monthly, published in English. By then Feibleman had struck out on his own. The 25
page review faulted the simplicity of Toynbee’s “challenge-response” explanation for
the development of civilizations. He included a number of other concerns about
Toynbee’s history which other reviewers would detect, but most important as a major
influence on Feibleman’s future work was his dissatisfaction with Toynbee’s
explanation for the genesis of civilizations as being simply common sense and his
elevation of the example of the development of Christian civilization from its Roman
predecessor as lacking sufficient examples in world history to qualify as an historical
generality. 10
Feibleman’s own explanation for culture became a major theme of his system of
philosophy. He wrote, "The origins of cultures always have the same cause: the implicit
dominant ontology (abbreviated: i.d.o.). The occasion is always the acceptance of the
i.d.o. This occasion may arise from any level of the environment: physical, chemical,
biological, psychological or social.” 11
Feibleman agreed with Toynbee’s assertion that outstanding cultural leaders, possessing
reason, imagination and force, were major sources of cultural growth, provided their
followers remained free of coercion. 12 Feibleman also concurred that cultures had
natural life-spans but admitted their longevity was simply unknown. To avoid slipping
into a purely idealistic explanation of cultures, Feibleman included the chosen
technology of a society -- beginning with simple tools -- as another vital factor in
cultural development. 13
Feibleman’s philosophy of culture held that the explicit philosophy of a Plato, Aristotle,
Kant or others was much less common and pervasive than the informal philosophy
represented by the i.d.o. Most people remained unaware that the i.d.o. was operating
within their unconscious minds, virtually from the moment of birth, but as the individual
8

Feibleman, Ontology (Baltimore, 1951), 786.
English translation: “All Under the Sun.”
10
Feibleman, T’ien Hsia Monthly, IX, 24.
11
Feibleman, The Theory of Human Culture (New York, 1946), 179.
12
Arnold J. Toynbee, A Study of History (London, 1935-1939), vol. IV, 5-6. Also vol. I, 191-192, vol. III,
245-246.
13
Feibleman, The Theory of Human Culture (New York, 1946), 82-84.
9
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developed, it became rational common sense and qualitatively detectable as the ethos of
a particular culture. 14
Feibleman’s implicit dominant ontology clearly meant something deeper than an
ideology, which might easily be discarded or traded in for a new model. The i.d.o. was
so closely linked to one’s very sense of identity that it could not easily be altered.
However, as one’s consciousness developed, the i.d.o. became more like typical
ideologies and increasingly subject to changes introduced either by diffusion or through
the creativity of talented leaders as Toynbee concluded. 15
Feibleman gives indications of what a particular i.d.o. might include in examples
extending from modern English history to the Middle Ages; however the fullest
incidence of what he considers a specific example of an i.d.o. involves his own
American culture. He believed that in order for an i.d.o. to achieve its fullest influence
it requires many years of exposure to a given i.d.o., and it is largely acted upon
subconsciously. People believe so deeply in particular propositions that they act upon
them with virtually with little or no conscious appraisal.
These fundamental propositions become accepted common sense. Elements
encompassed by an American i.d.o., include powerful cultural ideas found in part
among immigrant groups such as the Puritans and discoverable in their most mature
form in the writings of the English empirical philosophers and the French
Encyclopedists. These fundamental beliefs include four ensconced in Jefferson’s
Declaration of Independence:
1.
2.
3.
4.

The self-evidence of truth and especially:
The equality of the creation of all men.
The inalienable right to life and liberty.
The inalienable right to the pursuit of happiness (equality of opportunity).

Feibleman believed that the frontier experience in particular helped to foster two
additions to the American i.d.o., certainly by the 19th century.
5. The truth of workability
6. The sanctity of material success. 16
Feibleman points out a crucial conflict between these i.d.o. components, and here his
social conscience matches Toynbee’s in his denunciation of the bitch goddess of
material success to the exclusion of all else. “If human equality based on the creation of
14

Ibid., 48-53.
Ibid., 91,164.
16
Ibid., 253.
15
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human beings as free and equal is to lead to equality of opportunity, it cannot be
reconciled with the sanctity of material success, for the material success of some men, if
unchecked, will lead to the restraining of the equality of others.” 17 Although he does not
say it, slavery and the “Robber Barons” of American business would be obvious results
of these conflicts.
An ancillary theme of his philosophy of culture appeared first in The Theory of Human
Culture (also see page 5 above) written in 1946. Increasingly, he conceived of reality as
arranged in overlapping integrative levels arising from the physical to the chemical to
the biological to the psychological to the cultural and finally to the social level. These
integrative levels were discoverable both in nature and in various human activities. One
critic of Feibleman’s philosophy termed this hierarchy as “Feibleman’s Great Tree of
Being” and ascribed it to Feibleman’s fascination with holistic views of history and
philosophy spanning the entire spectrum of knowledge, which made him a generalist
early on. It also made him amenable to Toynbee’s world history.
A Change of Career: On to Academe
The emergency of World War II and the draft of Tulane faculty members into the armed
forces created a dearth of teachers at Tulane by 1943. Dean Martin ten Hoor knew
Feibleman was an established writer and independent philosopher who had not been
drafted. As a 40-year old married man with a minor son, Feibleman was not called to
serve despite several efforts on his part to obtain a direct commission. He believed that
his strong support of the liberal cause in the Spanish Civil War against Franco may have
contributed to his being ignored for officer candidacy. Many colleges across the nation,
including Tulane, acted as conduits for naval officer preparation through V-12
programs.
Feibleman volunteered for his new assignment as an “acting assistant professor” of
English. He discovered his quickest groups finished their coursework 1-2 weeks early,
so he introduced them to the broadest scope of knowledge to include philosophy.
Feibleman loved teaching and even received a feeler from the University of Chicago
about possibly joining their faculty. The offer of a full professorship of philosophy in
1946 and deep roots in New Orleans kept him home. He would have continued to teach
at Tulane beyond his seventy-third birthday if the university had not adopted mandatory
retirement age requirements.
First Meetings with Toynbee and Einstein: Princeton, 1950
Feibleman, accompanied by his wife, finally met Toynbee personally in 1950 when both
participated in a Conference on the Uniformities of History at Princeton. The two got

17
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along quite well, and the historian especially enjoyed hearing Feibleman’s account of
the marsh lands and Louisiana’s residents of the back country surrounding New Orleans.
The following day, a friend in the Spanish Department at Tulane had made
arrangements for Feibleman to meet with the most renowned and metaphysical of 20th
century scientists, Albert Einstein, who was a long time resident at Princeton’s Institute
for Advanced Studies. Feibleman took notes during their conversation and later
published a dialogue from this memorable meeting in a book of memoirs:
Feibleman: Why is it that pure science, without which there would be no applied
science, is flourishing so much in Europe and so little in America?
Einstein: Because the Europeans have something the Americans have not yet
learned and that is appreciation of thought. There is one quality essential to
scientists which some physicists lack.
Feibleman: What is that?
Einstein: Humility.
Feibleman: So many European intellectuals have come to the U.S. in recent
decades that perhaps they will establish it over here.
Einstein: (with a twinkle): Appreciation of thought is something we immigrants
do not seem to bring with us in our baggage.
On a lighter note, just as Feibleman and Einstein arose to part ways, the century’s most
famous scientist spoke again.
Einstein: You must send me something you have written. You have something?
Feibleman: Mr. Einstein, I have written fifteen books. [By contrast, Einstein had
published very little in terms of volume; however, the impact of his Special and
General Relativity papers on all knowledge including philosophy and the nature
of being which so fascinated Feibleman, hardly needs introduction.]
Einstein sitting down again, spoke with mock astonishment and surprise, and
laughingly repeated: “Fifteen books! But this is very suspicious!”
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He enjoyed this so much that he repeated the words and the laughter. 18 The question for
many would linger throughout Feibleman’s career: could proliferation and profundity
co-exist in a single philosopher?
Feibleman’s Magnum Opus: Ontology and Critics
Near the top of those influencing Feibleman’s philosophy was the American philosopher
and physical scientist, Charles S. Peirce. Feibleman wrote and published An
Introduction to the Philosophy of Charles S. Peirce: Interpreted as a System in 1946,
following a long battle with Harvard over permission to use their Peirce manuscripts
which had been notoriously neglected for many years.
Written outside of academe, Feibleman’s study of Peirce took the place of a dissertation.
He used many of the Peirce papers currently being edited at Harvard by Paul Weiss and
Charles Hartshorne. Both philosophers were former students of Whitehead and became
Feibleman’s friends. Feibleman’s pioneering work in Peirce studies received some
vindication in 1970 when M.I.T. published a paperback edition of the book.
In scale of conception Toynbee’s A Study of History is most analogous to the neglected
field of ontology in philosophy. Feibleman saw ontology as essential to all philosophy
in the quest for the good life. Although the idea of writing a work on ontology
developed over many years, shortly after Feibleman completed his 1946 books, one on
human culture and another an introduction to Peirce’s philosophy, he began five years
of intense work to complete what he professed was his magnum opus.
He wrote to a Unitarian friend and minister in St. Louis that

My reputation as a philosopher must stand or fall on this single work…I have devoted at
least half a day, seven days a week to it for the past five years….I have lived it, dreamed
about it, and practically slept with it on my mind for many years - continuously I should
say since I began the act of writing. 19

Feibleman’s Ontology (1951) was written as an example of what he termed secular
metaphysics. Shorn of much of its traditional connection to religion, he constructed
what he believed was a legitimate answer to the fundamental ontological questions:
“what is there?” and “what can we expect to become?” Typically, ontology is defined as
the study of being, and it first came into serious study as a legitimate field and division
of metaphysics with the works of such early thinkers as John Scotus, William of
Ockham, Christian Wolff, Gottlieb Baumgarten, and the 18th century philosopher, G.W.
Leibnitz. 20
18

Feibleman, The Way of a Man: An Autobiography, (New York, 1969), (JKF-AE dialogue), 360-363.
Letter, James K. Feibleman to Thaddeus Clark, 132/29/18, Feb. 18, 1950.
20
Paul Edwards (ed.) The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (New York, 1967),V, 542-543, and Donald
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Modern philosophy has seen the field divided most often into works considered by
modern philosophers as either mere poetry, as in the case of Martin Heidegger, or as a
problem of logical analysis, demonstrated particularly in the work of Willard Van
Orman Quine. Only a few modern American philosophers have been bold enough to
write ontologies. The Spanish-American philosopher, George Santayana did it, and
more recently Paul Weiss of Yale wrote a systematic ontology.
The bare essentials of Feibleman’s version in a 788-page book consist of two main
categories or realms, essence and existence, linked by a subordinate one which he called
“destiny.” The latter had nothing whatsoever to do with anything mystical, but rather
described a bridge that individuals follow as they make life decisions which set them on
a particular lifetime path. Feibleman wrote that if an individual was able to truly merge
these two realms of being, the result would be nothing short of ecstasy. The New
Orleans philosopher left open the operation of chance and accident operative in all
human lives. These unpredictable elements could either visit tragedy or wonderful
opportunity upon individuals, depending both upon circumstances and the choices
people made.
The reviewer was not sympathetic and echoed Paul Weiss’ long-time criticism that
Feibleman was too Platonic. Furthermore, the review held that Feibleman’s neglect of
religion reduced it to ethics. The reviewer questioned how there could be progress
toward an ideal ontology if all culture is its expression [as seen in Feibleman’s i.d.o.]? 21
Feibleman had written extensively on the i.d.o., particularly in The Study of Human
Culture, so it was only briefly covered in his ontology. He never believed that the i.d.o.
was static. Quite the contrary, he wrote that elements of individual i.d.o.s do change as
cultures evolve. Two additional reviews followed with comments ranging from
“provocative” 22 to “obscure” and “superficial,” but neither could be construed as wholly
positive. 23 Despite his disappointment, Feibleman never considered abandoning
philosophy and continued his work unabated. Even in retirement, there was always
another book to write.
By the very nature of its vastness, the complex subject of ontology makes it an easy
target for criticism. Professional scholars typically evaluate metaphysics on the basis of
logic, completeness, applicability and plausibility. Even experienced American
metaphysicians, such as Charles Hartshorne, admitted the difficulty in judging
philosophical scholarship. 24

21
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Anyone can play the ontology game. All people can venture some opinion about reality,
however simple or incomplete. Nonetheless, few could present as convincing a
perspective as Feibleman’s work, with its coupling of good social science with
imaginative constructs which reflect the development of Feibleman’s “i.d.o.” and a
personal quality absent from rival ontologies. Most importantly, Feibleman never
claimed anything remotely absolute about his ontology. Peirce’s doctrine of fallibilism
infuses his ontology with a sense of honesty and a refreshing lack of pretense not always
absent in academe. His philosophy reflects that humility which Albert Einstein felt
many U.S. researchers never developed.
Feibleman saw ontology as a field requiring a collective effort subject to constant
reconstruction based on new advances in science, upon which all believable
metaphysics ultimately rests. He hoped other ontologists would join to advance the
search for the good life. A truly valid ontology would mark a good starting point.
Reconsiderations: Volume XII
Nearly three decades after the first volumes of A Study of History came out in 1934,
Toynbee finally answered his critics more comprehensively in his final volume of A
Study of History, completed in 1961. The historian’s remarks showed that he valued the
criticism of philosophers who made him rethink some of his original hypotheses:
A philosopher will probably find little in this chapter except truisms and elementary
errors, if he finds anything at all that is not a meaningless misuse of words. All the
same, at my peril, I have to write it, because some of my critics have been philosophers
who have taken issue with me on philosophical grounds. I exposed myself to this by
raising philosophical questions. I did not seek these out. I found them rising out of a
study of history. This is, I should say, to be expected, because, as I see it, the study of
human affairs is really one and indivisible. 25

Neither did Toynbee forget his early critic and friend, the philosopher James K.
Feibleman of New Orleans. Toynbee defended himself against Feibleman’s criticism
that A Study of History lacked a sufficiently high level of abstraction and quantification
to such a degree that it was almost literary in its approach. The historian answered, “I do
not question Feibleman’s report, but I do demur to his requirement. What he is
demanding is, I believe, a counsel of perfection for a student of human affairs.” 26
Stephen Jay Gould, observed this tendency to demand quantification among biologists.
He described it as “physics envy.” 27 Feibleman abandoned that extreme requirement in
The Theory of Human Culture written 6 years after that review.

25
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Toynbee cited his philosophical critic from New Orleans over twenty-five times either
alone or in conjunction with others. By 1961, the historian’s picture had already made it
on to a 1947 cover of Time magazine, and he was a world-renowned figure. The world
historian also made a special admission to Feibleman regarding the impact of his
religious upbringing on his philosophy of history.
Some of Feibleman’s comments are telling as well as witty. In my view, he says, the
failure of human culture is the salvation of humankind. It is in…civilization’s decline
that all the good things for which civilization deserves its name take their start. There is
really nothing that a civilization can do that will please Toynbee except to collapse and
then, after giving birth to a universal church, to get out of the way! I cannot read this
without bursting out laughing and crying touché. I have not, after all, succeeded in
jumping clear of a standpoint I inherited from my ancestral religion. 28

To a philosopher who believed that much of human behavior could be explained largely
by those ideas (i.d.o.) people absorbed and acted upon in accordance with their cultural
conditioning begun in their earliest years, Toynbee’s admission must have seemed
particularly satisfying to Feibleman given the fact that Toynbee increasingly concluded
that only Christianity or some combination of the great world religions could ultimately
save civilization.
Feibleman’s books The Theory of Human Culture (1946) and Ontology (1951) would in
retrospect become key parts of a 16 volume system of philosophy which sought to keep
alive the quest for the good life. This became Feibleman’s life work. Both he and
Toynbee received substantial criticism of their work. Both committed errors, but in
works of such scope, specialists are bound to find mistakes. There are volumes of
criticism of Toynbee’s history.
A rough tally of reviews of Feibleman’s work from 1931 through 1982 shows that he
received 21 positive reviews, 19 negative ones and 22 mixed opinions. Toynbee’s
history received a vastly greater audience than Feibleman could have ever hoped for his
philosophy. The two men had obvious differences, but they shared much as well. As
fellow seekers of the good life, the historian looked to past experience to avoid the
pitfalls of history, and his philosopher friend aimed at the future hoping to improve
humankind and to anticipate problems.
Toynbee and Feibleman met again at Tulane in 1958 during a speaking tour through the
South. Toynbee stayed with the Feibleman family in their New Orleans home in
Metaire, and later he wrote an essay for his friend’s festschrift published in a full issue
of Studium Generale: Journal of Interdisciplinarian Studies (1971), dedicated to
Feibleman’s philosophy under the general editorship of G.H. Müller, Professor of
Mathematics at Heidelberg University.
28

Toynbee, Reconsiderations (London, 1961), XII, n. 302-303.

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2012

43

Comparative Civilizations Review, Vol. 66 [2012], No. 66, Art. 20

40

Number 66, Spring 2012

A System of Philosophy for the Modern Educated Public
Feibleman aimed at keeping his philosophy at such a level that it did not stray too far
from what he described as “the price of eggs.” 29 He achieved this by limiting specialized
philosophical vocabulary and ex cathedra statements devoid of any evidence as
encountered in much of traditional philosophy. Neither is his philosophy strictly
cerebral; the good life is both mental and physical. Thus, he avoids the mind-body split
so characteristic of many of his predecessors. To welcome more people to philosophy,
Feibleman went so far as to encourage his readers to construct their own ontologies. 30
His system includes all the major components of philosophy and more from logic to
ethics and comedy in 17 published volumes.
His prose is occasionally enlivened by an earthy humor, which admittedly contains a
sexist touch one might reasonably expect given his generation, arising out of the Vieux
Carré cultural milieu which helped to form his “i.d.o.” Drawing upon the variety of
customers who frequented his father’s Canal Street dry goods store across from the
French Quarter, he casually mentioned in his ethics book one of the unconventional
sources of wisdom, “An old prostitute is no worse for wear than an old virgin, but has
perhaps a secret smile and greater knowledge of the world.” 31
For these and many more reasons, most of his philosophy is easily accessible to
educated men and women. This is in marked contrast to the exceedingly abstruse
modern metaphysics of Martin Heidegger or Alfred North Whitehead. Even professional
philosophers do not agree on what they mean in many instances. Feibleman’s ability to
communicate with language drawn largely from the social sciences, plus his humility as
a philosopher who admits at the onset the limitations of any philosophy, including his
own, makes his thought particularly appealing.
Fellow metaphysician and editor of The Review of Metaphysics at Yale, Paul Weiss,
who never fully accepted this philosopher with such an unusual background, wrote
Feibleman in one of their last exchanges, “There are few today who know that
philosophy must be systematic---and there are few besides yourself who set out to do
what they should. But I have confidence in the power of honest inquiry to find its way
sooner or later.” 32
Postscript and Conclusions
Professor Feibleman remarried in 1955, and he and his wife, Shirley Ann Grau, raised a
family of four. In 1965, Shirley won the Pulitzer Prize for her novel, Keepers of the
Game. Feibleman’s son from his first marriage, Peter Feibleman, also became a
29
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31
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successful novelist and playwright. Considered together these Feibleman family
members formed a New Orleans literary dynasty. Feibleman became the long-time
Chairman of Tulane’s Department of Philosophy and helped found and edit Tulane
Studies in Philosophy. He was feted with two endowed professorships and two honorary
doctorates from Rider College and the University of Louisville and was named a
professor emeritus at Tulane in 1975.
In his presidential address, “The Third Sophistic,” to the Southwestern Philosophical
Society on the campus of Texas State University at San Marcos in 1981, he implored his
fellow philosophers to take up the challenge of Alfred North Whitehead to study
science, to incorporate their findings into their philosophies and to make those teachings
available to America’s educated citizenry. To the very end, Feibleman continued that
quest. All his life, he faithfully read and studied the major scientific journals such as
Science and the British journal Nature, which was his favorite. The final addition to his
17 volume system of philosophy, entitled, Education and Civilization (Humanities
Press), was published after he died in 1987.
Both Toynbee and Feibleman agreed that world government was an essential long term
goal for a planet plagued by endemic warfare, and they shared a common concern for
social justice and a hope that religion might help civilization to recover stability and
avoid decline. However, while the historian considered religion as the ultimate antidote
for civilization’s failings, the philosopher was less optimistic of such a remedy for
civilization’s maladies. Toynbee wrote of the folly of rational Westerners’ hope to
somehow rid themselves of religious fanaticism only to witness its recrudescence in the
guise of the secular religions of Communism, Fascism, and Western Nationalism, which
exceeded the zeal and destructiveness of all other religions. 33
Feibleman believed that the absolute claims of these ideologies melt under scientific
scrutiny. As a vital way of understanding and accepting the uncertainty of the modern
world, science permitted educated people to see through the many masks of fanaticism - be they religious or political -- and to accept rational probability in lieu of the delusion
of certitude.
Feibleman did not believe that Toynbee truly understood science as a powerful cultural
and analytical tool, quite apart from its links to technology. 34 He is correct in his belief
that throughout most of Toynbee’s writings, he fails to discriminate clearly between
science and its practical application. However, Feibleman is perhaps too critical here.
Late in his career, Toynbee corrected this blurring of theoretical and applied science in a
small pamphlet entitled, “Science in Human Affairs: An Historian’s View.” It is a short
but succinct and convincing portrayal of science’s power to deny certitude and to keep
33
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open inquiry, but as a humanist, he prudently cautioned readers that science like all
human endeavors depended ultimately upon the honesty of its practitioners. 35
Toynbee was also undoubtedly right in his belief that, in the case of the ignorant or the
poorly educated, philosophy could not fill the religious void. 36 Feibleman’s religious
insight remained markedly different from Toynbee’s. Although he never joined any
religion after he left the synagogue, he was a frequent guest speaker at Unitarian
services in New Orleans and maintained a deep reverence for life itself. He wrote in the
Pious Scientist (1958),
What science has done may be viewed religiously. Religion is not a special set of
thoughts but something you hold in the back of your mind when you are thinking about
something else. Religion is not a special kind of feeling but something you feel for the
parts when the feeling for the whole comes through them. Religion is not a special thing
to do but a certain way of looking at the way other things are done. What you do about
your religion ought to mean only how you do what you do about everything else. 37

Feibleman continued to write up until his death in 1987 at the age of 83, and he
anticipated world terrorism but not al-Qaeda in his 1985 book, From Hegel to Terrorism
and Other Essays. His final books The Destroyers: The Underside of Human Nature and
Education and Civilization were published posthumously. On the concluding page of
this last volume in his system of philosophy, Feibleman wrote that the important study
of the causes and cures for the ills of civilization remained in its infancy but
acknowledged that Toynbee and Spengler’s world histories marked important
beginnings. 38
Although each man was fully cognizant of the nuclear threat, Feibleman remained more
the hawk and Toynbee the dove in terms of their willingness to use force in the world
arena. The philosopher and historian remained vigilant about threats to civilization. Two
of Feibleman’s last books focused on those dangers, both in the case of terrorism and in
the inability of modern men to properly channel their natural aggressiveness. The two
thinkers continued to share their conviction that a common holistic perspective on
history and philosophy was vital to an understanding of human affairs given the changed
circumstances of planet earth with its maze of interconnections and vulnerability to the
machinations of its most violent human denizens.
A conclusion in his pamphlet size memoir, Janus at Seventy-five, set down earlier by an
aging Toynbee in 1964 might have just as easily been written by his philosopher friend
from New Orleans, “We are now moving into a chapter of human history in which our

35
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choice is going to be, not between a whole world and a shredded-up world, but between
one world and no world. 39
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Local Civilization and Political Decency:
Equilibrium and the Position of the Sultanate in
Java
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Good men will not consent to govern for cash or honors. They do not want to
be called mercenary for exacting a cash payment for the work of government,
or thieves for making money on the side; and they will not work for honors, for
they are not ambitious. 1
Democracy is a widely accepted and prevalent political system in the world today. It is
evidently based on the election of leaders according to the will of the majority.
Accordingly, a government composed of either directly or indirectly chosen
representatives of the people would be regarded as democratic and politically decent.
The idea of democracy was the subject of debate in the city-states in ancient Greece,
such as Athens, and influenced the course of both the French and American revolutions.
In the 18th century, various thinkers in the West further developed the idea of
democracy, and their ideas contributed to the establishment of nation states. In the
modern era, democracy has come to enshrine one of the ideals of Western civilization.
The contemporary scholar, Francis Fukuyama, is one of many who advocate liberal
democracy. 2 At the end of the 20th century, he stated:
The triumph of the West, of the Western idea, is evident first of all in the total
exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives to Western liberalism…..What we may be
witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of
post-war history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s
ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the
final form of human government. 3

Fukuyama might be right as democratic ideas in the West have admittedly played an
important role in liberating humans and have contributed to the development of a freer
world. 4 Apart from this Western-oriented political system, however, it is still possible to

1

Plato, The Republic, London, 2007, p. 29.
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3
Fukuyama, “The End of History?” National Interest, Summer 1989, pp. 3-4.
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identify traditional alternatives in governance which do not rely on any electoral system
in the appointment of top political leaders.
The Indonesian island of Java has been known for its distinctive civilization. While its
civilizational influence might be domestic and geographically limited, this local
civilization seems to offer a unique alternative characterized by a different relationship
between the ruler and his subjects. At the end of 2010, Yogyakarta in Central Java,
which has preserved the very essence of Javanese civilization with its deep-rooted
philosophy and has been ruled by a sultan, was thrown into political turmoil.
Yogyakarta’s traditional governance is that the sultan is automatically appointed as the
governor of the specially designated province of Yogyakarta, or Daerah Istimewa
Yogyakarta (DIY).
Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, popularly known as SBY, recently
expressed the view that a gubernatorial nomination in Yogyakarta was incompatible
with the idea of democracy and that there should be a direct election for the
governorship. The people in Yogyakarta angrily expressed their strong opposition to the
view of this two-time popularly-elected president. On 13 December 2010, when the
provincial council decided to support the current system of having the sultan as
governor, tens of thousands people took to the streets to show their disagreement with
the country’s president. 5 Some of the banners read: “SBY is the origin of disasters in
Yogyakarta,” blaming the president for the earthquakes and volcanic eruptions which
the province has experienced recently.
Regardless of age, ethnicity, or gender, people expressed their support for the sultan and
showed their heartfelt attachment to him on that day. 6 One survey conducted by
newspapers indicates that 93.3% of people in Yogyakarta were in favor of their
traditional automatic appointment of the sultan as governor. 7 Interviews conducted by
the author on the streets of Yogyakarta also confirmed the support shown by an
overwhelming majority of people for the status quo. 8
What does this local phenomenon mean? Would the people of Yogyakarta not like to
have a more democratic system? Does the reaction of the people of Yogyakarta to the
5

45 out of 55 council members supported the current system. One faction with 10 council members, a
party created by SBY, abstained from expressing their opinion, while other 5 factions unanimously voted
for the maintenance of the current system. KOMPAS 14 December.
6
There were also non-Javanese, including Papua New Guineans, who joined the demonstration and
gathering. The Council building was surrounded by as many as 20,000 people.
7
KOMPAS, 14 December.
8
Between 10 December 2010 and 17 December 2010, the author conducted informal interviews with
fourteen commoners, and thirteen of them are clearly opposed to the idea of SBY. Only one woman (food
seller at her 50s) does not mind having a gubernatorial election because she believes that the sultan will
surely be elected.
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idea of SBY come merely from their traditional belief system? Or are there any
civilizational principles that lead them to be part of the movement to support the sultan?
Various Means of Governance
Although liberal democracy is one of the most efficient systems of reflecting the will of
the people, it is not without problems. The adequacy of a direct voting system, for
example, would be seriously challenged where voters fail to maintain a certain level of
education, political motivation, and awareness. 9 The problem is that the masses tend to
favor entertainment rather than participate in serious debate. Such voters could thus be
manipulated, a phenomenon Gordon Tullock called “rent-seeking.” 10 It is obvious that
these problems are by no means a deficiency of the system of liberal democracy itself,
but they are the consequence of the implementation of the system.
The theories of both John Stuart Mill and Gordon Tullock would suggest that political
education, together with nurturing the morality of constituency, should be vital elements
for preserving the virtue of liberal democracy. At the same time, ethical awareness
among the elected is also important in ensuring the intended outcomes of liberal
democracy.
The caliphate was a unique Islamic system of governance that integrated religion and
politics. In fact, the caliph was a chief executive of the community whose major duties
were: “enforcement of the law and defense and expansion of the realm of Islam,
distribution of funds (booty and alms), and the general supervision of the
government.” 11 One of the major duties of the caliph was to ensure the implementation
of Sharia (Islamic law), and the sanctioning of his political practice by religious
authorities. Religion and politics are coupled in the life of Muslims.
In Sunni tradition, the caliph was elected by the community, and a candidate to be caliph
should fulfill certain criteria as a leader, such as appropriate knowledge and physical
fitness. 12 Some Muslims insist that because the caliph was prone to erroneous practice,
there needed to be a system to remove the caliph from his position. 13 However,
historically, the only way to remove a caliph was through assassination, a frequent
9

For example, J.S. Mill states: The dangers incident to a representative democracy are of two kinds:
danger of a low grade of intelligence in the representative body, and in the popular opinion which controls
it; and danger of class legislation on the part of the numerical majority, these being all composed the same
class. J.S. Mill, “Of True and False Democracy; Representation of All, and Representation of the Majority
Only”, in J.M. Robson (ed.), Essays of Politics and Society, Toronto, 1977, p. 488, cited in Agama dan
Peradaban, H. Kato, Jakarta, 2002, p. 42. (translated from doctoral thesis: H. Kato, Religion and its
Functions in Society, 1999 Sydney University.
10
See G.Tullock,The Rent-Seeking Society, Indiana: Liberty Fund, 2005.
11
The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World ,Vol.1, p. 239.
12
Ibid. p. 240.
13
I. Yusanto, “Caliphate, Sharia and the Future of Umat”, in The Clash of Itihad Fundamentalist versus
Liberal Muslims, H. Kato (ed.), 2011, pp.131-132.
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occurrence in Islamic history. Caliphs had the potential to be “erratic, imperial, fair and
just, despotic and tyrannical, dynastic or individual.” 14 Few of these characteristics are
democratic.
In Shi’a tradition, imams (recognized Islamic scholars) never assumed political power.
They also rejected the caliphs recognized by the Sunnis because they believed that only
a direct descendant of the Prophet should be the caliph. Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran,
however, violated Shiite rules by seizing total political power and having the authority
to pick candidates for so-called popular elections. Democracy has not done well under
this system.
The pre-war Japanese monarchy was another type of governance in modern history.
This institution was dictatorial and tyrannical and it lasted until the end of World War II;
there was no mechanism for electing the emperor nor was there one to dethrone him.
Unlike the secular character of the caliph, the Emperor of Japan was regarded as a living
God of Shinto. Succession was based on lineage, and there was no room for the
discussion on the suitability of the successor as leader of the country. Because the
Emperor was essentially a religious symbol, actual political rule was usurped by a
dictatorial and fascist military dictatorship. The Emperor was out of the loop.
As a result of this dictatorship, the civilians, “subjects” of the emperor in pre-war Japan,
suffered from the suppression of their basic human rights such as the freedom of press,
speech, and religion. Totalitarianism prevailed in Japan not only before but also during
World War II. The institution had led Japan to imperialism, and in turn to the suffering
and agony of Asian countries as a result of attempts at invasion and occupation by the
imperial army of Japan. This historical fact shows that autocracy has the potential to
create political indecency.
It is also important to remember that although many might believe that the Japanese
monarch has always maintained his political influence and has always been respected by
the people throughout history, the authority of the Emperor was eclipsed and his
position disregarded by the public during different periods of time. National Shinto was
in fact created in order to justify the divinity of the Emperor in the time of the Meiji
Restoration in the 19th century. 15 Although the modern Japanese monarchy recognizes
the historic continuity of the Emperor, power resides in a democratic government.
Both the Islamic caliphate and Japanese monarchy suffered from a serious shortcoming
in that neither system offered a mechanism to take into account the wishes of the people.
Liberal democracy, on the other hand, theoretically advocates the rights of the
constituency and reflects the will of the people. Yet, it is worth reiterating that the
political awareness and morality of the people are vital to maintaining the decency of
14
15

B. Milton-Edwards, Islamic Fundamentalism since 1945, Oxon, 2005, p.14.
K. Inoue, Japanese History (Vol. 2), p. 136.
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liberal democracy. Yogyakarta, however, seems to demonstrate an interesting political
apparatus consistent with the preservation of their civilizational tradition.
Historical Background of Yogyakarta
Indonesia is a center of Islam in Southeast Asia, with more than 80% of a population of
240 million being Muslims. Notwithstanding the demographics, the political system still
remains secular. A multi-party election and a direct presidential election are conducted
every five years. In this sense, Indonesia is no alien to the Western style of liberal
democracy. There are 33 provinces, and each of them is represented by a governor who
is chosen through direct election, except for Yogyakarta.
A rather extraordinary political arrangement was made for Yogyakarta at the time of the
formation of Republic after independence, formally recognised by the international
community for the first time in 1949. The declaration of independence was actually
made by Indonesia itself at the conclusion of World War II on 17 August 1945. 16
Between 1945 and 1949, Indonesia had to struggle for full independence from the
Dutch. During this time, Yogyakarta was the capital of Indonesia; it had been ruled by
the family of its sultan since the middle of the 18th century. 17
Although the kingdom of Yogyakarta -- ruled by the sultan -- predates the Republic of
Indonesia, Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX chose to have his territory remain a part of the
Republic when independence was first declared. The sultan, together with other national
leaders, such as Sukarno, contributed to the liberation of Indonesia from the
Netherlands. Because of the significant contributions made by the sultan, the early
government of the Republic of Indonesia granted a special status to Yogyakarta, and the
sultan became the governor of the province for life. 18
Ever since, it has become a tradition that the Sultan of Yogyakarta and Paku Alam, who
is a ruler of a smaller territory in the district of Yogyakarta, have been granted the
highest and second highest gubernatorial positions, respectively. Currently, Hamengku
Buwono X holds the position of governor of Yogyakarta, while Paku Alam IX is vicegovernor. The Indonesian Constitution also recognises the special status of the province
with respect to traditional customs. 19

16

R. Cribb and C. Brown, Modern Indonesia: A History Since 1945, London, 1995, p.16.
In the vicinity of Yogyakarta, there had existed a kingdom called Mataram since the eighth century. It
was at the time of the official establishment of the kingdom of Yogyakarta in 1755 that Mataram was
divided into two kingdoms, i.e., Yogyakarta and Surakarta. See, Ricklefs, M.C., A History of Indonesia
Since c.1200, Stanford, 2008, pp.119-121.
18
Ibid., p.36.
19
Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945, p. 19.
17
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Fury and Demostrations in Yogyakarta
At noon on 13 December 2010, the citizens of Yogyakarta demonstrated. In fact, a main
street of the city was virtually occupied by demonstrators opposed to the idea of a direct
election for the post of governor. In front of the council building, the demonstrators
criticised and mocked SBY. It was obvious that the people of Yogyakarta respected
“their” sultan more than they respected the elected head of the state. A young student
majoring in literature at Gajah Mada University, one of the most prestigious universities
in Southeast Asia, ardently expressed his devotion and trust for “his” sultan:
His (the sultan’s) governance is a better system (than the other system). He does good
things for the people (of Yogyakarta). But many politicians do not do any good for the
people. (We should not forget) Yogyakarta has existed long before the Republic and
the sultan of Yogyakarta is a treasure of this country. The kingdom of Yogyakarta still
functions. I am very proud of being Javanese. 20

It seems that his views are shared by many other people in Yogyakarta. For example,
when asked, young shop clerks at a modern shopping mall in the city also passionately
rejected the direct election of the governor. They explain that although they do not work
at the sultan’s palace (kraton) physically, they are in fact working for the sultan as abdi
dalem or servants of the sultan. 21 Even high school students who joined the
demonstration expressed their opposition to the plan, saying that an election of governor
would cause social conflict and would be insulting. 22
At almost every street corner, people set up banners to articulate their discontent with
their president and to show the highest degree of attachment to the sultan. A younger
brother of the sultan, Prabukusumo, also appeared in front of the crowd during the
protest rallies, and people cheered. In his address, he said that: “those who still have a
conscience, those who don’t forget history, let’s give our support to the ‘special
status.’” 23 The atmosphere of the rallies was eminently amicable, and the hand-written
placards also conveyed the sentiments of the people in Yogyakarta. 24
The provincial council that day officially made the decision to support the current
system, on 13 December 2010. The decision emphasized four key points: support for the
special status of the province; support for an appointment mechanism; endorsement of
the current governor and vice-governor, and reaffirmation of the special status. This
popular political pronouncement was sent to SBY. As of December 2011, no decision
20

Interview conducted by the author in Yogyakarta,13 December, 2010.
Interview conducted by the author in Yogyakarta,15 December, 2010
22
14 December, KOMPAS
23
Recorded by the author and confirmed by the article of Jakarta Post and other newspapers thereafter.
24
For example, “My Yogyakarta, YES, My Sultan 100%”, “Sultan, my King, Sultan my governor,
Appointment of Sultan My Choice, Nothing else”, “SBY what do you want?” are among typical
statements observed during the rallies.
21
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has been made for the modification of the traditional process of gubernatorial
appointment in Yogyakarta.
Do all these feelings and reactions of people merely originate in the fact that Yogyakarta
has a longer history than the Republic of Indonesia? Is the attachment to the sultan
based merely on nostalgia? Besides historical and sentimental reasons, there are more
convincing explanations of why the people of Yogyakarta refuse to accept a Western
means of choosing their leader. These are profoundly connected with specific
civilizational notions which not only define their political position but also define the
basis of life itself.
The Position of the Sultan
Ever since acceding to the throne as sultan in 1989, Hamengku Buwono X has been the
governor of the special district of Yogyakarta as an administrator. It would be inexact to
believe that this gubernatorial position was granted to him merely on the basis of the
great contributions made by his ancestors to independence of Indonesia. A more
fundamental reason lies in the unique mythological position of the sultan in Javanese
cosmology. It should be noted that the sultan of Yogyakarta is regarded not only as an
administrator but also as an entity with supernatural power. Although the sultanate in
Yogyakarta to some extent has been colored by Islam, traditional Javanese custom and
rituals constitute much of its essence.
In the Javanese worldview, the most sacred place is volcanic Mount Merapi north of
Yogyakarta. This holy mountain is regarded as the domicile of God or parahyangan.
Conversely, the south of Yogyakarta, which is the sea, is believed to be a place for
waste or palemahan. In mythology, there are palaces or kraton in each area, and there
live some spirits or roh in the palaces. Between the south and the north, the sultan of
Yogyakarta resides in his own kraton. This kraton is a place of humans or pawongan,
who are headed by the sultan. In some villages in the province of Yogyakarta, people
believe that these three kratons are deeply interconnected and have frequent
communication with each other. It is also said that roh of the south and the north will
provide assistance to the sultan of Yogyakarta when he faces physical dangers,
including socio-cultural crises. 25
The sultan is the only person who is able to bring the revelation of God or wahyu.
Directional positioning of Mount Merapi and the kraton of Yogyakarta, which
symbolize the sacred and secular worlds respectively, affirms the spiritual assignment of
the sultan. The throne of the sultan in the kraton faces Mount Merapi directly, and the
sultan sits and sees Mount Merapi in the court ceremonies. Petrus, one of the organizers
of the 13 December protest rallies, explained that their spiritual tie with the sultan is so
strong that they are never able to be parted, and the sultan is an important leader with
25

Lucas Sasongko Triyoga, Merapi dan Orang Jawa, Jakarta, 2010, p.62.
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the ability of wahyu. 26 The rationale of the sultan’s dual role, then, can be understood
from two perspectives, namely the secular and the sacred.
The Sultan’s Attributes and Secular Role
According to Javanese philosophy, belief in the afterlife is important and practiced with
religious tolerance. This is epitomised by the arrangement of tombs in graveyards. In
Java, especially in Yogyakarta, tombs are arranged regardless of one’s religion. A
Catholic and a Muslim, for example, are often buried alongside each other whereas in
other areas of Indonesia, graveyards are strictly divided according to religion. One of the
valued qualities of the sultan is this sort of tolerance. Non-Javanese such as Papua New
Guineans lie happily and safely in Yogyakarta.
It is the sultan’s duty to protect people, both Javanese and non-Javanese. Part of the
sultan’s name, Hamengku, means “bundle” in Javanese. Songsong, the umbrella that the
sultan uses in the procession, symbolises his role in society. A large songsong signifies
in no uncertain terms his great power and strength. At the same time, the umbrella that
blocks sunlight and heat implies the capacity of sheltering people under it. The sultan
provides spiritual and physical protection for the people, and people in turn are
supposed to dedicate themselves to him. They offered crops to the sultan in the past for
this reason. This mutual protection is called ayom mengayomi.
While ayom mengayomi is certainly a legacy of the feudal era, the sultan still plays his
role as king of Yogyakarta in that he offers his land or mager sari for public use. That
includes Gajah Mada University, Yogyakarta International Airport, the Yogyakarta
railway station, and other vast areas in the vicinity of Yogyakarta. This is one example
of the common Javanese practice dono driyah, where the affluent offer financial support
to the less fortunate. The sultan, as a role model, takes the lead in this practice.
Man-powered tricycles called becak are gradually being phased out in the larger cities in
Indonesia including Jakarta. Consequently, the riders of becak have been losing their
jobs around the country, contributing to an increase of unemployment in Indonesia.
However, becak in Yogyakarta are still operating freely as it is the sultan’s policy to
secure the means of livelihood of the drivers. Therefore, the drivers of becak in
Yogyakarta came out in vigorous opposition to the idea of SBY. It was their task to
perform ayom mengayomi. They flew an Indonesian flag at half-mast on the day of the
protest rallies, showing their anger and sadness for president’s incomprehension of their
feelings towards the sultan.
The sultan’s protection and compassion towards people is also symbolically shown in
court rituals. For example, at the coronation, or penobatan, ducks, chickens, dwarfs, and
albinos joined the procession together with the sultan as it moved toward the kraton.
26

Interview conducted by the author in Tembi, 14 December, 2010.
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Each group denotes specific characters of humans: being fond of blathering;
belligerence; being weak, and being a minority. Participation of these in penobatan
demonstrated one of the sultan’s qualities: appreciation for all humans and protection of
them.
In the modern world, the law of the jungle is applied to the life of humans. Politicians,
who are supposed to protect citizens, are busily engaged in securing victory in the next
election; they are not able to devote themselves to the genuine betterment of people’s
lives. A self-centred mentality also creates a less compassionate society, and little
attention is paid to marginalized people. However, regardless of his actual achievement,
political integrity or personality, the sultan of Yogyakarta, is regarded by the Javanese
people as an important and trustworthy savior in this desolate world, and it is he who
protects and cares for his “subjects.”
The Sultan’s Attributes and Sacred Roles
Although the sultan is a human, he is supposed to possess an extraordinary qualification
to connect the sacred and secular worlds. In other words, the sultan is a symbolic figure
uniting God and humans.
By being united with God, humans are for the first time able to reach a perfect existence
or budi luhur. There are three stages in this process: nang or a calm state of mind; ning
or a silent state of mind; and nung or unification with God. At the stage of ning, humans
try to close nine orifices of the body, which are eyes, nostrils, ears, mouth, anus and the
genitals. This is a transitional moment when humans move from the secular world to the
sacred one. The sultan, who connects the two worlds, is a symbol of the process of
becoming budi luhur for the Javanese.
The traditional concept memayu hayuning bawana (realization of world peace) is often
verbalised and appreciated by Javanese people, including the sultan. This ideal state of
society is not possible without three important factors: selaras (suitability), seimbang
(balance) and serasi (harmony). The sultan possesses his own “suitable” (selaras)
enabling him to execute his duties in order to contribute to the realization of memayu
hayuning bawana.
The Javanese perceive that this world consists of opposing elements, such as hot and
cold, dark and bright, dirty and clean. Both balance and harmony are very much valued
in Javanese society, and it is Sultan’s sacred duty to maintain and nurture these virtues
with his tolerance and compassion. The devoted preservation of opposing elements is
symbolized in the direction and location of kraton and in the arrangement of other
objects in Yogyakarta.
The sultan’s Kraton itself stands facing Mount Merapi. Between the two, there is a
tower called Tugu. There is an imaginary line from the kraton, to Merapi, which
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validates the relationship between the sultan and God. To the north of the kraton there is
a field known as alun-alun where people gather in the time of court ceremonies. From
the direction of Merapi, the right side of alun-alun is regarded as a sacred world, while
the left side is seen as a secular one. Each world is represented by a tree and by a
symbol, namely, a mosque on the right and a market on the left. Between the two worlds
is the Sultan’s throne, the position of which is a metaphor for the sultan’s sacred duty to
maintain the balance between the two conflicting worlds.
Therefore, it is more accurate to say that the sultan is destined to deal with secular
issues, including politics. If the sultan fails to do so, the society will be chaotic and
unstable, a prospect that people do not welcome in the very least (ogah ribut).
Traditional Governance and its Problems
It is plausible to believe that behind the calls by SBY to remove the special status of the
sultan of Yogyakarta is the desire to avoid having the international community brand
Indonesia as undemocratic. There is no doubt that liberal democracy, with its system of
the election of representatives, is a genuine means of reflecting the voices of the people.
The election of representatives by the people ensures the sovereignty of the citizens.
Many, including Fukuyama, believe that Western liberal and representative democracy
is universally valid, and other systems are obsolete and contradictory to the essence of
democracy. As Jean Jacques Rousseau pointed out, “the idea of representation is a
modern one.” 27
According to such a view, Yogyakarta would be regarded as remaining primitive and
traditional. The people of Yogyakarta are unwilling to abandon their long-lived
civilizational relationship with the sultan. This localism is labelled by Hastangka, an
academic based in Yogyakarta, as Pancasilaist democracy. 28
The essential elements in this local governance are consensus, tolerance, humanism, and
politeness. Hastangka also insists that local factors, such as culture, history, and societal
condition, should not be ignored in building democracy. 29 In the case of Yogyakarta,
these surely are contained in the complex philosophy underlying the Javanese
worldview, the characteristics of the sultan, and the spirituality of the people.
Petrus, an enthusiastic supporter of the sultan, thinks that the current system in
Yogyakarta does not contradict the idea of democracy as a vast majority of the people in
the province have already expressed their wish that the sultan be the governor. 30 He is
27

Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, London, 2004, p.113.
Pancasila is a national ideology which consists of five principles: the belief in One God; humanity; the
unity of Indonesia; democracy guided by the wisdom of representative deliberation; and social justice.
29
Hastangka, “Democrat, Keraton dan Istana”, in Kedaulatan Rakyat 14 December, 2010.
30
Interview conducted by the author in Tembi, 14 December 2010.
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convinced that the sultan will never deviate from the right path as a leader because the
sultan possesses extraordinary character and abilities, including wahyu. 31
There is a Javanese tradition of avoiding the popular vote known as kerajkatan. This
concept emphasizes the totality of the local community, and is based on a decisionmaking system known as musyawarah (deliberation) and mufakat (unanimity). 32 As
Petrus explained in relation to the Javanese, the communal unity and consensus resulting
from these traditional concepts are democratic, in spite of the existence of the sultan as
an absolute leader. These local civilizational concepts are undeniably at variance with
the supposedly universally-accepted principles of Western democratic theory.
Yet, as has been observed, this alternate form of democracy seems to be supported by
the majority of Yogyakartans. It is also crucial for us to note that this local practice
could result in the emergence of a tyrannical ruler. The political mechanism in
Yogyakarta is vulnerable to the development of a dictatorship as there is no system that
can dethrone the sultan in accordance with the will of the people. In this sense, the
current system in Yogyakarta is far from perfect, and there should be more development
in the time to come.
Conclusions
Western liberal democracy might function well in many parts of the world, and the will
of the people is reflected in policies of governments formed within this system.
However, it is a fact that universally some people are reluctant to accept this modern
system. Such is the case with the people in Yogyakarta, people who believe that
Western liberal democracy would not be the most preferred alternative in their locality.
The author does not intend to pass a judgement on which system is better. Rather, what
should be accentuated here is that political behaviour of Yogyakartans is based on the
long-standing civilizational notion of equilibrium with a great emphasis on the sultan.
Tadao Umesao, a noted Japanese anthropologist, defines civilization and culture as:
… civilization as the entire system of daily life, as a system which includes various
devices and institutions. Culture, on the other hand, would designate the system of
values held by those living within the whole system of civilization. 33

For Yogyakartans, the sultan is a civilizational system inseparable from their lives. The
appreciation of equilibrium is a Javanese cultural expression substantiated by their
civilization. What we observe in Yogyakarta is not a personality cult surrounding
31

Interview conducted by the author in Tembi, 14 December 2010.
N. Mulder, Mysticism in Java, Amsterdam, 1998, p.63.
33
T. Umesao, Kindaibunmei ni okeru Nihon Bunmei (Japanese civilisation in modern civilisation,
Tokyo,2000, p.22. The English translation is available at:
http://ir.minpaku.ac.jp/dspace/bitstream/10502/447/1/SES16_002.pdf
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Hamengku Buwono X. Rather, it is the appreciation of Javanese civilization and culture,
which could differentiate it from the Japanese monarchy.
This political system of Yogyakarta cannot be labelled a “democracy” as many
Yogyakartans insist; it is obviously a form of monarchy established around the
sultanate. However, this does not automatically mean that the current system in
Yogyakarta could only bring about corruption. Political decency should be possible as
long as the sultan maintains the integrity associated with the sultanate. As Plato said,
should the chosen leader become a true philosopher, 34 he might be able to do so.
However, the problem is that there is no guarantee of this outcome.
Plato also pointed out that “the form of the good” is an essential qualification for a
rational man, which needless to say includes a ruler or king. Bambang Pudjasworo, an
expert of Javanese philosophy, shares the view of Plato, saying that there is an urgent
need to establish a system of choosing a “right person” as the sultan or of replacing the
sultan if the sultan lacks support for his concept of the good. 35
The possibility of tyrannical rule does not preclude that of political decency. However, it
is the wish of many that Javanese philosophy, which defines the quality and the role of
the sultan, will promote decency over tyranny.
It might be possible that the leadership in Yogyakarta creates a society of peace that
promotes the welfare of the people. However, the most crucial factors for the realization
of this are the political and ethical awareness of the sultan himself, on the one hand, and
the system that verifies the appositeness of the present and future sultans on the other
hand. If these two issues are not properly addressed, the society of Yogyakarta might
fall prey some day to dictatorship and tyranny, and a traditional society based on local
civilization might vanish. The case of Yogyakarta is, thus, a great test of whether
humans have already come to the end of history.
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Fire and Force:
Civilization as Noosphere
in the Works of Teilhard de Chardin
Anthony M. Stevens-Arroyo
stevensa@ptd.net

Someday, after mastering the winds, the waves,
the tides and gravity, we shall harness for God
the energies of love, and then, for a second time in the
history of the world, man will have discovered fire.
-Pierre Teilhard de Chardin

The French Jesuit, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, was a priest trained as a paleontologist.
He became a living proof of the adage that it is luck to be “in the right place at the right
time.” In his career, he was witness to the unraveling of the Piltdown Man hoax in 1912
when he was still a student in England and as a mature scientist worked in the
unearthing of the Peking Man in 1921, a major event in paleontology that revolutionized
much of the early twentieth century thinking about evolution. Silenced by the Vatican,
which was still wrestling with theological implications of evolution, de Chardin turned
to writing more spiritual reflections on the meaning of evolution to the human
experience.
In that context, he addressed the issue of civilization, adopting a strikingly innovative
perspective. Who else, after all, has written about civilizational process as driven by the
“fire and force” of love? This emotional, even mystical, approach to the study of
civilizations, however, is not the only contribution of Teilhard to the field of
civilizational studies.
De Chardin’s 1 thought was highly influenced by his reading of the French Jewish
philosopher, Henri Bergson, (1859-1941) winner of the 1927 Nobel Prize in Literature
for his L'Évolution Créatrice. Published in 1907, Bergson’s work argued against
Herbert Spencer’s rationalist application of Darwin’s theory to human civilization.
Bergson’s objections were important because they refuted a reductionist trend of those
times to impose biological determinism upon human behavior. Although Spencer’s
intentions may be debated, the influence of British Utilitarianism in his writings allowed
the emergence of the raw and reactionary political theory of “Social Darwinism.”
By that measure, society was shaped by “survival of the fittest,” a phrase Spencer
coined to interpret Darwin’s theory. Bergson rejected the notion that human advance
derived solely from social power acting in self-interest and advocated instead a greater
respect for the development of virtuous altruism in evolution. Whether in animal
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instincts towards pack behavior or the human creation of tribal loyalties, Bergson
viewed Darwinism as proof that “the fittest” were not necessarily the biggest and the
strongest but rather the most adaptive and cooperative among the species. To separate
his approach from Spencer’s emphasis on physical power, Bergson stated that evolution
was a spiritual force contained within matter, implicitly repudiating Aristotelianism in
which spirit and matter are counterpoised as quasi-dualistic forces. One can see in the
writings of de Chardin a reflection of Bergson’s humanizing efforts upon Spencer’s
ambitious undertaking.
It would be a grand mistake, however, to equate Teilhard’s theories of the evolution of
civilization to mere repetition of either Bergson or Spencer. De Chardin’s approach to
the human experience is significantly different from that of both predecessors for its
scientific understanding of evolution, its emphasis upon futurity, and its Christian
mysticism. His theories demand familiarity with paleontology, an education in Classical
Greek philosophy and patience with countless neologisms. Those qualities, not
incidentally, also stamped his work as so idiosyncratic as to avoid falling within any one
alone of the academic disciplines of biology, theology or history.
In our own discipline of Civilizational Studies, one can link individual scholars of the
ISCSC 2 to de Chardin, but he is seldom cited in the body of work since the 1970s. This
paper will offer an overview of crucial concepts in Teilhard’s thought that bear on
civilizational studies. At issue is whether de Chardin’s notion that evolution is guided
by the fire and force of love can be applied to the institutions and innovations that
characterize civilizations.
I. Orthogenesis and the Evolution of Consciousness
Teilhard disputed theories that made completely random all physical adaptations in the
evolution of species. He proposed instead a theory of orthogenesis, 3 which views
evolution as following a direction towards certain stabilizing configurations. There may
be abortive starts, dead-ends and cataclysmic reversals in the process, but nonetheless
coherence comes from forces that predictably control and govern such comings and
goings among species development. Today, his ideas might best fit under the heading
of “convergent evolution” as described in the writings of Richard Dawkins 4 and Stephen
J. Gould. 5 These scholars propose evolution as the unwinding of diverse and accidental
forces that assume a pattern of fitful development, but which nonetheless eliminates
redundant and unadapted life forms. 6
Teilhard’s orthogenesis ought not to be equated with “Intelligent Design,” a theory
recently elaborated to argue that evolutionary change proves the existence of God.
Despite his unabashed Christian mysticism, de Chardin avoids theological interpretation
of physical forces. Unlike Intelligent Design, Teilhard places the “intelligence” of the
universe within humanity as a basically human attribute, not outside of it as something
imposed by a deity. De Chardin defers from asking for the ‘who’ or ‘what’ that created
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the architecture because, he says, this is not a physical question but a metaphysical one
and he wishes to limits his analysis to the physical realm.
Teilhard identifies energy contained within matter as spiritual substance, so that
everything has a “within” and a “without.” This is a highly important notion, traceable
to Bergson. In de Chardin’s most scientific work, The Phenomenon of Man, written by
1940 but published only posthumously because of Church censures during his lifetime,
he cites the geological evidence for the transformation of gases, cellular microbes, and
plant life into mineral forms. 7 Although they have been created by crystallization, these
minerals should be examined “biologically,” he says, because they began as organic
forms. Eventually, says de Chardin, what was organic energy in a primordial world
suffered through eons of existence to emerge in mineral form as coal or oil.
After tens of millions of years of evolution, the original energy that was trapped inside
of minerals is now being transformed back to energy by human activity. He describes
this as a “doubling back” of intelligence because human thought discovers both how
minerals were formed and also how the same principles can tap that energy for current
use. Thus, when human technology turns minerals into energy for purposes of
sustaining life, or extending travel, or producing life-rewarding products, matter
becomes spiritual, that is, its existence acquires intelligent purpose that exploits the
chemical processes that formed the substances.
In his celebrated “Hymn to Matter,” Teilhard wrote:
I acclaim you [matter] as the universal power which brings together and unites,
through which the multitudinous monads are bound together and in which they all
converge on the way of the spirit. 8

A key notion in de Chardin’s thought is the continuity between complexified matter 9 --called “controlled additivity” in another place 10 -- and the spiritual characteristics of
energy and consciousness. Molecules gain consciousness in evolution. This occurs
because of “a continuous accumulation of properties” by organic life in a sort of
“snowball” effect that results in thought. As he describes in detail, the nervous system
and brain found in simpler forms of life gradually acquire complexity into a human
brain. Not content to view this evolution in merely physical terms, Teilhard claims that
structural changes in organisms as simple as earthworms were guided by a purposeful
adaptation.
The underlying principles of evolution in those simple organisms eventually produce
human brain ganglia. Thus, argues de Chardin, the purpose of evolution present at the
beginning of change in matter was guided towards the emergence of human
consciousness, a spiritualized result. He may be understood to invoke the principle that
“form follows function.” This, I believe, is a better formulation of how he interprets the
teleology behind the interlocked forces of evolution.
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In defending his theory from the empirical measure that physical reality does not itself
exhibit the spiritual energy of thought, de Chardin insists it is unscientific to conceive of
the brain without locating it within functions that improve the survival of the human
species. Thus, Homo sapiens was not an “accident” of random selection, but the
culmination of an inexorable complexification of matter that achieved its fuller spiritual
dimension with the human brain.
The being who is the object of his own reflection, in consequence, of that very
doubling back upon himself, becomes in a flash able to raise himself to a new
sphere. …life, being an ascent of consciousness could not continue to advance
indefinitely along its line without transforming itself in depth.11

The human species itself emerged from primordial substances and through plants and
animals, said de Chardin, driven by a geo-genetic dynamic wherein matter transformed
itself into consciousness thus becoming spiritual, i.e., intelligent life. Yet at the same
time, intelligence is linked to everything else in the planet, much as when human beings
eat food produced by a food chain. He uses the example of how the top rungs of a
ladder depend upon the lower ones and suggests the process is like the leaves at the top
of a tree which are dependent on the whole system of roots, trunk and branches. 12 He
insists that matter has a spiritual dimension in the energy that undergoes “the
metamorphoses of living creatures.” 13 He writes:
... natural history no longer appears as an interlocking succession of structural
types replacing one another, but as an ascent of inner sap spreading out in a
forest of consolidated instinct… Right at its base, the living world is constituted
by consciousness clothed in flesh and bone… 14

My suggestion here is that Teilhard applies these inexorable processes of
complexification and controlled additivity--- not just to the physical evolution of things,
but also to the social evolution of human institutions. While The Phenomenon of Man,
his book on evolution, explains these principles against the backdrop of paleontology,
his Divine Milieu applies the same principles to civilization. In other words, when a
civilization adds tools, writing, knowledge of time and tides, understanding of
agricultural cycles and the science of engineering to its accumulated knowledge, it has
registered itself as a higher rung in the intellectual evolution of the human species,
continuing on another level the same process that produced the physical characteristics
of humanity. This is how Teilhard links the process that produced the human species
from less evolved matter in nature to the historical emergence of civilizations. Much as
humanity evolved from different hominoid species that give way to more specialized
forms, civilizations are species of human organization that are constantly evolving.
This, I believe, is the essential function of what de Chardin wrote about as the
“Noosphere.”
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II. The Noosphere
The term “Noosphere” is a Teilhardian neologism, created from the classical Greek
words nous ="mind" + sphaira ="sphere". De Chardin defines evolution as the “gaining
of the psychic zones of the world” 15 but this idea is not limited to the prehistoric
emergence of Homo sapiens after millennia of physical change in hominoid species.
The physical emergence, says Teilhard, is only one part of evolution. Humanity has
continued evolution through the creation of civilizations that extend “the psychic zones
of the world” to more and more people. That same process extends not only the
outreach of information to more people; it also exponentially increases the content of
human knowledge that is transmitted. It is natural to the future completion of our
species’ nature, as it was in bringing us to the present moment.
The noosphere is the reservoir of human knowledge. In Teilhard’s theory based on
paleontology, the noosphere functioned for humans as an acquired species’ possession
much as instinct functioned for animals as an inherited possession. The noosphere was
as intrinsic to the evolutionary scheme for psychic development as had been anatomical
changes for physical development. In one place, Teilhard considers the emergence of
consciousness, i.e. of intelligence, as equal in importance to the emergence of solid
matter from “the condensation of the terrestrial chemism or the advent of life itself.” 16
As Teilhard put it:
The time has come to realize that an interpretation of the universe -- even a positivist
one -- remains unsatisfying unless it covers the interior as well as the exterior of things;
mind as well as matter. The true physics is that which will, one day, achieve the
inclusion of man in his wholeness in a coherent picture of the world.17

As the noosphere expanded, theorized de Chardin, it would unify human awareness.
After all scientific knowledge is factual and does not suffer distortion by individual
interpretations, thus the expansion of the body of scientific truth would bring
humankind to agree on a constantly growing data base. This common possession of
knowledge was enrichment of the entire species and not just of individuals.
…there is one phenomenon which, in the eyes of posterity, may well
overshadow everything that has been discovered in radiation and electricity: and
that is the permanent entry into operation, in our day, of inter-human affinities –
the movement, irresistible and ever increasing in speed, which we can see for
ourselves, welding peoples and individuals one to another, for all their
recalcitrance, in a more sublime intoxication. It is the constitution, in progress at
this very moment, of the organized human bloc, powerful and autonomous – the
mass coalescing of humankind. 18

Anticipating the “mass coalescing” of humanity through “inter-human affinities” is not a
remarkable prophecy in this age of Internet and Facebook. But Teilhard wrote this not
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only before the invention of cyberspace and the Internet but in 1929, before the
invention of broadcast television networks.
I venture to say that the accumulated knowledge in cyberspace today in spontaneous
sites approximates Teilhard’s noosphere, a reality that he named
“superconsciousness.” 19 This is both an apt and provocative description of knowledge
residing in cyberspace because it is generated by and belongs to all human beings.
Constantly expanding, it unifies human experience, becoming quite literally a collective
human consciousness on which stands individual human consciousness.
III. Civilization and the Divine Milieu
Proclaiming the inevitability of “the mass coalescing of humankind” for Teilhard is not
equivalent to a guarantee of utopia. His application of evolution to the future of human
civilization does not eliminate the “abortive starts, dead-ends and cataclysmic reversals
in the process” that are the pattern for physical evolution in the past. This nuance can be
captured by recognizing how paleontology views species.
A phylum is a cluster of related species considered as connected to each other through
eons or evolution. Thus, each manifestation of the species covers it, its predecessors
and its heirs, within “an envelope of life” that surrounds all these forms of evolving life.
Consider, for instance, that the Hyracotherium, the prehistoric Eocene ancestor of the
horse, is connected to the modern thoroughbred race horse. Similarly, human
civilization must be analyzed across a long time span to understand its adaptations as
vital to the present survival. Teilhard wants us to view the past, present and future as an
organic whole. He writes:
It is the same in every domain: when anything really new begins to germinate around
us, we cannot distinguish it – for the very good reason that it could only be recognized
in the light of what it is going to be. Yet, if, when it has reached full growth, we look
back to find its starting point, we only find that the starting point itself is now hidden
from our view, destroyed or forgotten. Close as they are to us, where are the first
Greeks and Romans? Where are the first shuttles, chariots, or hearth-stones? And
where, even after the shortest lapse of time, are the first motor-cars, aeroplanes or
cinemas? In biology, in civilization, in linguistics, as in all things, time, like a
draughtsman with an eraser, rubs out every weak line in the drawing of life. 20

Although these different manifestations of energy are dispersed along a ladder in the
order of being, they are, nonetheless, governed by the same forces. And, just as in the
example of gases and organic substances that are fossilized and later return to energy
form under the intelligent use of human kind, Teilhard views the same force to operate
in the shaping of human civilization. In his view, the collapse of past civilizations is a
precondition for the rise of new and better civilizations, very much in parallel with the
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pattern of physical evolution of the species. Along with his bias in favor of Christianity,
he locates the matrix of future civilization with the West, that is, with Europe.
It is easy for the pessimist to belittle that extraordinary period of history during which
in the space of a few thousand years civilizations crumbled one after another into ruin.
But it is surely far more scientific to discern once again, beneath these successive
waxings and wanings, the great spiral of life always irreversibly ascending, but by
stages, along the dominant line of its evolution. Susa, Memphis, Athens may crumble:
but an ever more highly organized awareness of the universe is passed on from hand to
hand and increases with each successive stage in clarity and brilliance….
But in dealing with this historical period we should be allowing sentiment to falsify
fact if we refused to recognize that during its centuries the principal axis of
anthropogenesis has passed through the West. It was in this ardent zone of growth and
universal recasting that all that makes man what he is today was discovered — or at
least must have been rediscovered, for even those things which had long been known
elsewhere achieved their definitive human value only when they were incorporated
into the system of European ideas and activities. We are not being merely naive if we
hail as a great event the discovery by Columbus of America….
The fact is that during the last six thousand years, in the Mediterranean area, a neohumanity has been germinating and is now at this moment completing its absorption
into itself of the remaining vestiges of the Neolithic mosaic of ethnic groupings, so as
to form a new layer, of greater density than all the others, on the noosphere. And the
proof of this is that today, in order to remain human or to become more fully human,
all the peoples from end to end of the earth are being inexorably led to formulate the
world’s hopes and problems in the very terms devised by the West.21

Before interpreting de Chardin as an apologist for the West, however, one should note
that he was quite clear that the human species took physical shape in Africa. To assert
that the noosphere first formed in Europe, then, is likely only a historical recognition
and not the basis for some grand theory of racial or regional superiority. The more
important issue is contained in his statement that “in order to remain human or to
become more fully human, all the peoples from end to end of the earth are being
inexorably led to formulate the world’s hopes and problems.”
Analyzing this statement with the analogy to pre-historic hominoid species, the
challenge to civilization may be understood in stark terms: Western civilization, like
Chinese civilization or Egyptian civilization, is species destined to eventual
obsolescence as were Neanderthals and Peking Man. Just as these forms gave way to
Homo sapiens in the evolutionary process, particular civilizations are evolving into a
common global civilization that unifies rather than divides humanity.
Faithfulness to the evolutionary comparison requires recognition that species do not so
much disappear as they are absorbed. So too, with civilization: as suggested on the
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evolutionary scale of civilizations, positive accomplishments from Egypt and Assyria
are incorporate into the civilizations of Greece and Rome. The novel part of de
Chardin’s evolutionary scale is his dependence on matter as a stage for spiritual
accomplishment. His theory makes no Manichean dichotomy between the idea of
mathematics and the stone used to construct the pyramids of Egypt. One exists within
the other and the advance of the human experience depends as much on the stone as it
does on the idea of mathematics.
The easiest point of entry of de Chardin’s thought to civilizational theory today is in
terms of the environment. Teilhard anticipated many of the environmentalist concerns
of today because of his conception of the pyramid of life. We are, of course, familiar
with related notions like “the food chain.” If humanity pollutes and corrupts the planet
so as to destroy the links of animals and nature and human beings, then humanity
attacks itself. River water, for example, is not just “river water” but an organic
connection in the food chain that is both controlled and used by humanity, but whose
destruction would be a form of species suicide. Its tides connect it organically to cities
alongside its banks, while also framing the commerce and migration of peoples and
ideas for the planet. Think of the Mississippi, therefore, as “Ol’ Man River.”
Teilhard challenges the Hobbesian theories that defined civilization as a conquest over
the forces of nature. The brute confidence that reason and human engineering can
overcome all natural barriers is often cited as the positive legacy of the Enlightenment
and the modern era. In de Chardin, that confidence in human experience is not focused
on overcoming nature, but rather by aligning one’s consciousness in concert with natural
forces. This definition of lasting civilizational achievement as concert with the
environment is found in Teilhard.
Human civilization is the consciousness of all the matter in the universe: the astronomer
is the consciousness of the stars being studied; the carpenter is the intelligence of the
trees that produced his wood. Alongside these positive transformations of matter to the
betterment of humanity are evil perversions that pollute, contaminate and kill. Thus, the
purpose of all God’s creation is fulfilled or frustrated by a set of human choices.
This approach to nature as misunderstood and misused by contemporary society
anticipates the anti-Enlightenment thrust of critical theory as first developed out of the
Frankfurt School by Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno. Where de Chardin parts
company with today’s Post-Modernist thinking, however, is his confidence in a
teleological better place. That better place is the Omega Point and the vehicle to get
there is in Teilhard’s concept of love as the driving force and fire of human
civilizational evolution.
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IV. Love and The Omega Point
The energy that produced the first evolution created the consciousness of the noosphere,
and also impels the human future. “Love is the affinity which links and draws together
the elements of the world... Love, in fact, is the agent of universal synthesis,” writes de
Chardin. It has been very easy for persons with a theological bent to conceive of “love”
thus named as identical to a Christian virtue. However, I believe it is more useful to
understand “love” in Teilhard’s evolutionary scheme as akin to the Greek philosophical
notion of physical unity or magnetism.
Organic life is drawn to and then assimilates other elements, such as when a plant’s
roots seek water and its leaves seek sunlight. These natural forces are absorbed into the
life of the plant and become a higher form of life in the process. The human emotion of
love can be understood to embrace other beings in much the same way. Here, as
elsewhere in his system, Teilhard uses the same concept in paleontology as in
civilization history.
If there were no internal propensity to unite, even at a prodigiously rudimentary level indeed in the molecule itself - it would be physically impossible for love to appear
higher up, with us, in "hominized'' form. . . . Driven by the forces of love, the
fragments of the world seek each other so that the world may come into being. 22

The effects of the noosphere do not eliminate evil, that is, the perverted use of the tools
of technology or the awareness of our connectedness to others. In fact, the possibility to
use science for good increases the evil in the world when science is used to divide or
crush life. For de Chardin, “the Divine Milieu” is not heaven, but rather the general
awareness in society (i.e. the human phylum) that every human use of energy has
cosmic effects on others. Moreover, “God” in his writings is not necessarily the
Christian God, but the Buddhist, Hindu divinity or the non-religious Gaia. Even
atheists fall within his definition of the divine if they consider the earth to have a
beginning. 23
This unity of consciousness will take place in the noosphere of human civilization, but
like a physical force shooting a canon ball into the air, it has a trajectory and a target that
lies in the future. He calls that moment, the “Omega Point.” 24
Because it contains and engenders consciousness, space-time is necessarily of a
convergent nature [and] must somewhere in the future become involuted to a point
which we might call Omega, which fuses and consumes them integrally in itself.25

The Omega Point enables judgments that resemble, but do not constitute Teilhard’s
theory of Good and Evil. He introduces no Decalogue or Pope to set standards of
morality. Is the cosmos becoming more hominized, i.e. humanized with consciousness
of the unfolding of life on the planet? or is that awareness thwarted? Good and Evil,
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says de Chardin, is not constituted by a single act, but in how we respond to events and
use or misuse them to expand life. 26
V. Conclusions
Elements of Teilhard’s thought deserve incorporation into the contemporary field of
civilizational analysis. This may be done, I submit, without need of repeating the
Christian mysticism that was most pronounced in the final works of Teilhard, works that
reflect his preoccupation with the questioning he suffered from Church authorities. It
may not be denied, however, that de Chardin saw the movement towards the future as
shaped and guided by the Christian experience.
He compared the consciousness of the material cosmos in the noosphere to the
communion wafer of bread being consecrated by a priest during the mass into a new
spiritual reality of Christ’s Sacred Body. This is a bit much for a secular
civilizationalist. One may also argue, however, that it was a self-protective apologetic
by de Chardin to shield himself from the incessant prohibitions and condemnations
issued out of the Vatican during his lifetime. 27
There is great reward to civilizationists in his work because he offers an important new
dimension to a futuristic view of civilizational process. This concern with the future
has been especially important in the ground-breaking work of Andrew Targowski 28 who
has focused on a systematic inclusion of ecology, biology, energy, demographics and
the like as factors shaping the future. A similar futurist dimension to civilization is
evident in the work on youth culture 29 by Adán Stevens-Díaz, who has put modern dress
upon Teilhard’s visionary description of the noosphere with his discussion of the power
of the Internet to create flash mobs and revolutionary movements.
Consider as example of non-futuristic thinking most political science and journalistic
reports on the Arab Spring of 2011. Events in Egypt are usually described in terms of
the actions taking place in the famous square or political statements issued in response.
Mention of food shortages, for instance, is generally limited to a background factor
fanning the unpopularity of the Mubarak regime. Civilization is introduced by reference
to a desire to imitate the values of the West or as the result of contact via Internet and
television with Western life styles. In sum, we are asked to view a political awakening
as an intellectual event standing alone and independently from material changes in
nature. De Chardin, in contrast, demands that both experiences are contained within the
same “envelope of life.”
De Chardin’s interpretation of the Arab Spring might run something like this: Climate
change damaged grain crops in Siberia and together with diminishing supply of gasoline
contributed to rising prices of food. These were organic planetary events that brought
an economic crisis in Egyptian and Tunisian societies because these material shortages
altered cultural patterns of consumption. The Internet and social media expanded the

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2012

71

Comparative Civilizations Review, Vol. 66 [2012], No. 66, Art. 20

68

Number 66, Spring 2012

impact of these material changes and shaped an emerging collective consciousness that
the political and economic systems of distribution had to be altered for life to prosper.
Once people deprived of freedom accessed the noosphere, that is, the reservoir of human
experience of such things in other parts of the globe, the people were enabled to take
coordinated actions according to patterns that had been successful in challenging stale
political power. The eventual result of the environmental changes and material
shortages was a new awareness that humanity could be unified around the exercise of
basic principles of liberty and democratic expression. The two forces of nature and
politics are interconnected in this Teilhardian vision because the noosphere of human
consciousness embraces the knowledge of both how to pollute and also how to tumble
regimes.
This sort of analysis, I submit, is the futuristic book end to the materialist-environmental
approach of scholars like Jared Diamond and more recently Ian Morris. If “guns, germs
and steel” are interrelated to civilizational processes in the past, ought we not to look for
similar interactive factors in the future with “Internet, climate change and oil”? In this
way, I believe we can incorporate Teilhard’s definition of the noosphere for studies of
the future course of global civilization. As the French Jesuit wrote, such an effort will
represent that “for a second time in the history of the world, man will have discovered
fire.” 30
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Annotated Bibliography* of the Works of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin
*French titles and date of publication first: English translation follows
Le Phenomenene Humain. Paris, Seuil, 1955/ The Phenomenon of Man. N.Y.: Harper,
1959; 1961 p.b. 1965 revised p.b.
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L'Apparition de l'Homme. Paris, Seuil, 1956 / The Appearance of Man. N.Y.: Harper,
1965.
Teilhard's theory of the origins of man.
La Vision du Passe. Paris, Seuil, 1957 / The Vision of the Past. N.Y.: Harper, 1967.
Development of the themes of The Phenomenon of Man.
Le Milieu divin. Paris, Seuil, 1957 / The Divine Milieu. N.Y.: Harper, 1960; 1965 p.b.
A classic essay on the interior life; a Christian spirituality "for those who love the
world."
L'Avenir de l'Homme. Paris, Seuil, 1959 / The Future of Man. N.Y.: Harper, 1964; 1969
p.b.
Very important to an understanding of Teilhard's vision; sets forth the "grand
option" that modern humanity must confront in facing the evolutionary future.
L'Energie Humaine. Paris, Seuil, 1962 / Human Energy. N.Y.: Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich, 1971; 1972 p.b.
Six of Teilhard's major essays in which the theme of love energy is treated
extensively. Fr. Wildiers considers them of "first importance for the sound
understanding of his teaching. They are perhaps some of the most original and
valuable expositions that he made."
L'Activation de l'Energie. Paris, Seuil, 1963 / The Activation of Energy. N.Y.: Harcourt
Brace Jovanovich 1971; 1972 p.b.
These essays follow chronologically those in Human Energy and are important to
an understanding of the inner coherence of Teilhard's vision.
La Place de l'Homme dans la Nature. Paris, Seuil, 1963 / Man's Place in Nature. N.Y.:
Harper, 1966; 1973 p.b.
Teilhard's concept of man’s place in the whole cosmic process, the evolving
cosmos, includes the famous one on Original Sin which was the cause.
Science et Christ. Paris, Seuil, 1965 / Science and Christ. N.Y.: Harper, 1969.
Rich and stimulating ideas of a Christian philosophy for the modern world.
Comment Je Crois. Paris, Seuil, 1969 / Christianity and Evolution. N.Y.: Harcourt
Brace Jovanovich, 1971; 1974 p.b.
These essays, which set forth Teilhard's vision of the Christian mystery and of his
banishment to China. The original French title could not be used because of the
publication in 1969 of a translation of the title essay "How I Believe" by Harper
paperbacks.
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La Direction de l'Avenir. Paris, Seuil, 1973 / Toward the Future. N.Y.: Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich, 1975; 1975 p.b
The theme is that human fulfillment consists in personal communion with the
divine center of the evolutionary process, culminating in the spiritualization of
matter. Includes the famous essay "The Evolution of Chastity."
Ecrits du Temps de la Guerre, 1916-1919. Paris, Grasset, 1965 / Writings in Time of
War. N.Y.: Harper, 1968.
The germs of all of Teilhard's later thought lie in these essays; they are his
"intellectual testament." Written in the trenches in the midst of war and death, they
are an expression of life, an impassioned vision of the Earth and an adoration of
God. (Seven essays in the French edition are not in the English edition. However,
two will be found in Hymn of the Universe and the remaining five in The Heart of
Matter.)
La Coeur de la Matiere. Paris, Seuil, 1976 / The Heart of Matter. N.Y.: Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich, 1979.
The last of the Collected Works, the book contains in the title essay a spiritual
autobiography and in "The Christic" a development of The Divine Milieu. Written
towards the end of his life, they sum up Teilhard's unique vision.
Hymn of the Universe, New York: Harper & Row. 1961.
Related Works Cited
Bergson, Henri. 1907/1911. Creative Evolution, tr., Arthur Mitchell, New York:
Dover. from L'Évolution Créatrice 1907. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
Dawkins, Richard. 1986. The Blind Watchmaker: Why the Evidence of Evolution
Reveals a Universe without Design. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.
Diamond, Jared. 1997/1999. Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies.
New York: W. W. Norton and Company.
Gould, Stephen J. 1977. Ever Since Darwin: Reflections in Natural History. New York:
W. W. Norton & Company.
Gould, Stephen J. 1980. The Panda's Thumb: More Reflections in Natural History.
New York: W. W. Norton & Company
Horkheimer, Max and Theodor Adorno. 1944. Dialectic of Enlightenment. English
translation by John Cumming (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972)
Morris, Ian. 2010. Why the West Rules – for Now. New York: Farrar, Straus and
Giroux.
Spencer, Herbert. 1896. (1864, 1867; revised and enlarged: 1896), Principles of Biology
in two volumes. D. Appleton & Co., New York.
Spencer, Herbert. 1897. The Principles of Sociology, 3 vols. New York: D. Appleton
and Co., 1876-96.
Stevens-Díaz, Adán. 2011. “Civilization and Youth Culture.” The ISCSC Newsletter, 50
(Winter 2011) 1, 7.
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Stevens-Díaz, Adán. 2006. "Dystopia and Civilizations: Comparison of Social
Movements in the Network Society." Comparative Civilizations Review (55: 7290).
Targowski, Andrew. 2011. “The Civilization Manifesto Towards the Wise Civilization
and New Ideology.” Civilizational Futures: Proceedings of the 2010 Conference of
the International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations. Editors:
Connie Lamb and Andrew Targowski. Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University.
1-59.
Toynbee Arnold. 1946/1974. A Study of History. 10 vols. Abridgement by D. C.
Somervell, 2 vols. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Endnotes
1

His baptismal name is “Pierre”, his surname, “Teilhard” and the title “de Chardin” a tradition for his
family which was given seigniorial rights under King Louis XVIII of France. In this text, “Teilhard” and
“de Chardin” shall be used alternately for reasons of style, since both surnames are his.

2

The late Roger Wescott, President of the ISCSC from 1992 to 1995 was a board member of the Teilhard
Association in 1974. See: http://www.teilharddechardin.org/history_8.html

3

The Phenomenon of Man pg. 70.

4

1986. The Blind Watchmaker: Why the Evidence of Evolution Reveals a Universe without Design. New
York: W. W. Norton & Company.
5

Ever Since Darwin: Reflections in Natural History. 1977. New York: W. W. Norton & Company; and
The Panda's Thumb: More Reflections in Natural History. 1980. New York: W. W. Norton & Company

6

“The earth was probably born by accident; but in accordance with one of the most general laws of
evolution, scarcely had this accident happened that it was immediately made use of and recast into
something naturally directed. By the very mechanism of its birth, the film in which the ‘within’ of the
earth was concentrated and deepened emerges under our eyes in the form of an organic whole in which no
element can any longer be separated from those surround it.” The Phenomenon of Man, 74.

7

The Phenomenon of Man pp. 68ff.

8

Hymn to the Universe, 1961.

9

The Phenomenon of Man p. 48.

10

The Phenomenon of Man, p. 141.

11

The Phenomenon of Man, pp. 165-166.

12

The Phenomenon of Man pg. 103ff, see 119-120.

13

The Phenomenon of Man, pg. 69.
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The Phenomenon of Man, p. 151.

15

…evolution is now, whether we like it or not, gaining the psychic zones of the world and transferring to
the spiritual constructions of life not only the cosmic stuff but also the cosmic ' primacy ' hitherto reserved
by science to the tangled whirlwind of the ancient ‘ether'. --The Phenomenon of Man, 220
16

The Phenomenon of Man, p. 183.

17

The Phenomenon of Man, pp. 35-36.

18

Toward the Future, p. 20.

19

“We are faced with a harmonized collectivity of consciousnesses to a sort of superconciousness. The
earth is not only becoming covered by myriads of grains of thought, but becoming enclosed in a single
thinking envelope, a single unanimous reflection." (The Phenomenon of Man 1961, pp. 251-2)
20

The Phenomenon of Man, p.121.

21

Hymn of the Universe, p. 34 (online version)

22
23

The Phenomenon of Man, p. 264.
See Toward the Future, pp. 40-59 et passim.

24

The name for the Omega point derives from Revelation 1:8 in the Christian Scriptures that speaks of
God as the “Alpha and the Omega.”

25

The Phenomenon of Man p. 259.

26

"Not everything is immediately good to those who seek God; but everything is capable of becoming
good" (Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, The Divine Milieu [New York: Harper & Row, 1960], 86). Also: “In
the final analysis, the questions of why bad things happen to good people transmutes itself into some very
different questions, no longer asking why something happened, but asking how we will respond, what we
intend to do now that it happened.”
27

Gradually, the works of Teilhard gained greater acceptance and became a Catholic view on evolution
and futuristic studies. Consider the front-page article by Cardinal Agostino Casaroli wrote of
l'Osservatore Romano on June 10, 1981:"What our contemporaries will undoubtedly remember, beyond
the difficulties of conception and deficiencies of expression in this audacious attempt to reach a synthesis,
is the testimony of the coherent life of a man possessed by Christ in the depths of his soul. He was
concerned with honoring both faith and reason, and anticipated the response to John Paul II's appeal: 'Be
not afraid, open, open wide to Christ the doors of the immense domains of culture, civilization, and
progress.” There is some solace that this image of the consecration of a secular matter by Christians was
recently upheld by Pope Benedict XVI as an inspiration taken from Teilhard for all Catholics. ‘This is
also the great vision of Teilhard de Chardin: in the end we shall achieve a true cosmic liturgy, where the
cosmos becomes a living host.”
http://www.traditioninaction.org/ProgressivistDoc/A_120_RatzTeilhardl.html.
28

Targowski, Andrew. 2011. “The Civilization Manifesto Towards the Wise Civilization and New
Ideology.” Civilizational Futures: Proceedings of the 2010 Conference of the International Society for the
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Comparative Study of Civilizations. Editors: Connie Lamb and Andrew Targowski. Provo, Utah:
Brigham Young University. 1-59.
29

Stevens-Díaz, Adán. 2011. “Civilization and Youth Culture.” The ISCSC Newsletter, 50 (Winter 2011)
1, 7. and. 2006. "Dystopia and Civilizations: Comparison of Social Movements in the Network Society."
Comparative Civilizations Review (55: 72-90).
30

“The Evolution of Chastity” in Toward the Future. London: Collins, 1975, 86-87.
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A Brief History of International Money Supply
Systems in Major Civilizations
with a Focus on Links
to Major Economic Depressions
Kazutake Miyahara

Kobe City Univ. of Foreign Studies
ma26ax36ml@kcn.jp

My hypothesis is: A civilization is formed with a pairing of language and money under
a political system. For example, the contemporary Japanese civilization is being formed
with the Japanese language and Japanese yen under Japanese government.
In a previous paper (Comparative Civilizations Review No. 60, Spring 2009) 1 I wrote
that civilization is a process that integrates whole civilizations on the Earth, and that
globalization today is being advanced with mainly American English and the U.S.
dollar. I also described there the important role of major linguae francae, international
languages.
So this time I would like to describe international money supply systems in major
mainstream civilizations: Sumerian, Mesopotamian, Achaemenid Persian, Greek,
Roman, French, British and American versions. A global civilization would require an
international currency as well as an international language.
I will conclude by arguing that inadequate or unfit international money supply systems
are a major cause of economic crises or depressions, and I will suggest a new supply
system of international currency.
What is money?
Money, currency, is a sign of trust with a certain value in a human group, and its
function is to exchange goods and services, to preserve and measure value, and to invest
as capital. However, we must remember that the most important essence of money is
trust. If trust in a society’s monetary system is lost, the money will not be accepted or
circulate.
Materials for money
Currencies with utility value can be cereals, salt, dry fish, livestock and other items with
real value in practical life. Cereals were often used for money with utility value in the
earliest civilizations. In the case of the Yellow River civilization, it was millet, and in
the Mesoamerican civilizations, it was corn.
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Examples of items used for money with symbolic value are gold, silver, copper, iron,
shell, and stone. In a small society, people could use shell, stone and other symbolic
materials as money. But in a larger society, metals were more commonly used.
Gradually the ranks of those metals became clear according to their symbolic value.
Gold became the first and silver was the second and the average exchange ratio between
gold and silver was usually from one to thirteen to one to fifteen. But those precious
metals were always in short supply in every civilization in each period. Thus, political
authorities and people always felt a “money shortage” owing to a material shortage.
Metals may have some practical value as well as symbolic value, especially in the
modern world.
Currencies with symbolic value only are paper moneys, which are usually backed with
the trust of their issuer’s banks. Otherwise, paper is just paper, fragile and of little
practical value. Banks have sometimes failed to meet the society’s expectation. To
correct this, political authorities have often designated a money-issuing bank as a
national central bank. A paper money monetary system usually gains trust with the
support of the political authorities.
There are many auxiliary paper currencies in modern civilizations, such as checks,
promissory notes, bills of exchange, postal money orders, and so on. Also, today plastic
money, credit cards, and electronic money on computers constitute moneys with
symbolic value only. Those forms of currency were very fragile originally and were not
trusted in preindustrial society.
But in economically developed societies, trust levels were raised among organizations
and people in general and those monetary devices and systems became widely used and
accepted.
Civilization, Money and Cities
Cities and civilization are critically dependent on both language and money. Why
money? Because if money is supplied to the society, “Division of Labor” becomes
possible. The division of labor allows the development of many kinds of specialists,
such as political leaders, priests, officers, military, merchants, craftsmen, and scholars.
Specialists such as these made possible the creation of more advanced cities and
civilizations.
In rural areas, people lived a self-sufficient life and seldom used money. But in cities
people could not live without money. City dwellers are all specialists of some kind, and
new cultures or civilizations are usually born in cities, where money is very actively
circulating.
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Money and Political Authority
Political authority has usually played an essential role in the development of
civilizations. How does a political authority build and manage civilizations? The tools
are primarily two: language and currency. The political authorities build a civilization
by using language and by supplying and managing money. Money suppliers are usually
political authorities, but if they fail in supplying or managing money, they suffer from
serious disorder and are usually removed. Thus, political authority and the monetary
system of a civilization have an intimate relationship.
What is international currency?
International currency is the money used for international, beyond border businesses. It
makes possible the international division of labor. However, it is not for business only.
International business conveys and diffuses the cultures of mainstream civilization to
other civilizations. It also works as a promoter for cultural integration together with its
lingua franca.
For example, after World War II Japan accumulated large amounts of U.S. dollars
through its businesses, and with the accumulated dollars it purchased many items of
American culture such as industrial technology, books, movies, TV programs, and
computer software. Japanese students studied in the United States, paying in U.S.
dollars. Using U.S. dollars, Japan extended its businesses worldwide and spread not
only American culture but also Japanese culture. The U.S. dollar came to be used as a
world currency. Then what is international currency? We could say it is the money used
to form a global civilization.
Moneys in Major Agrarian Mainstream Civilizations
Money in Sumerian Civilization (2800―2300 BCE). The temple was the center of
political authority in Sumerian civilization and received from farmers significant
amounts of wheat and barley as ‘dedications’. The temple allotted these dedications to
their priests, military, officials, craftsmen and so forth. As a wielder of political
authority, the temple promoted the civilization using the cereals it had been given as
money. Though they did not have symbolic international money, their cereals played the
role of international money, as did the Sumerian language. This means that the cereals
paid for the development of Mesopotamian culture.
Money in Mesopotamian Civilization (2300―1700 BCE). Akkadians conquered the
whole region of Mesopotamia and Akkadian kings provided mainly cereal moneys, and
some silver. During the third Ur dynasty, silver became the value standard and the silver
ingot was used as money. In the Babylonian dynasty wages were paid not only in
cereals but also in silver ingot. Also, in Hammurabi’s Code (1750 BCE) the interest rate
was proscribed at 20% for silver and 33% for barley. 2 This means that the city dwellers
76
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were dependent on money, so when they felt a lack of money, they were obliged to
borrow.
Did Mesopotamian Civilization have international money? Maybe not. But both the
cereals and the silver ingots were used for the conduct of international business and the
Mesopotamian culture was transferred beyond their borders together with the Akkadian
language, the lingua franca in those days.
Money in Achaemenid Persian Civilization (560―330 BCE). The Persian kings
Cyrus the Great (560―530 BCE) and Darius I (550―486 BCE) built the Achaemenid
Empire which was the largest and most powerful in human history until that time. The
borders stretched from the Indus River (India) in the east to Egypt in the west.
Darius I revolutionized the Persian economy by introducing a silver and gold coinage
system to the empire. Adopting Aramaic as the official language, developing standard
weights and measures, and creating a postal service along the new Royal Road (a
highway system), he facilitated the exchange of commodities across a vast empire. 3
Among these accomplishments, the most important decisions were that Darius adopted
Aramaic as official language of the empire and silver and gold coinage as common
money in the empire. The use of gold coinage was especially important because it
dominated the world as the most trusted currency thereafter for more than 2,000 years.
Zoroastrianism was the de facto state religion of the empire and it banned slavery.
Therefore, for example, when Darius constructed Persepolis, he paid workers in silver
and gold coins. The workers had been invited from many countries; stone cutters came
from Greece and Asia Minor, goldsmiths from Egypt, and brick makers from Babylon.
Also, cedar came from Lebanon and gold from Bactria. 4 This means that Persian coins,
gold and silver, served as international money.
In later days, Persian kings ordered their tax collectors to collect taxes in gold and silver
coins. The ratio between gold and silver in the empire was 1:13.
Persian kings issued gold and silver coins as domestic money but they were at the same
time used for international purposes. Because the gold and silver coins were purely gold
and silver, they maintained the same value outside the empire. As a result, gold and
silver coins conveyed the Persian cultures to other civilizations.
Money in Greek Civilization (800―150 BCE). Phoenicia was primarily a commercial
society. Its merchants bartered, using no money. They could not build a civilization
without money. However, Athens began to use silver ingots for trade. One reason for
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this is that Athens had a silver mine near their city; later they minted silver coins and
issued them as money.
Neighboring Sparta, on the other hand, had neither silver or gold mines nearby. Wars
were costly, and Sparta had little money to pay for them, especially if they were lengthy
wars. The economically more powerful Athens defeated Sparta.
Macedonia possessed gold mines and King Philip, the father of Alexander the Great,
minted gold coins. This gold enabled Macedonia to become a strong economic and
military power, and it supported Alexander’s wars. 5 When he conquered the Persian
Empire, he looted huge amounts of gold and gold coins from the Persian palaces. Also,
he released the bulk silver and gold concealed in the Persian motherland, introducing a
huge amount of money into the whole empire he conquered. As a result, the economy of
the empire was vitalized and the people prospered.
Athenian silver coins were widely used in the Mediterranean world but after
Alexander’s conquest of the Persian Empire, Greek coins became international money
throughout the empire and beyond. “Koine,” Greek language, followed as well.
Money in Roman Civilization (272 BCE―476 CE). In the 4th century BCE, bronze
coins were cast and were used to pay wages for the military. Also a silver coin, the
“denarius,” was created in the 2nd century BCE. In those days Rome’s city population
reached up to 1.25 million and the shortage of materials for money became serious. As a
result, the coins were “light weighted.”
For example, the weight of bronze coins changed from 273 grams →100g→27 g→9g
and the coins eventually became brass. Also, silver coins vanished and were replaced
with copper coins. The weight of the gold coin was lightened from 8.18 g to 4.5 g in the
period of Constantine the Great (306―337 CE). 6 Another reason for the money
shortage came from increased importation of merchandise from overseas locations such
as India and China.
This means that massive amounts of gold and silver coins flowed out of the Roman
Empire. Even today many Roman gold coins are found in Indian ruins. A serious money
shortage left the Roman economy inactive and weakened. Finally inflation attacked
Rome in the middle of the 5th century and the Roman Empire collapsed by 476 CE.
Latin served as the lingua franca and helped to spread Roman Civilization. The Roman
money was used in international markets, and helped to spread Roman culture too,
though its influence was not as great as that of Latin.
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Notable currencies in other civilizations.
Byzantium. The solidus gold coin was the standard money of the Byzantine Empire and
it served as an international money in the eastern Mediterranean world in the 12th
century. Byzantium obtained gold from several conquered countries and institutions:
gold mines in the Ural Mountains, treasures of the churches and monasteries, and from
the surplus of international commerce. The solidus gold coin worked as a promoter for
cultural integration in the region.
Sassanian Persia. The Sassanians adopted the silver standard.
Mongolian China. From 1260 to 1356, Mongolian China issued paper money for 96
years. At the end of the 13th century, an Italian traveler wrote in his book, ”The Travels
of Marco Polo,” that he was deeply surprised to see paper money, which circulated
throughout the vast Chinese empire, although gold and silver were used for money in
most of the other countries in the world. However, when certain economic policies
failed, and inflation attacked the empire, the political authority of the Mongolians
collapsed. That was in 1368. After the failure of paper money, China adopted the silver
standard system until the beginning of the 20th century.
Despite this failure, the experience of Mongolian China demonstrated that paper money
can be fully useful and effective when the extant political authority is trusted by the
people.
Money in French Civilization (800―1700 CE). In 780 CE, Charlemagne (742―814),
the king of Franks, established a monopoly to mint money in his kingdom. But coins
were all silver coins, such as the Libra, solidus and denarius. The value of one Libra was
twenty solidi and one solidus was twelve denarii. He procured a huge volume of silver
from the stocks in his kingdom, war booty, foreign trade with the Islamic nations, and
silver mines in his country. In Western Europe, the silver standard continued, but gold
coins from Byzantine and Islamic nations came into France and were also used there
and circulated.
Thus, French authorities either could not strictly control their money supply, or they
welcomed the arrival of gold coinage in order to do business with Byzantines and
Muslims.
The period between the 11th and the 13th century was a prosperous one and the
population increased significantly. This made possible the Crusades to the Middle East.
Population growth and a gradual increase in trade and commerce required much more
money in France. But the French kings suffered from a serious shortage of silver. In this
period, the king began to collect taxes, as much as possible, in silver and silver coins.
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During the Middle Ages in Western Europe, the silver standard continued, but the
French King Louis IX minted an Ecu gold coin in 1266. It was 14 years after that when
Genoa and Florence in Italy began to issue gold coins. This tendency meant that gold
was expanding its predominance even in Western Europe.
In the 14th and 15th centuries, a dearth of gold metal occurred and it was especially
serious in the Iberian Peninsula, where people used gold to buy spice, sugar, jewels and
other luxury items. This shortage of silver and gold gave birth to the “bill of exchange.”
This shortage was the main stimulus that motivated the Spanish and Portuguese to sail
overseas in search of gold, silver, and new trade routes to the east. This opened “the Age
of Discovery.” 7
As a result, Spain and Portugal conquered most of Latin America and brought back huge
volumes of silver and gold to Europe. This meant that both countries issued huge
amounts of money, which resulted in serious inflation in their economies. Much of the
gold and silver was used to purchase goods manufactured in other countries rather than
in Iberia. As a result, Spain and Portugal became weaker while England and France
became more powerful and eventually dominated Europe.
Until the 18th century, France was a dominant civilization in Western Europe based on
its agriculture rather than on trade, commerce and industrial growth per se. As a result,
commercial and monetary centers did not exist in France except for the Champagne fairs
of the 12th and the 13th centuries. On the other hand, the northern European nations
organized a commercial confederacy, the Hanseatic League of North German Cities.
The monetary (financial) center moved from Flanders to the Netherlands and finally to
Britain.
In the case of French Civilization, they did not have an eminent international money,
except for the Ecu gold coin in the 13th century. The French language was welcomed in
other areas but their money was neither active nor influential in the outside world.
Summary of Money in Agrarian Civilizations. In an agrarian society, most people
lived a self-sufficient life based on subsistence farming. Therefore, they did not have
great need for money. However, the political rulers did need to pay their officers,
military, clergy, craftsmen, scholars, merchants and civil servants. So the political
authorities forced their people to ‘dedicate’ cereals to the temple, and those cereals
became money in the original civilizations. But cereals were too bulky and troublesome
to handle.
Soon after civilizations developed, they began to use more portable monies such as the
silver ingot and gold coins. Besides being more portable, why were silver and gold coins
welcomed?
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It was primarily because those brilliant metals were non-corrosive, beautiful and
appealed to people instinctively. This, along with a short supply of the materials, helped
give it value worldwide, except for within the Egyptian Civilization, where they deemed
gold as god and did not use it as money.
The biggest problem for these precious metals was the shortage of materials for money
everywhere, anytime on the earth.
Yet another serious problem was that political authorities could not effectively control
silver and gold moneys, because they moved so easily in and out of a country’s borders.
Gold and silver coins were from the start international moneys and they circulated not
only in domestic markets but also overseas. Therefore, during the agrarian period,
domestic money supply systems were simultaneously the international money supply
systems.
From the 15th century to the 16th century, the Western European countries promoted
Mercantilism in order to obtain national wealth based on gold, silver, and surplus money
from foreign trade. Every king competed with other rulers to build rich nations and
obtain overseas colonies. Mercantilism and colonialism constituted in effect major
efforts to gain gold, silver and surplus money for the West Europeans as the agrarian
civilizations were coming to an end.
Throughout the agrarian period, after the Achaemenid Persian Civilization, the
mainstream civilizations including Byzantine and Islamic issued prominent gold coins
and these circulated well beyond borders of nations and empires. This demonstrates that
gold was always trusted by most people in the world and, consequently it was the
primary international money used throughout the agrarian period.
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Currencies in the Industrial Period
Money in British Civilization (1700―1940). Prior to the industrial revolution,
England began a transition from an economy based primarily on agriculture to one
based on trade and commerce. Mercantilism was the prevailing economic policy. In the
era of Edward III (1327―77), England was an exporter of raw wool to Flanders and the
Netherlands, and an importer of woolen textiles from them. The king wanted to change
this economic structure, and he did so by banning raw wool exports and encouraging
woolen textile manufacturers. He invited skilled weavers and dyers from the
Netherlands and Flanders to come to England. These craftsmen built their own
manufactures mainly in the rural area, where no guild could control them. 8 They
developed the British woolen and worsted industry, and later this industry helped to lead
Britain to the Industrial Revolution.
In 17th century England, the industrial world was suffering from a serious money
shortage (a lack of capital). This had a great impact on existing and new businesses. The
money shortage was due primarily to a shortage of gold and silver. Consequently many
bankers appeared to fill this shortage and began to issue bank notes, which were a
private paper money backed by the issuing banks. But there was disorder and confusion
in the society without a value standard and common money.
Among those banks, the Bank of England seemed to be trustworthy, and it was given a
monopoly title to issue bank notes. In 1694 the Bank of England became a central bank
of England and began to issue convertible notes. The Bank of England was the first
central bank in the world, and it was the politically authorized bank in charge of
England’s money supply and management. The convertible notes could reduce the
volume of gold needed to circulate, but the bank had to increase the gold reserve
according to the expansion of the national economy.
In 1703, a free trade agreement between Britain and the Portuguese was concluded, and
this made it possible for Britain to export huge volumes of woolen textiles to Brazil,
Portugal’s colony. In return, Britain received enormous quantities of gold from Brazil.
As gold gradually accumulated in London, the money center of Europe moved from
Amsterdam to London. The Brazilian gold was invested in new industries and played a
critical role in bringing about the Industrial Revolution in 18th century Britain. For more
than 2000 years, Western Europe had been buying Asian products, primarily from India
and China, and paying for them with gold and silver. But Britain changed this trend by
forcing India to become Britain’s colony. Manufactured products such as cotton textiles
were exported to India, and Britain received gold and silver in return.
Most of the world also imported British products, further increasing gold accumulation
in London, which eventually became the No. 1 international financial center of the
world. Worldwide bankers, insurance and shipping companies established their offices
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in London and settled their drafts and documents. The Pound Sterling was used by these
businesses as the international key money.
In 1844, the Bank of England was officially chartered as the central bank of Britain and
began to serve, in effect, as a central bank of the world. For example, when it lowered
the interest rate of the Pound, an outward flow of gold began. This meant that the Bank
of England supplied money to the world economy. But the Bank always had to reserve a
certain amount of gold, since the Pound was under the gold standard system. Under this
system, when the world economy expanded, more gold had to be provided. Fortunately,
in 1848 gold was discovered in California, then later in Australia and Siberia. In the
1890s South Africa began to produce much gold and, altogether, this helped to fulfill the
world’s needs.
Most of the major banks, governments, and trading firms in the world opened deposit
accounts in London. Britain became “the world bank” after having been the “world
factory.” In the latter half of the 19th century, Britain’s balance of payment in foreign
trade became unfavorable due to fewer exports and increased imports. But other income
from shipping, insurance, and overseas investments contributed to England’s overall
favorable balance of payments with these surpluses.
Backed with these surpluses, the Pound Sterling maintained its strength as did the gold
standard system. As one result, the rest of the world trusted the Pound Sterling and it
served as the international key money for about 100 years, from the middle of the 19th
century to the middle of the 20th century. During this period, the Bank of England, as a
political authority, provided international money and this helped to form the world
economy. Therefore, interdependence of the economies of nations grew, and this began
to form a global civilization.
After 1870, the rest of the major countries of the world (except for China) joined this
system and adopted the gold standard. In the case of the agrarian French Civilization,
the French language was more influential than the French currency. But in the case of
industrial Britain, its money played much a more important role than its language and
the Pound Sterling was crucial in integrating the whole world.
Money in American Civilization (1800―Present). During the colonial period,
America had to import many kinds of industrial products from Britain. Gold continued
to flow out of America to Britain. Moreover, the British government followed the
economic policy of Mercantilism and did not pay for raw materials in gold coin.
Consequently, colonial America always suffered from a serious money shortage. This
was one of the major reasons why Americans wanted independence.
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In order to cover the huge amount of war expenditure to fight the War for Independence,
the new America established a new bank based on funding from France and issued
government bills. In 1792 the Money Act was enacted and the U.S. dollar was born. It
was a bi-metallic standard with the ratio between gold and silver set at 1:15.
When the American Civil War began, the government issued paper money called “green
backs” to pay for the cost of war. In the beginning, these were convertible but they
became unconvertible later, because total money volume increased and gold stocks
vanished. Even so, people trusted their government and the now-unconvertible green
backs circulated throughout the nation.
In 1873 the United States adopted the gold standard system, and in 1913 the Federal
Reserve Banks were established as the central banks of the United States.
After World War I, America changed from being a debtor to a creditor nation in the
world economy. Major parts of Europe were destroyed by the war but America avoided
destruction of its homeland. Moreover, America was positioned to sell huge quantities
of merchandise to Europe, and as a result, it enjoyed the prosperity of the so called
“golden 20s.”
But this meant that the majority of the gold in the whole world accumulated in America
and the rest of the world suffered from a crisis of gold shortage. America had collected
the majority of the world’s gold and the rest of the world had little, so the world
economy stopped moving. This was the original cause of the Great Depression in the
1930s.
Britain lost huge amounts of its gold supplies and could not maintain the gold standard.
It adopted the “managed money system” (unconvertible paper money).
The rest of the world followed Britain. Under the managed money system, each country
could issue unconvertible paper money without the backing of gold. Local economies
recovered a little but this situation meant that all moneys in the world now lost
significance and value beyond their own nation’s borders. As explained in the case of
Mongolian China in the 13th and 14th centuries, the unconvertible paper money could
circulate within the empire, but it was not trusted outside the country.
Similarly, no paper money -- including the U.S. dollar -- was completely trusted in
international markets. Industrialized civilizations could not survive without a stable
international money supply, and the world put faint trust in the Pound Sterling as key
money, because it was already weak and unstable. The major nations began exchange
dumping to do favorable foreign business. The exchange dumping war was one of the
major reasons for World War II.
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After the War concluded, it was found that 75% of the official gold reserves in the world
had accumulated in America. 9 Based on this American gold, the major Western nations
agreed to establish the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and asked the American
government to issue international money under the rules of the IMF.
The main rule was this: the exchange rate was fixed under the international gold
standard. Namely, one ounce of gold was equivalent to the U.S. $35.00. Instead of the
British Pound, the U.S. dollar became the key international money after 1944, when the
IMF treaty was concluded.
As long as the U.S. dollar was backed with gold, the dollar was trusted by other nations.
But when the American gold reserve began to decrease as a result of consecutive red ink
in that nation’s international balance of payments, the value of the dollar fell lower
against other major moneys.
Now, we must recognize that the IMF treaty was intended to form an international
money supply system through the American red ink balance in international payments.
From the beginning, this was a really strange system though it was backed with gold.
America imports goods and services from abroad more than America exports. This
American deficit makes dollars flow out and provides dollars to the world economy.
Therefore, America must buy more and more every year to make deficits so that
America can supply international money. Then the U.S. dollar can keep its status as the
international key money. However, we must note that this money supply system
promoted “globalization” together with the American version of English.
The Original Cause of the Financial Crisis in 2008.
By 1971, America’s gold reserves had decreased to crisis levels. President Nixon
decided to abandon the international gold standard. At this point, gold ceased its long
life as money in civilization history. At the same time the U.S. dollar lost its backing by
gold, and the value of the dollar decreased sharply at the exchange market. For example,
one dollar ($1) went from 360 to 265 Japanese yen in 1971.
The exchange market changed from a fixed rate to a floating rate. Under this floating
system, the exchange rate between the U.S. dollar and the Japanese yen changed as
follows: $1 = 265 yen in 1971, 145 yen in 1990, 105 yen in 2000, and 90 yen in 2008. 10
Why did the U.S. dollar decrease in relative value? Because the U.S. economy
accumulated huge debts and the country couldn’t balance its international trade. From
1971, the U.S. economy has continued to accumulate debts every year consecutively.
This has continued up until the present time.
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The red ink amounts were $1,303 million in 1971; $19,407 million in 1980; $80,864
million in 1990; $379,835 million in 2000; and $700,000 million in 2007.11
Thus, for the past 40 years, debts have been accumulating and totals have reached
unprecedented levels. So finally America has become the largest debtor in the world
though it is still considered to be the richest country. (The major creditors are China,
Japan and the EU.)
However, we must remember that this is the international money supply system since
1971. Through the huge amount of American deficits in foreign business, an
international money has been supplied to the world economy. This means that
tremendous amounts of money have been supplied to the world economy, which has led
to two different kinds of effects.
One is that it has expanded the scale of the world economy and has helped to develop
countries such as China and India. The other is that currencies have flooded worldwide,
especially in industrialized countries such as Japan and the nations of the EU. This
money flood has pushed the interest rate down in the developed countries. It has been
especially low in Japan for more than 10 years. Its official rate has been 0.1%~0.3 %. 12
Large amounts of money have flooded the American economy as well, and American
financial enterprises have had to find areas in which to invest the money. They
approached the government and Congress for assistance. In order to find ways to invest
in-flowing supplies of moneys, the government established housing loan organizations
such as Freddie Mac, later adding Fannie Mae, and it supported them. Shortly afterward,
subprime loans appeared. Also, financial enterprises have developed financial
engineering with many economists’ help, and so they have invented new financial
instruments, which are called “derivatives.” Then, these instruments have been sold
worldwide.
By 2008 it became clear that the new financial instruments were really poisonous
derivatives. Major financial enterprises in the world held those derivatives in huge
quantities. For example, the total amount of CDS (credit default swaps) reached to $54
trillion,13 and financial businesses fell into a distrust of one other. Then almost all
moneys stopped moving among financial enterprises worldwide.
This was the first step of the global financial crisis that began in 2008.
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As explained above, the original cause of the crisis was not the derivatives alone, but
rather it was the flood of money. The money flood produced very low interest rates and
created a demand for the derivatives. Why was there a flood of money? Because
Americans paid huge amounts in U.S. dollars to foreign exporters for vast quantities of
consumer goods. In the process they accumulated huge debts over the past few decades.
The accumulated debts were the real cause of the money flood.
Why then, could Americans import so many foreign products? The answer: the U.S.
dollar made it possible, since it is the key international money. (This also enabled
America to begin the Afghan and Iraq wars.)
The conclusion is that the current international money supply system has been the
leading cause of the financial crisis since 2008.
The Future of the International Currency Supply System
Except for the paper money used in Mongolian China at the end of the 13th and the
beginning of the 14th century, almost all moneys issued in mainstream civilizations
during the agrarian period were gold and silver coins. And they were international
moneys at the same time. Thus gold and silver were universal moneys, especially gold,
and they were trusted by people beyond national borders.
Therefore, when the British Civilization opened the industrial period, they had to adopt
the gold standard system and the rest of the world followed them. But it became clear
that the volume of gold was limited as a natural resource.
This was especially true after World War I. More than 70% of gold for money in the
world accumulated in America and the rest of the world suffered from a serious shortage
of gold for the gold standard system. This meant that most countries had little money to
manage their economy. The whole world suffered from the Great Depression, and each
nation adopted the managed paper money system and abandoned the gold standard. As
the result, each civilization could issue paper money and manage it for its own
economy. The Great Depression helped to move all nations to abandon backing their
money with gold.
Once this occurred, each civilization could issue paper money and manage its economy
but there was no authority to supply international money, though the industrialized
civilizations had to have an international money supply system.
Then the world had to fight World War II. During that War, an international conference
was held in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire in 1944 and the participants discussed how
to organize an authority to supply international money (global reserve currency). They
agreed to establish the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and asked America to supply
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the international money under the rules agreed upon. At this stage, almost all national
moneys in the world were under the managed paper money system. But there was little
trust of those paper moneys and the international key money had to be backed with gold.
Backed with gold, the U.S. dollar became an international key money. (This is also
called international reserve money.)
However, this Bretton Woods system had a fundamental paradox. In 1960 Yale
economist Robert Triffin indicated that the use of a national money as international
reserve money leads to a tension between national monetary policy and international
monetary policy. 14 This was the well known “Triffin Dilemma,” and it became obvious
when President Nixon announced in August 1971 that the dollar could no longer be
exchanged for gold.
By the 1960s the American economy was strong and it continued to accumulate a
surplus in its international balance of payments. This meant that U.S. dollars were not
supplied to the world economy and the world faced a serious international money
shortage, namely the dollar shortage. In order to fill this shortage, the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) created a new money system, Special Drawing Rights (SDR), in
1969 and it allocated them to the member nations according to the contributed amounts
to use this new money when their reserve of U.S. dollars became scarce.
However, with the end of the 1960s the American economy began to accumulate
deficits in its international balance of payments. So, the world had little need for the new
money (SDR), and they have been usually used in IMF documents and as the basis for
international fees owed to the Universal Postal Union.
In 1987 Harvard economist Richard N. Cooper wrote in his book that the SDR would be
taken up about 2010 as the international money. 15 In connection with the financial
crisis of 2008, the governor of the People’s Bank of China (Chinese Central Bank),
Zhou Xiaochuan, in fact proposed in March 2009 to adopt the SDR as a global reserve
currency. 16
When the Bretton Woods conference was held in 1944, a leader of the British
delegation, economist John Maynard Keynes, proposed the ‘Bancor’ (which means
‘paper gold’) system. Though his proposal was very different from the later SDR, the
idea itself was close to the SDR. Thus, Keynes’ proposal was not accepted in 1944 but it
would be realized in the 2010s in the form of the SDR.
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World civilization now needs a new international currency to replace such national
moneys as the U.S. dollar or the Euro.
In order to create a new system, we must reorganize the International Monetary Fund,
make it more powerful and give it the authority to supply and manage international
money. The name of the money could be called “Bancor” in honor of John Maynard
Keynes, instead of SDR. But its system should be similar to that of the SDR system.
The original exchange rate between SDR and the U.S. dollar was equal, namely one
SDR was equal to one U.S. dollar. Currently, however, one SDR is about 1.6 U.S.
dollars.
The SDR is defined in terms of a basket of four major currencies used in international
trade and finance. The ratio in recent years is as follows:
USD: 44%,
EUR: 34%,

JPY: 11%,
GBP 11%. 17

When the system is revised in the future, other moneys such as Chinese, Indian and
Russian currency will be added to those moneys. The SDR or Bancor is a very stable
money system because it is backed by major economies. Therefore, it will be trusted by
the world, and a stable world economy can be realized. Without a stable economy, we
cannot fight against major global problems such as the environmental crisis.
The great river of mainstream civilization reached America in the middle of the 20th
century. The American type of civilization spread worldwide with American English
and the U.S. dollar. It also opened the concept of globalization. If the world can
reorganize the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to create a new international money
supply system in the beginning of the 21st century, human history will begin to form a
mainstream global civilization.
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Abstract
“Geo-civilization” is a new concept proposed by the author. It means a macro-geocontinuum in which two or more civilizations share a common geographical locus and
similar religions and cultural values. In contrast, civilization in the traditional sense
refers to a large historico-cultural entity sharing a common set of values. Within a geocivilization, each of the traditional political entities is interlocked with another, not only
geo-historically, but culturally, economically, and politically.
A geo-civilization generates a situation in which the cost of association among the
peoples or even civilizations concerned is reduced and the effectiveness of association is
raised. This implies a relatively high efficiency or productivity. I conclude that in
examining the long-term performance of a civilization, the conventional terms of
“civilization” and “culture” are inadequate. i
The benefits of spatial adjacency
This article proposes that a congeries of countries, which may or may not belong to
different civilizations but which share a common geographical locus, constitute a natural
geo-unit, or a super geo-community, or simply a geo-civilization. (Wallerstein 1994:
184-199) 1
In the historical and present-day interactions of human societies, the spatial proximity
between them is much more important than has hitherto been considered. Such
proximity brings about immediate relevance to all those concerned in terms of mutual
interest, and to a great extent, this relevance is embodied in the relatively low cost and
relatively high efficiency of association among the societies concerned, be they nations,
clusters of nations or even civilizations in the traditional sense.
Exchanges of personnel, information, technology, products, services, and capital among
adjacent peoples, regions, or countries take place faster and more efficiently compared
to peoples, regions and countries not adjacent.

1

The coinage of the term ‘geo-civilization’ was inspired by Immanuel Wallerstein’s use of ‘geo-culture’ in
his Geopolitics and Geoculture (1994).

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2012

95

Comparative Civilizations Review, Vol. 66 [2012], No. 66, Art. 20

92

Number 66, Spring 2012

Human association with relatively low cost and relatively high efficiency, which is
possible only if different human groups or societies share a common geographic locus,
means relatively high productivity. In market-economy terms, such shared space would
make possible a situation in which the products and services are more competitive than
for those without such proximity.
This competition springs precisely from the spatial proximity shared by the peoples
concerned, even if originally they might have very different cultures, religions. or even
civilizations. Essentially, this proximity causes actual or potential magnification of
mutual interests for all those concerned.
Adjacent human communities enjoy a high degree of cultural association with one
another. A glimpse at the ancient civilizations in the Mediterranean-West Asian world
reveals that the peoples there shared essentially the same cultures and religions --Paganism, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. It is the same with the ancient civilizations
in the Indus River Basin or in the Yellow River Basin. This kind of religio-cultural
homogeneity is the result of heterogeneous peoples sharing a common geographical
locus for long periods of time. Thanks to their spatial adjacency, the cost of association
between the peoples is easily reduced and the effectiveness and efficiency of association
easily raised.
The neighborliness of neighbors
In Chinese, there is a saying: “A neighbor nearby is better than a relative far away.” The
reason that a neighbor is more helpful than a far-away relative is exactly because he is a
neighbor. Thanks to his proximity, there may evolve a close association between
neighbors, and for the same reason there may arise possibilities of mutually beneficial
cooperation. A distant relative, even though linked by blood, is not able to serve when
needed as a willing neighbor is.
Neighbors being neighborly is a universal phenomenon. In ancient times, when people
needed to build an irrigation system, construct a dam, dig ditches or dredge waterways,
they needed not only cooperation but complex coordination with others. A single family
or clan couldn’t possibly have accomplished such tasks. Similarly, for safety’s sake and
other purposes, neighbors who had no blood ties might even be incorporated into one
tribe. To a great extent, the reason that the state comes into being lies in this need for
cooperation. Members of a relatively small community, living in proximity to one
another, often did not have any choice but to cooperate with another community.
(Demangeon 1993: 10)
Such cooperation is extremely important for the emergence of the state and indeed, for
the formation of early civilizations. When discussing the essential “traits” of a nation,
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spatial factors such as neighbors and natural conditions are more important than the
inherent “characteristics” of any particular nation.
Of course, counterevidence can be easily found that neighbors are not always
neighborly. The ferocious World Wars that European nations fought among themselves
and the Israeli-Arab conflicts are two examples. The Sino-Japanese, Sino-Vietnamese
and Sino-Indian border conflicts can be cited too. Though European internal wars are
already history, there seems to be no immediate hope of settling the fierce Israeli-Arab
conflicts because of the great developmental differences between Israel and its Arab
neighbors. But the problem may be solved eventually, probably as a result of Europe’s
eventual integration of its Mediterranean and Middle East neighbors.
Then how to answer the question of China’s border disputes with its neighbors? To a
great extent, the modern vogue of nation-state and nationalism are to blame. Before
modern times, China was a peaceful and friendly country, and it still is today. In the
2000 years before the 20th century, Sino-Japanese and Sino-Indian relations were even
paragons of neighborliness, in sharp contrast to both the mutual relations of Western
European countries and Western Europe’s relations with its Muslim neighbors.
Although Sino-Vietnamese relations were a bit troublesome, there were on the whole
more eras of peaceful cooperation than periods of conflict and hostilities. So ultimately,
China’s border disputes with its neighbors, like those among European countries before
1945, will probably be settled. This may even occur in the not too distant future.
How Japan and Russia benefited from their loci
We are in an era of globalization. The world we are in is rapidly globalizing. In fact, it is
already highly globalized in comparison with even half a century ago. The label “Made
in China” is not as obvious as it seems. Actually, today nothing is made in just one
country.
A car made in China has many parts (even important parts) actually imported from
somewhere else, maybe from Japan, South Korea, Malaysia or Thailand. The same
experience applies to auto parts made in China or Malaysia because you can export
them to Japan, to Korea, to Europe, or to America. Then these parts are assembled into a
car about which some people would say it is made in Japan and others would say it is
made in Korea. Economic nationalism is almost meaningless today.
However, it can be also said that economic nationalism is still important for mobilizing
the people of a nation who may belong to different ethnic groups, who thus have
different commitments. Their interests may be synchronized into one single political
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unity so as to attain certain higher goals, as is indicated by China’s program of “Four
Modernizations.” 2
Sino-Japanese relations can illustrate the point. When people in the Yellow River and
the Yangtze River basins already enjoyed a high level of civilization, Japan was still at a
lower stage of development. But Japan was very lucky indeed, for it was favorably
located in a place which happened to be near China, or near the east end of the Eurasian
continent where civilization had emerged two or three thousand years before.
Imagine if Japan had been located where Hawaii now is. Then what would have
happened? It is almost certain that their socio-economic development level would have
remained very low indeed. Precisely because Japan is adjacent to China, the ancient
people on the Japanese islands could make consistent use of their geographic
convenience, fruitfully appropriating Chinese culture and successfully transforming
itself into a highly civilized nation in a brief period.
On the other hand, after the Sino-Japanese war of 1894, especially from the end of the
1970s onward, China had to embark upon overall reforms. (Incidentally, China has had
plenty of reforms in modern times, or indeed quite a few revolutions.) Thus, when China
began to reform, it found that a much more advanced Japan was nearby, and that it
could conveniently send its personnel there for training, could conveniently export its
products there for sale, and could conveniently import Japanese products and
appropriate Japanese technology and management skills. Equally important, China
could learn from the more advanced Japanese entrepreneurial culture. China has
developed very fast in the past 30 years, yet at least at the initial stage of the Reform and
Opening-Up movement, it benefited so much from a neighboring Japan that it is now
difficult for young people to imagine this indebtedness.
Before the end of the 17th century, although Russia was already civilized through
Mongolian rule and had accomplished an initial form of modernization in the 15th and
16th centuries, 3 it still remained backward in comparison with Western Europe. There is
no doubt that at this point in history West Europe had a considerably higher level of
civilization and possessed much more advanced technology than Russia. Russia was
lucky in being a neighbor to West Europe.

2

In the late 1970s, as part of the Reform and Opening-Up Movement, China launched its famous national
program of modernizations of its industry, agriculture, defense and techno-science, namely, the “Four
Modernizations”.
3
See Donald Ostrowski, Muscovy and the Mongols: Cross-Cultural Influences on the Steppe Frontier,
1304-1589 (Cambridge University Press, 2002) and Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, Empires in
World History (Princeton University Press, 2010, Chapter 7). Thanks are due to the anonymous reviewer
of this essay for drawing my attention to the relevant scholarship.
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Czar Peter the Great, a giant of two meters in height, dressed like a worker and led a
huge delegation (the “Grand Embassy”) of “spies” into the West in the late 1690s. They
traveled to various European countries such as Austria, France and England and stayed
in Holland for probably one year. During this period they were busy gathering
information and establishing contacts with influential local people.
After having met quite a few European monarchs and hiring many skilled workers, the
delegation returned to Russia with the secrets of advanced technology and culture of
West Europe. Back home, Peter started an overall reform movement almost
immediately, at the beginning of the 18th century, which enabled them to catch up
quickly, at least technologically. In a matter of decades, the national strengths or the
overall capacities of Russia increased dramatically.
Previously it had been struggling with Turkey, barely holding its own. It could not
possibly have challenged any Western country. Now it was recognized as an emerging
power, a major player in European politics, especially in its triangular geopolitical game
with Turkey and West Europe. At the time Europe resembled the “Warring States” in
China before the common era, fighting that would continue until the middle of the 20th
century. By the 1750s, Russia was already a major player in the European political
arena.
A question can thus be asked: had the geographic location of Russia been somewhere
else, preventing it from appropriating the advanced technologies and cultures of both
the West and East, would it have become the powerful country it became from the mid18th century onward?
European Union: a role model of regional integration
Along with cooperation between neighbors there is also conflict, antagonism, and even
hostility. In fact, among different ethnic groups, nations, or civilizations there are
always disputes, conflicts, antagonisms, wars, sometimes even large-scale wars.
Nevertheless, this does not mean that human beings should deny the importance of
neighborly cooperation.
On the contrary, cooperation is so important that it is only too obvious that without
cooperation, mankind could not have survived. Compared with other species, primates
are a great deal better at cooperation. It has been observed that mountain gorillas can
coordinate among themselves extremely well and use highly complex tactics, in feeding
and defense. Many other species do not enjoy such cooperation.
In some parts of Africa, hyenas can actually fight lions. Although lions are bigger and
more powerful, hyenas can fight them collectively, to their advantage. But so far as
coordination and cooperation are concerned, most species are not on par with primates.
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Humans are the most developed primates on earth. They can enter into much more
sophisticated cooperation than other primates, let alone non-primate species.
Historically, European countries have continually fought each other since the fall of the
Roman Empire. In the first half of the 20th century, they fought the bloodiest wars in
history. When World War II came to an end, the Europeans finally realized that it was
disastrous fighting among themselves. In fact, even before the Second World War,
Bertrand Russell, a highly influential European philosopher, had realized that although
China is as vast as Europe in territory, the Chinese were much more peaceful than the
Europeans. (Russell 1996: 52; Feng 1995: 157)
To him, there had been no chronic and large-scale internal wars in China, like the kind
of wars that had been fought among the monarchical or national states of Europe and
had lasted for hundreds of years. Historian Arnold Toynbee held essentially the same
view. In fact, in much of Chinese history, if there ever was a war, it was relatively brief
and far from as ferocious as those in Europe. For example, the first internal
“revolutionary” war in 20th-century China lasted for only a few years in the early 1930s,
and it consisted mostly of scattered fighting rather than large-scale battle. The second
internal revolutionary war in the same century lasted for only three years, from 1946 to
1949.
Although occasionally there was fierce fighting between the Kuomintang and the
Communists, many lives were spared because of the massive Kuomintang surrender. It
was essentially the same case in the history of dynastic China. Thus compared with the
modern wars in Europe, casualties were much less in Chinese wars. Internal conflicts
are generally much less violent than wars between sovereign nation states, although
there are exceptions to this.
However, after the Second World War, European nations realized that if they could
unify into one single political family rather than continue to fight each other, Europe
could benefit immeasurably. That is why there is now the European Union. Before the
EU came into being, there had been its predecessors, especially the European Coal and
Steel Community and the European Economic Community.
All of these, including the EU, are steps toward a unified Europe. Today, the EU is
already a sort of trans-national or super-national organization to which every member
nation has to yield a bit of its sovereignty. Recently the European Union has elected a
foreign minister. This is certainly a first for Europe.
However, the unifying momentum that European nations gained in the past decades
appears in trouble. The past three years have not seen any substantial progress. Instead,
the EU has suffered quite a few setbacks. The great unification cause was even dealt a
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serious blow in the referendums of France and Holland. The draft of a proposed EU
Constitution was vetoed by these countries. Despite all this, the EU still serves as an
example for other nations in similar situations to follow: to cooperate more closely on a
higher level. Peoples in East Asia should do the same. China, Korea, Japan, and the
ASEAN countries should cooperate with one another actively, with the eventual
objective of integrating into one entity, i.e., an East Asian Community, no matter how
loose or insignificant it may appear initially.
There may be some attempts at impeding this unity by America and Japan, both of
whom are alarmed by China’s rapid rise. In fact Japan has invited America to balance
the influence of China, to join in the preparatory talks at the East Asian Summit about
closer East Asian cooperation, especially about a prospective East Asian Community.
Yet China doesn’t have to worry too much about that, because there are plenty of ways
of integration in East Asia apart from the East Asian Summit. It is only one form of
integration after all.
The idea of nation state is not universal
At present, every country in the world believes that the nation state is the basic form of
institution that a cluster of ethnic groups can possibly take. In fact, the sovereignty of a
nation state is seen as sacred. Every country on earth believes that its territorial integrity
is its bottom line, sacred and under no circumstances to be violated. No foreign country
is to interfere in its internal affairs. However, few would admit that a nation state is not
an eternal reality but rather a contingent construction. Although it seems to be sacred at
the present time, it has not always been the case in the past. In fact the idea of a nation
state started with the Treaty of Westphalia or the Peace of Westphalia (1648), which
consisted of a series of peace treaties signed by numerous European kingdoms and
dukedoms. In the field of international politics, it has been referred to as the
“Westphalia model,” the traditional approach to regulating a highly decentralized world
of sovereign states. It is mainly a European concept of the international order and has no
innate claim to universality.
Europe and America have been predominant in world affairs since the end of World
War II, and they have promoted the concept of “nation state” around the world. Yet
throughout history, the idea of a nation state was almost unheard of, there being always
tribes, kingdoms, and empires with their chieftains, kings and emperors.
During the Warring States period in Chinese history, large expanses of territory,
occasionally reaching the size of ten to twenty counties, were ceded to another as the
result of a military defeat; and some decades later, the ceded land was taken back to the
original owner state, again as the result of a military victory. Nobody thought it odd or
unfair.
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Before the second European war ended in 1945, the European nation states behaved in a
similar manner. At the time, Europe was very much like Warring States China.
European states then had kept fighting among themselves and couldn't imagine
integrating into a United States of Europe. However, since the two great wars, the
European way of thinking has changed profoundly. Consequently, European states have
been conducting a trans-national integration, which is still going on at present, though it
has suffered some setbacks in recent years. This kind of integration could even be seen
as trans-civilizational.
A look into the religious composition of the European Union reveals that it is made up
of Roman Catholic, Protestant and Eastern Orthodox Church countries (in religious and
cultural terms, modern Greece belongs to the Eastern Orthodox Church Society),
belonging respectively to Western and Eastern Orthodox Civilizations in Toynbee’s
classification of civilizations (Toynbee 1935-1961et passim). In this sense, the EU is
very much a product of trans-civilizational cooperation.
There are even signs that in the next 30 to 40 years, Europe or the European Union may
succeed in incorporating Turkey (my personal prediction). Turkey has been applying for
membership in the EU for quite some time, yet due to internal problems, or problems in
the eyes of major EU countries, it has not yet satisfied the criteria for joining the EU.
Because of this, some Turks would even declare that they no longer mind if they are
accepted or not. Nevertheless, the trend represented by the ongoing European
integration is clear.
Predictably, Europe has the capacity to incorporate not only Turkey, but also Israel and
the Arab countries surrounding the Mediterranean as well. There is a strong reason for
Europeans to do so. Historically, these regions or countries were not only adjacent to
Europe but culturally similar to it, even though they have different religions and
traditionally have even been seen as belonging to different civilizations. Europeans were
traditionally Christians, but Turks and Arabs surrounding Europe were Muslims. But it
has to be remembered that Islam and Christianity originated in the same place and in the
same religio-cultural milieu, in what now Israel/Palestine, Syria and Jordan. They are,
therefore, sister religions.
Because of this common origin, they share commonality: monotheism, the notions of
Heaven and Hell, the ideas of demons and angels. Before Jesus Christ, even the idea of
resurrection was found all over the Mediterranean.
Apart from Europe, there are other human communities in the world that possess the
same potentials for such cooperation and integration as Europe. Some have even
displayed a strong willingness to cooperate and integrate on a higher level than before,
such as the East and Southeast Asian counties. There is good reason to see these
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countries, or even civilizations, sharing common loci as a natural geographic unit, a
super geo-community, or simply a geo-civilization. They possess the potential to realize
a higher level of cooperation and integration than at present.
It can thus be proposed that before a genuine global civilization comes into being, geocivilizations will serve as a kind of prelude to it. Geo-civilization is higher and larger
than civilization in the traditional sense, but lower and smaller than global civilization.
Therefore, it is a kind of preparation for, or even a pre-phase of, global civilization. In
other words, geo-civilization can be regarded as a quasi-global civilization.
In the foreseeable future, various nations and civilizations in the traditional sense will no
longer be categorized by such. The ideas of nations, cultures, and civilizations will no
longer be as important as before. What is important is a larger community, a larger
entity, which is committed to the universal values of social justice, equality, rule of law,
and human rights. In other words, the consummation of geo-civilization is global
civilization.
Geo-civilization: a group of entities sharing a common geo-continuum
To better understand the concept of geo-civilization, we will take a look at civilization
in the traditional sense. From the perspective of cultural development, civilization can
be seen as an aggregate of peoples sharing a common locus and a common value
system. In most cases, a civilization has a fixed geographical locus. For instance people
of Indian civilization mostly live on the subcontinent of South Asia. People of Western
civilization before the 16th century mainly lived in the middle and western part of
Europe. After the 16th century, they expanded to the Americas, Australia, and
southernmost part of Africa. People who are committed to the Islamic religions have
basically inhabited the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia. Historically, people
of Chinese society mainly lived where China is now and in the surrounding areas as
well.
The Japanese mainly lived on the Japanese home islands traditionally. Yet in the 20th
century, the Japanese displayed a strong urge to colonize. Japan not only turned Korea
into a colony and invaded the coastal regions of China, but also expanded to Southeast
Asia and occupied the Malay Peninsula and Indonesia for quite some time. They
annexed Taiwan from China. These are well-known facts, but attention should be paid
to the Japanese settlement in South America, for there are fairly large Japanese
communities in these places outside East Asia.
Geo-civilization’s difference from civilization in the traditional sense lies in the greater
importance attached to the geographical locus and natural environment of a historicocultural congeries of peoples in a temporal-spatial continuum. Also, greater importance
is attached to the long-term structural effects of the natural environment upon a
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particular aggregate of peoples sharing a common locus and value system (Braudel
1994: 9-10). Geo-civilization refers to more than one historico-cultural entity in a
specific geographical locus, whereas traditional civilization simply refers to just one
large historico-cultural community sharing a common set of values and way of life.
Thus it can be proposed that a geo-civilization is a cluster of historico-cultural entities or
civilizations sharing a common geo-continuum. To use geo-civilization would mean that
although the term traditional civilization can still be used, a shift of focus has occurred.
In examining the exchanges, cooperation, and conflicts from interaction among a cluster
of civilizations sharing one common geo-unit, especially if the purpose is to work out
future trends based on these interactions, the notions of civilization and culture are
cognitively inadequate.
Also, geo-civilization can be seen as a kind of geo-historical entity or even a geocongeries of civilizations; they not only share major historical memories but also have a
relatively high degree of political and economic integration.
In a geo-civilization, different but geo-connected communities have long been living in
a common “macro locus” and have for long been influencing one another, both in
cooperation and in conflict with each other.
Historically, human societies sharing one common geo-continuum had conflicts and
even wars with each other. Yet to a great extent, exactly because of this shared space
and shared memories, there gradually emerged a certain degree of historico-cultural
cohesion among these societies. David Wilkinson, an American world-systems thinker,
advanced exactly this viewpoint. According to him, even though there are wars and
conflicts among the communities in a specific geo-continuum, exactly because of this a
kind of historico-cultural cohesion is destined to emerge among them, or at least there is
that trend toward greater and greater integration of them (Wilkinson 1995:46-52).
Remember that, historically, China and India had many tribes, nations, and states. But
now look at what has happened. Within China and India there are no more such states or
nations. Though there are still numerous ethnic groups, they are all solidly unified under
one politico-economic entity. It is true, historically, they had conflicts with each other
and sometimes they even fought ferocious wars among themselves. Here, Europe is a
good example, even though it has not done a perfect job of being politically unified.
On the other hand, although as early as during the Qin Dynasty China had done a
superlative job in terms of political unification and cultural integration, it is now faced
with the extremely difficult task of integrating the whole of East Asia, including Japan,
Korea and the Southeast Asian states. Although the common geographical locus of these
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states requires that they be united, it is admittedly a tremendous task to incorporate them
all into one super entity or one colossal geo-civilization.
Maybe it will take one century before the peoples of East Asia can finally achieve this
goal. A few months ago, we were more optimistic than now, believing that it would
probably take another 50 years. But a series of unfortunate events have happened
recently in connection with certain islands in the ocean and border disputes on the
Korean peninsula. Nevertheless, China should have a more expansive view of the future.
It should utilize long-term vision.
China historically was much more powerful than all the other nations surrounding it
combined. Of course what happened to China from 1840 to 1949 was a very different
story. During this period, China was weak. Now China is coming back rapidly to its
original position. Therefore, not only the government but the average Chinese should
have a grand view of what will happen in the future. We don’t have to appear too
militant towards Japan.
In fact, the Japanese and Chinese as neighbors have been interlocked not only
geographically, but culturally and economically. Indeed, the two countries at present are
economically interlocked. If China could adopt a more generous attitude towards Japan,
it would find itself possessing much larger diplomatic space and would find more
diplomatic resources available to it in dealing with other powers, especially with
America and with the European countries. China would find itself enjoying more
freedom and greater comfort in international affairs.
If China obsessively imagines there is a ferocious enemy just next door, how can it feel
otherwise than restricted and restrained? As a matter of fact, whether someone is an
enemy or friend depends very much on one’s own way of looking at him. It is
deplorable that even now, in the 21st century, China still finds it difficult to overcome a
sense of victimization, which is harmful to its development.
Because nations or civilizations are adjacent to one another, sharing a common
geographical locus or geo-continuum, they are not only physically close, but often
culturally similar. On the basis of their geographic proximity, they consciously or
unconsciously cooperate with one another. In this sense, different human communities
sharing a common locus and being adjacent have a kind of “yuanfen” (roughly meaning
lot or luck by which people are brought together). Exactly because of this yuanfen, the
nations, countries and even civilizations adjacent to each other share not only common
histories, cultures and religions, but also a common destiny.
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Geo-political rivalry versus geo-civilization
To talk about a geo-civilization is by and large to talk about a geo-economic
community. In the foreseeable future, a geo-civilization will mainly be a geo-economic
phenomenon. It is obviously too early to talk about East Asia as a geo-political entity. In
East and Southeast Asia, for very complicated historical reasons, and to some extent
also because of the deep involvement of external powers, there are not yet any signs of
the emergence of a geo-community as a geo-political alliance between the nations or
civilizations concerned.
Here again, the European Union serves as a counter example. Observable circumstances
clearly indicate that a geo-civilization like Europe is not merely a possibility, but an
actual reality. Although they will inevitably encounter plenty of obstacles, the nationstates of Europe are now in the initial stage of evolving into a unified political
community. Maybe in another 50 or 60 years, there will be a United States of Europe, or
a European Federation!
Precisely for this reason special attention should be paid to the economic cooperation
and political interaction between the East and Southeast Asian countries. After all, they
share a common macro locus and are in a definite sense a single geo-community. The
peoples in East and Southeast Asia should not be short sighted, unwisely fixing their
eyes only on the conflicts, disputes, and past wars between them.
Even so, the geo-political reality of rivalry, conflicts or wars is not that easy to dismiss.
Take, for instance, the Cold War. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and its
alliance in East Europe had their Warsaw Treaty Organization. The West in Western
Europe, America, and Canada formed the opposite group, NATO, which still exists.
Although the Cold War is over, one party is still there flexing its muscles at a shadow
opponent.
The Cold War came to an end a long time ago, but a colossal military organization
remained, with belligerent sentiments but without an opponent, or desperately trying to
find a new opponent. During the Cold War, the two military alliances --- the Warsaw
Pact and the NATO states --- were the most prominent players in international affairs.
They were two gigantic geo-political actors hostile to and competing with one another.
The so-called Cold War waged by them was both rhetorically and literally a war,
presumably a war between capitalism and socialism. But could it be that these
ideological differences are just an excuse?
Mere ideology can never be so powerful as to divide millions of people so profoundly,
on such an immense scale. Only major structural differences or clashes of interest could
have done just that. There couldn’t possibly have been such large-scale mobilization if
there had only been ideological antagonism between the two parties.
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Today, Russia has abandoned its communist ideology of 20 years ago, but it is still
treated as a major rival by the West. China has abandoned socialism, too, but somehow
it is now regarded as the No. 1 geo-political opponent of the West. (Although China is
still a nominally socialist country, it is the de facto No. 1 capitalist country in the world,
even bigger than America). Clearly, even in this highly globalized era, when capitalism
finally reigns, clashes of interest are still there. Therefore, it is quite clear that
ideological differences during the Cold War were only an excuse for mobilization. Geopolitical factors were much more important and much longer lasting than mere ideology.
Ideology is always superficial. Behind ideological differences there are always deeprooted differences of interest. This would mean that NATO and the Warsaw Pact states
developed as ideological alliances only superficially; they were rival geo-political
parties in essence. It was a highly dangerous situation in which they were military
alliances, each with a unified military command, each with powerful mobilizing
capacities and with huge nuclear arsenals. It was very dangerous indeed, as their mutual
antagonism could have dragged the world into the calamity of a third World War.
A geo-civilization should make best use of its geographical yuanfen
A geo-civilization should be seen as a pre-determined spatial arrangement, visible and
palpable, not as an abstract construct. It is not to be dismissed. Under such
circumstances, a geo-civilization means not only very close economic and political
interaction between different areas, states and civilizations in a common geographic
locus, but actual or potential political integration of them. Fundamentally, a geocivilization depends on an unchangeable and inescapable spatial connectedness or
adjacency.
Because of this adjacency, a geo-civilization can also be seen as a kind of spatial reality
that the nations and civilizations concerned have to face. Thus, what they should do is
not to cling obstinately to negative memories of past conflicts and wars, but to look
forward into the future, making the best of their geographical yuanfen and bringing out
maximally such potentials as are inherent in this adjacency.
Apart from this, the term of geo-civilization also means that one has to take into
consideration not only the incidents or events that have taken place or are taking place at
present, but also future possibilities. Although in most parts of the world, geocivilization has not become a reality, still, by using the concept, one can have a better
view of what will happen to the present-day countries or civilizations in the future. This
understanding of what is to happen in the future is undoubtedly based on the
possibilities inherent in the actual circumstances of the past and present.
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If we set out to describe and classify civilizations, we will surely find that sometimes
two, three or more giant human communities sharing a common macro locus may be
regarded as different civilizations; that sometimes they may also be treated as separate
societies with very different religions and cultures. But if we can see through the surface
differences, we will find that these nations, civilizations or religions have essentially the
same cultural “genes,” or are genetically closely related.
Take, for example, the similarities between Judaism, Islam and Christianity and between
the East Orthodox Church and Western Catholic Church. Actually these religions
represent the phenomena usually referred to as civilizations. But obviously, they share
the same cultural genes. It is very much the same with the relations among Japan, Korea
and China. Although Japan is often seen as a separate civilization in civilizational
studies, it in fact has a great deal in common with China, not only geographically and
economically, but also culturally and religiously.
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The 1961 Conference of the ISCSC: Notes and Summaries
Michael Palencia-Roth
University of Illinois

Introductory observation: It was at this 1961 conference in Salzburg, Austria, that
Arnold Toynbee, Pitirim Sorokin, Othmar Anderle and others founded the ISCSC.
Sorokin became its first president. After a couple of meetings, the Society experienced
financial and organizational difficulties; because of that, Anderle sought in 1968 to
transfer the Society to the USA. The transfer was successfully accomplished in 1971
through the efforts of Roger Wescott, Benjamin Nelson (the first American president),
Vytautas Kavolis, Matthew Melko, David Wilkinson, Robert Park, and C.P. Wolf.
The American incarnation of the ISCSC, begun in 1971, has continued without
interruption to the present day.
This summary of the 1961 conference was begun in the spring of 2009, left unfinished
in June 2009, and then finished in May and August 2011. The Problems of Civilizations
is a trilingual text (English, French, and German), most of it not translated except for
brief summaries of discussions. I have translated and paraphrased from each original
language. The language of each speaker is identified at the end of this document. The
use of quotations indicates an exact citation.
This summary should be read in conjunction with my essay, “On Giants’ Shoulders: The
1961 Salzburg Meeting of the ISCSC,” Civilization in Crisis: Proceedings of the 39th
International Conference of the International Society for the Comparative Study of
Civilizations. Edited by Laina Farhat-Holzman and Thomas Rienzo (Kalamazoo:
Western Michigan University, 2009), pp. 58-73.
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---------------------------------------Anderle, Othmar F. The Problems of Civilizations: Report of the First Synopsis
Conference of the S.I.E.C.C. Salzburg, 8-15 October 1961. The Hague: Mouton & Co.,
1964.
SIECC = Société Internationale pour les Études Comparées des Civilisations
[International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations]
-----------------------------------------pp. 5-6 -- Preface by Pitirim Sorokin, as President.
Two different lines of study have developed in recent years. One is the
“microsociological” approach, or the study of small groups and smallest social units.
The other is the “macrosociological” and “macrohistorical” approach, which study
“cultural wholes” (5).
Cultural wholes: “N. Danilevsky calls them ‘the culture-historical types’; O. Spengler
terms them ‘the High Cultures’ (die Hochkulturen); A. Toynbee refers to them as ‘the
civilizations’ or ‘the units and intelligible fields of historical study’; A.L. Kroeber, as
‘the high-value culture patterns’; N. Berdyaev, as ‘the great cultures’; F.S.C. Northrop,
as ‘cultural systems’ or ‘the world cultures’; I call them ‘the social and the cultural
supersystems’. Whatever the name, all investigators of these vast ‘sociocultural
continents agree in that they are real, causal-meaningful wholes, different from the state,
or the nation or any other social group. Ordinarily, the boundaries of such a cultural
entity transcend the geographical boundaries of national or political or religious or racial
or ethnic groups” (5).
The investigators agree, moreover, that these “civilizations” or “cultural supersystems”
are like deep ocean currents that determine the patterns and intensity of the cultural
waves on the surface (5).
At this critical point in human history, knowledge of “the structural and dynamic
properties of ‘civilizations’ or ‘great cultures’ has become particularly urgent for the
very survival of the human race as well as for continuation of its creative history.”
Hence, the establishment of the International Society for the Comparative Study of
Civilizations and the first congress devoted to the ‘basic problems’ of civilizations or
Hochkulturen (6).
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This volume of the proceedings gives a somewhat abbreviated account but it also should
give a good idea of the prevalent views on civilizations and cultural systems, as well as
the points of agreement or disagreement. “It is hoped that the second and subsequent
congresses of the society will substantially develop each of the main problems discussed
in this volume” (6).
Sorokin thanks UNESCO Paris, the Austrian UNESCO Commission, the governments
of Salzburg as city and region, and the patron of the society, Dr. Eli Lilly, who gave
generously for the publication of this volume. [End of Preface]
From the last page of the book, following p. 460:
Main topics for discussions in each of the six successive days, with Thursday as a rest
day:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)

Monday, 9 October: The reality of civilizations
Tuesday, 10 October: The study of civilizations
Wednesday, 11 October: Civilizational encounters
Friday, 13 October: The problem of universal history
Saturday, 14 October: The future of civilizations
Sunday, 15 October: ONE WORLD: The contribution of the human sciences to
the peaceful unification of humanity.
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pp. 13-37 -- Einführung [Introduction] by Othmar E. Anderle:
Anderle begins by quoting Lao-Tzu (or Lao-tse), “The journey of a thousand miles
begins with one step.” This congress is the first step of a possibly very long journey, a
journey for which we have a sense of the direction. However, nobody knows its
outcome. Like all such journeys, it entails great risks, for many reasons (13).
It was unclear that many scholars would accept the invitation to come to the conference.
The questions that concern us here have long been a part of both public and private
discussions. However, “die Wissenschaft” [that is, formal academic discipline] has been
skeptical toward analyzing these problems or even downright hostile. That is
understandable because in no other field of study does the dilettante and littérateur
consider himself to be in his element. Self-respect discourages entering the field of
competition with such contestants (13). This does not alter the fact, however, that the
problematic itself is vital and that it belongs to a legitimate field of study (13-14).
Because our times have been poised at the edge of an immeasurable abyss during the
thousand wounds of the Second World War, we feel justified in demanding of this field
of study that it lead to the instruction, enlightenment, and the illumination of situations
as pre-requisites for significant decisions, significant actions, and life-enhancing
behaviors or attitudes (14).
For good or ill, we have to take up the struggle against the littérateurs and the
dilettantes. The main danger or risk in the integrative and interdisciplinary way of
posing the questions is that it pushes prematurely toward synopsis (14). But synopsis is
necessary if one is going to consider cultures as a whole. Yet individual disciplines are
resistant to synopses because such disciplines are biased toward the concrete.
There is also a risk in how the congress has been organized because we have not
followed the usual pattern of finished papers being delivered one after the other; rather,
we have opted for panels and round-table discussions. We thus have opted for a freer
and more open congress. Because of its form, this congress is unique in the history of
learnèd societies and therefore “path breaking” (16).
The problematic of “high cultures” or civilizations also has its history (17).
“As is commonly known, the consideration of world history from the perspective of
“high cultures” began with Giambattista Vico (1668-1744) (17). To be sure, Vico did
not use the term ‘civilization’ to mean ‘high culture’; rather he spoke of ‘the people’ and
of ‘nations’. Vico was the first cultural ‘morphologist’ in that he was less interested in
the ‘what’ than in the ‘how.’ Vico tried to move the focus from ‘the nation’ to ‘the

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2012

113

Comparative Civilizations Review, Vol. 66 [2012], No. 66, Art. 20

110

Number 66, Spring 2012

culture’, in pursuit of a more holistic approach to history and historical change. This
conception of history ‘went underground’ (18) after Vico and surfaced only periodically
in figures like Karl Friedrich Vollgraft (d. 1863), Ernst von Lasaulx (d. 1861), Nikolaj
Jakowlewitsch Danilewskij (d. 1861), as well as in essays by Alexis de Tocqueville,
Juan Donosco Cortés, and Jacob Burckhardt (18).
For many centuries, the West had viewed its history in terms of national history and had
forgotten to view it as a whole. The last common threat from the outside was the
Turkish siege of Vienna in 1683. The idea of ‘Europe’ became identified with
‘civilization’, and both became identified with ‘Christianity’ (19). Although these
identifications were value-driven, the main accent lay with the civilized-noncivilized
polarity, not with the West-Nonwest one. These polarities were not the same.
It took the two wars of the 20th century for the West to realize that it was threatened as a
whole and that the old equivalence of West and Christianity was no longer valid. The
result was in some ways a change in consciousness from a national orientation to a
broader more cultural one. Spengler was instrumental in this change of consciousness
(20-21).
In terms of scholarly activity, a number of practitioners of holistic history did not come
from the established disciplines but rather from outsiders and loners. Charlatans also
entered this field of activity. The reaction from the academy was one of scorn, silence,
ridicule, and downright discrimination. From the other side, the outsiders often did
battle against ‘official’ and ‘academic’ study, declaring it to be overspecialized, self
indulgent, small minded and blind toward the large defining questions (21).
The main issue of the conflict between the two sides was the question of “integration,”
namely how the parts fit into the whole and vice versa. The question was whether one
built one’s analysis from the parts to get to the whole or from the whole down to the
parts (22).
The question of the threats to our culture [by this Anderle means Abendland, the West]
has a number of facets, both inner and outer. Inner: structural change, new orders, social
questions, the challenge of technology, the religious problem. Outer: the relationship of
our culture to other cultures, which culminates in the problem of colonialism, and then
in decolonization. The issue that overshadows all others is the relationship of the “free”
West to the communist East (das Verhältnis des ‘freien’ Abendlandes zum
kommunistischen Osten), specifically the Soviet Union. Is the issue, as some would
have it, that of the conflict between the kingdom of Satan or the Antichrist and that of
the children of God? Is it a question of one ideology against another or the conflict
between two social and economic systems? Alternatively, is it a question simply of two
political power groups? (24)
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Is the Soviet Union a culture in the process of the being born (in statu nascendi-Spengler) or is it a particular and newly developing member of our own culture?
[Abendland] (25)
Given this enormous abyss between the “new thought in terms of cultural patterns” and
the traditional specialized and concentrated disciplines, it is an accomplishment of the
first order to be able to get such extraordinary scholars together in order to discuss ‘the
problems of civilizations’. All this is a promising development for the study of cultures
(25).
The first series of questions [for the first day] concerns the “reality” of high cultures
(civilizations, civilizations). Is there such a reality and how does that reality come
about? In addition, how should we define “high culture” in order to make it coincide
with that reality? Are high cultures primarily structures, processes, actions,
accomplishments, units of sense, abstract systems, essences? How are they to be
differentiated over and against cultures that are more primitive? What are the boundaries
between them and the worlds around them temporally and geographically? In any case,
cultures are highly complex structures, that is to say ‘processes’. Are they the result of
accumulated occurrences or of some kind of patterned organization? (26)
A second series of questions, related to the first, is that of the methodology of the
research into high cultures. Such research requires more complex methodologies, not
simply different methodologies (26).
There is not a single high culture, but a number of them, and that of course is related to
the question of encounters between and among them. How do cultures actually make
contact with one another? Are cultures windowless monads or does contact with another
culture lead to a give-and-take? What does the study of the past teach us about the
present? (27)
The concept of “high culture” has become the dominant historical-sociological category
(27).
The problem of Universal History is the following: it may be nothing more than the total
biography of high culture, as Spengler said (28).
The question of universal history is also linked to that of the future of high cultures.
What kind of future does the West have? Does the type “High Culture” have a future or
is it dying? Is the time of high cultures over and are we standing at the threshold of a
global world culture? (28)
The “One World” problematic has a special relationship with “thinking in cultures”:
namely, that it threatens to do away with the problematic entirely. That cannot be
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surprising, for the stronger the vision of a single humanity, the weaker is the emphasis
on the differences that separate cultures from one another. Whereas in times gone by the
dominant ideology and view of history came from Christianity; then it came from
nationalism; recently it has come from culture; and now the dominant view comes from
humanity itself. If thinking in cultures is already a bit passé, then isn’t the problematic
of high cultures also already a bit outmoded, also something like yesterday’s news? One
must deal with this as a possibility (29).
It is possible that the West’s embrace of the one-world vision is nothing more than a
compensation --and justification-- for its own loss of the hegemonic position in the
world. Such an embrace will only accelerate the progress toward one-world and will
result in the enforced suicide of the West (30).
Of course, it cannot be the task of congresses to treat the problematic of high cultures
exhaustively or to look for completely valid solutions for specific areas. Rather, such
congresses should bring together scholars from both areas of interest, the panoramic and
the detailed, as well as encourage international and interdisciplinary cooperation (30).
Even on the first substantive day of the congress, the concept of “High Culture” could
not be satisfactorily defined, and yet, despite all the disagreements, there was unanimity
among the participants in speaking about high cultures as particularly distinct, historicosocio-cultural manifestations. There was general agreement that Toynbee’s concept of
cultures as “intelligible fields of study” was useful. However, the issue of the stock taking of high cultures was neglected for lack of time (31).
On the second day of the congress, which dealt with the study of civilizations, there was
common agreement that this problem called for the integration of individual fields of
study. However, everyone also agreed that one could not simply add different
methodologies together in order to reach the goal of an integrated field of study. The
difficulty, everyone agreed, lay in HOW the different methodologies were going to be
integrated. Anderle introduced the concept of “holistic integration” into the debate and
recommended it for particular cases in which the integration problem concerned whole
structures (31-32).
For this second day, also, the issue of cultures as totalities or not became a particularly
difficult question.
In addition, the same question again made its presence felt at the opening of the third
day, on intercivilizational encounters. The issue came down to how cultures interacted,
either as wholes or in parts. Swiftly, consensus was reached that the concept of monadic
cultures in Spengler’s sense should be put to one side. That is, cultures did not encounter
each other as wholes. Many of the participants in the discussion brought up individual
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cases in which only a part of a culture (say a traveler or an educational system or a
missionary incursion) encountered another culture (32-33).
As was to be expected, the concept of intercivilizational encounters came up again in the
session on Russia and its particular place between East and West. The issue was not one
of communism per se but rather Russia as alien to the West, or as a convergent even
heretical variant of the West (Sorokin, Toynbee, Romein). All this led, of course, to the
issue of the final day, the One World issue or that of a unified humanity (33).
But before we got to that, we had to concern ourselves with the problematics of the next
day, the problem of Universal History (34).
One question was whether or not there are culturally transcendent powers that gave
universal history sense. And if so, which ones? In addition, there was strong unanimity
that religion was one such culturally transcendent power. Some questioned the extent to
which one could talk about a religious “metahistory”. Because, however, this was not a
congress of theologians but of cultural historians, other factors were brought into the
mix, such as geographical determinism, metahistorical or ideographical perspectives. It
was agreed that a universal history that corresponded to new aspects and new
approaches to history was one of the most pressing intellectual matters of our time.
Although no solutions to the problems were found, it was agreed that we should
continue searching for solutions (35-35).
As impressive as the debate was on universal history, a new high point was reached with
the debate on the future of civilizations. We started by asking to what extent historical
prognostication [what some might call futuristics] could be a Wissenschaft, that is, have
a certain scientific validity. Anderle proposed that such prognostication be restricted to
“holistic” structures and aspects and not to details. This proposal found much
agreement. Then the question was raised, whether “wholeness” referred to a partial
closedness of a culture or to a specific wholeness quality concerning cultural processes,
which were themselves modified by other criteria of wholeness. Anderle objected to the
watering down of the concept of wholeness, and so two opposing viewpoints were aired,
without being resolved: the wholeness concept must be utilized in a strict sense when
speaking of cultural morphologies; or it must not (35).
Members of the congress in general were convinced that we were historically at the end
of the epoch of high cultures and humanity was entering a new epoch, that of One
World, and that this transition should influence our behavior in a variety of fields:
culture, society, politics, and religion. In addition, this conviction led naturally to the
desire that our discipline, the comparative study of civilizations, be of use in the
peaceful unification of humankind. There was general agreement that the fate of human
beings could be manipulated, in a general sort of way, and that it was possible to steer
people in a certain direction. Because of the development of technology and the atom
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bomb, humanity was psychologically prepared to accept as a fact the slogan “one world
or no world”. It is the task of science, in particular the human sciences, to awaken
humankind to the consciousness of this kind of responsibility. Both Sorokin and
Toynbee were strong on this point, but they also had to contend with dissenting opinions
from the audience, people who complained, warned, doubted but were still hopeful. All
this left a deep impression, as it concerned two of the most honored figures among
contemporary scholars (36).
This note of “personal engagement” left a deep impression on everyone. Although from
the beginning to the end of the congress, the “factual” was always part of the
discussions, there was something else, which was also present: an inescapable tone of an
inner participation (and commitment). There was the sense that although the congress
was through and through “scientific”, it was also concerned with the contemporary
world. This is why President Sorokin, in his closing address, said the following: “This is
the first International Scientific Congress for the Comparative Study of Civilization
which has taken place in human history. . . We have made something unique and for the
first time . . . . After the seven days of discussion everyone of us has become aware, that
it is exactly those problems . . . that are on the agenda of history and that their scientific
comprehension is perhaps the most important task of today’s and the future’s social
sciences” (37).
The society that was brought into existence by this congress can see in these remarks not
only a justification but also the encouragement to pursue the “most important task”
which is the comparative study of civilizations. [End of the Einführung]
pp. 39-42 -- Gesamtbericht über den Verlauf des Kongresses (General report on
the course of the congress):
The first “Synopsiskongresß der Internationalen Gesellschaft für Vergleichende
Kulturforschung” took place from the 8-15 October 1961 in Salzburg. The meeting was
dedicated to the problematics of high cultures. More than 200 people took part; of those
200, there were scholars in academic positions from 13 different countries: Belgium,
West Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, the People’s Republic of China, the
Netherlands, Austria, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States.
The congress was organized by Othmar F. Anderle, with the principal assistance of the
Austrian UNESCO commission. The ceremonial opening on the 8th of October was
presided over by the president, Pitirim A. Sorokin. The official work of the congress
began on Monday, the 9th of October. Each day was devoted to a main topic, divided
into five discussion circles, concluding with a roundtable discussion by the main
participants of the day so that tentative general observations could be made. This way of
proceeding pleased the participants, for it also allowed interventions from the audience.
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There was simultaneous translation into German, English, and French.
Because of the constant and cordial contact among the participants, because of the
atmosphere, by the end of the congress everyone felt like part of a large family (einer
grosßen Familie).
The congress was enhanced by the presence of the two most honored and prominent
participants, P.A. Sorokin and A.J. Toynbee. Also unusual was the emphasis on
“Denken in Kulturen” (thinking in cultures) as the main approach. It was agreed that a
“new ethos” was needed for a new type of scholarly activity, all of which would take
some time to develop. [End of Gesamtbericht]
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pp. 45-96 -- Day 1: Monday, 9 October: The ‘reality’ of civilizations, chaired by
Othmar F. Anderle.
4 sections:
1)
2)
3)
4)

Civilizations as ‘intelligible fields of study (Toynbee)
The definition of the phenomenon of ‘civilization’
An inventory of civilizations
Questions and responses

Anderle begins the session by reading some congratulatory telegrams, among them one
from “Albert Schweitzer aus Lambarene”, who sends his regrets for not being able to
attend the session because of the amount of work he has in Africa (Lambarene) (46).
He says, however, that he does not believe that Hochkulturen truly exist (46), and that in
our cultures today, such high cultures are “underdeveloped” (46).
Professor Fischer writes from the behind the Iron Curtain, in French, that he regrets not
being able to attend but goes on to say how important the entire initiative is and that in
order for it to succeed, there must be peace, for it is only peace that guarantees the
survival of our civilization, even of existence itself (47).
Sir Isaiah Berlin sends his regrets but in a long statement praises the conference and
says that it is high time that in the 20th century we students of civilizations realize that
no single “mode of behavior or culture has a monopoly, whether of wisdom or of fault,
either of virtue or of vice” (48). Also, we must realize the unconscious sources of many
things that we take to be objectively right and that this realization should make us more
humble and more respectful of the truth. All this, also, should increase our tolerance for
other cultures and reduce nationalistic fervor (48). He hopes for a “saner and more
peaceful world” (48). He asks that the principles of tolerance, humility, the respect for
truth, skepticism, and objectivity “commend themselves to the very distinguished
scholars, all far more distinguished than myself, who are to deal with these problem”
(48).
Several other scholars send their congratulations, after which Anderle praises the
fruitfulness of Toynbee’s definition of civilizations as “intelligible fields of study” and
asks Toynbee to be the first to speak (50).
Toynbee begins by saying that the German language has a useful distinction that English
does not have, namely the difference between “Kultur” and “Zivilisation”. He follows
Spengler in saying that Zivilisation has a somewhat derogatory meaning, for it refers to
the merely material apparatus of Kultur, Zivilisation then being a later stage in the life
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history of a culture, that is, a culture in decline. In English and French, when we say
“civilization”, we mean “Hochkultur” (50-51).
He then describes how he arrived at the conception of civilizations as “intelligible fields
of study”. The human mind cannot grasp the whole of reality in a single act of
perception and so must break it down into its fragments. And then, bit by bit reassemble
those fragments into a whole. A civilization is the largest such whole that can be
usefully analyzed. Historians have been misled by studying “states” or “nations” and
thus much of history is oriented toward the history of nations. But anthropologists, for
instance, do not study nations but “cultures in the sense of the totality of life, in all its
aspects and activities, in the particular communities in question” (52). So GraecoRoman or Sumerian cultures are approached as wholes. Similarly, after the first century
of the Common Era, western culture up to about 1700 can be studied as a whole, and
that whole as equivalent to the history of Christendom. Jewish civilization and GraecoRoman civilization are in the background of western civilization. There are relatively
few such cultures, whereas there are many nations. And nations themselves, e.g.
England, cannot be understood entirely within their own geographical limits. One has to
go to Rome, Palestine and the entire Mediterranean in order to understand England (53).
When one is speaking of social or economic history, for instance, then “Hochkulturen”
make sense as intelligible fields of study, but if one is speaking of the history of
religion, then it is impossible to keep it within a single “Hochkultur”. Christianity
encompasses Jewish civilization, Graeco-Roman civilization, and Western Europe.
Sorokin answers Toynbee: There are two main approaches to the study of civilizations.
The one is that represented by Danilewskij, Spengler, and Toynbee, which tries to
define “intelligible fields of study,” identify civilizations as a “spatially bounded entity
somehow located within a part of the population occupying certain territory” (54). This
conception of civilization manifests itself in a concern to classify civilizations:
Danilewskij’s nine different types; Spengler’s Apollonian, Magian, Faustian and so on;
Toynbee’s 21 or 26 different civilizations.
A second approach does not try so much to locate and classify civilizations; rather it
disregards “the spatial distribution of civilizations” (54) and “tries to find in the total
human universe of social and cultural phenomena main systems of high cultures or high
civilizations as a unified body, in which each important part is interdependent and
dependent on other parts, each part depends upon its whole and the whole depends upon
its parts” (54-55). This second approach is illustrated by F.C. Northrop “in his
fundamental division of two types of civilization, in his terminology “aesthetic and
theoretic” or by the anthropologist A. Kroeber, who looks at “master types or patterns of
civilization” (55).
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“My own approach also belongs to this type. Namely, I am not so much interested
whether a given individual civilization is located at a given historical moment within a
given part of the human population. What I am interested in, rightly or wrongly, is
studying an enormous number of social groups and an enormous number of various
cultural systems that include scientific, philosophical and aesthetical, ethical, juridical
and other systems.” These may be combined, summed up, into giant “Cultural SuperSystems”, which are vast Ganzheiten made up of many small and big systems, “unified
into one causal, meaningful unity” (55).
Despite the differences in the two approaches, they agree on the following.
• First, civilizations or cultural super-systems “live and function” as real unities
which are not identified with the state, the nation or any other social group.
• Second, their total number in the entire history of human culture is very small: 9,
10, or 21 “civilizations”; two, three, or five cultural super-systems.
• Third, each of these types is different from the others on the basis of some major
premise or philosophical presupposition or (to use Spengler’s term) a prime
symbol.
• Fourth, each of the great civilizations or cultural super-systems is aesthetically or
logically consistent in its component parts.
• Fifth, each of these great unities is grounded in empirical reality and structured
as a meaningful causal or holistic unity.
• Sixth, in terms of their general characteristics, civilizations or cultural supersystems tend to accept what is congenial to them and to reject what is not (56).
A. Hilckman, director of an institute for the comparative study of cultures at the
Johannes Gutenberg University in Mainz, answers both Toynbee and Sorokin in a
lengthy speech (57-61). He advances a definition of “Kultur” as the “totality of human
activity” “Gesamtweise des Menschseins” (60) and a definition of “civilization” as a
specific kind of human activity, as a “Sonderkultur”.
I. Olagüe, as a historian of Spanish decadence, also responds (61-69). He says that there
is a great deal of confusion about the terms “culture” and “civilization,” that culture is a
part of civilization, that there can be several cultures within one civilization. No culture
dies completely but instead is absorbed into a larger pattern of development.
J. Vogt speaks from the perspective of an historian of antiquity. He goes into the history
of the study of “Hochkultur” as an academic discipline, something that begins with J.G.
Herder, progresses through the 19th century and culminates with Spengler and Toynbee.
He considers Hilckman’s definition of “culture” to be too vague and too inclusive (71).
Says that the concept of “high civilization” is a useful one, for it implies the existence of
writing (which unites the past with a future), the state, the independence of creative
personalities, action in history that is intentional and conscious (73).
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H. Kühn, specialist in prehistory, says that there are three basis criteria for high
civilization: writing, cities, and commerce. He opposes the separation between prehistory and history, saying that the two are separated less in kind than in degree (77).
J. Vogt (82-84) breaks in to say that it is easy to have agreement on the major
characteristics (writing, cities, commerce) of major civilizations, but the picture is
cloudier when we look at cultures that are obviously not major: Mesopotamian, Hittite.
When do these cultures begin and when do they end? Or take the example of Syrian
culture and its daughter cultures of Iran and Arabia. At what point do we say that Syrian
culture stops and the other cultures begin? The theory of civilizational beginnings and
endings is all well and good, but we need practical markers, concrete historical points so
that we can study these transitions scientifically.
H, Kühn responds by saying that he was not so much concerned to talk about the
differences within individual civilizations but rather the demarcations that separated
civilizations from cultures. And, in his view, it is cities, writing and commerce that
separate civilizations from cultures, or “Hochkultur” from what is not “Hochkultur”.
When we inquire after the fundamental properties of high cultures we realize, says F.
Schachermeyr, that they are dynamic, that we’re speaking of “process” and that without
a process of development, no high culture can come about, can exist (85).
I. Olagüe attempts to define civilization (88-91). He concludes: “une civilisation est un
ensemble d’idées-forces, conçues para une société et qui, héritées, transformées ou
récemment créées, composent un tout en fonction du cadre géographique environnant, à
un moment donné de l’évolution historique” (91).
I. Olagüe asks what he terms an innocent question that may focus the discussion: “Is a
civilization the product of a society or not”? (95)
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pp. 97-169 -- Day 2: Tuesday, 10 October. The study of civilizations, chaired by
Ignacio Olagüe.
Four sections:
5)
6)
7)
8)

The problem of synopsis and of interdisciplinary synthesis
Summation and teamwork, induction and statistics
Holistic integration (the analysis of structure)
The possibilities of international and interdisciplinary cooperation

Anderle opens the discussion on Day 2 by asking how it is that we come to study
civilizations. It is the work of a lifetime to come to know only one civilization.
Therefore, when one tries to add a second civilization to that, in order to engage in
comparative civilization analysis, one is engaging in an impossible task. And yet the
knowledge of two civilizations is not enough to support the comparative study of
civilizations. Even Toynbee is aware of these gigantic difficulties. A partial solution to
these difficulties is to do research in teams. Another is to seek interdisciplinary teams
(98-101).
Toynbee answers: “I have had a certain experience of these problems. . . . I think Eduard
Meyer was probably the last historian who was able to have first-hand experience of
several cultures. Ed. Meyer had some knowledge of Egyptology. He could read some
Egyptian hieroglyphs. He had also some knowledge of Assyriology, and of course he
was completely at home in Greek and Roman studies. This gave him a first-hand
multiple basis for studying, not indeed the history of all civilizations, but simply the
Ancient History of the western part of the Old World, west of India, which is a very
small part of the history of civilizations.”
However, it would be, Toynbee says, a reductio ad absurdum to be stifled by the
advance of knowledge to restrict ourselves to the extent that we refuse to take “a holistic
view.” Toynbee says that it is “essential that a synoptic student should have thorough
detailed knowledge at least in a single field.” In this case, if one is master of “the firsthand information” of one’s field, then one is more likely to be able to distinguish, in
other fields, “between more reliable and less reliable sources of information” (102). The
accident of his birth and education, Toynbee says, has made him knowledgeable in
Greek, Latin, and in western civilization generally. If he had been born and raised in
China, then his perspective would have come from Chinese. This kind of limitation is
inevitable. One should try to take remedies against this problem, not simply declare it
unsolvable.
As far as the question of teamwork is concerned, it is possible to produce a work from a
unified point of view if there are two authors only. But if there is a large group of
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authors, then such unity is impossible to achieve. The analogy is, “no committee has
ever written a poem” (103).
Olagüe responds that everyone is being too pessimistic and that we should take as our
models those investigators of natural history of the 19th century who went ahead with
studying individual species despite the fact that they were overwhelmed by the number
of new species being discovered in their day. In every case, they sought to relate the
new species to the known or familiar ones. In other words, they thought in terms of
structures that were already present. Civilizationists should do the same (103-104).
M. Rassem (104-109) discusses the issues of synthesis, teamwork, cooperation etc. as
problems limited by the individual human minds that deal with them. Civilizations can
be misunderstood because people are not capable of understanding them properly. But
we must also remember that there is no thought that is not also at the same time at least
implicitly a theory or a philosophy of history. And any such theory is nurtured by the
collective knowledge of a culture.
I. Olagüe answers that it is impossible for any one person know everything there is to
know in his culture. Even Aristotle did not know everything, and Ptolemy did not visit
every city for which he derived coordinates. A major problem for civilizationists is that
our knowledge of cultures will always be incomplete, and many cultures that we deal
with have many gaps, some of which will never be filled by documentation. If all this is
true in the case of western cultures, it is even truer in the case of the antiquity of certain
Asian cultures like India and China. It is enormously difficult to arrive at a historical
synthesis of these cultures, or even to synthesize the current state of their sciences. So
let us rather have perhaps more modest research goals and let us study materials that are
more concrete. For instance, it would be most interesting to study the production of food
in different cultures, different diets, whether vegetarian or carnivorous (India or the
West), and what those diets, studied from comparative civilizational perspectives, call
tell us about culture, about health, about biology (109-110).
Sorokin says: “By synthesis, I mean not ideographic description of various civilizations,
of various historic events, but the nomothetic discovery, formulation and proof of a
uniformity given in various societies in various periods, a uniformity, which may be
more general and less general, but anyhow uniformity, giving us a knowledge of
repeated relationship of the events in a human universe” (111).
Sorokin continues: Great discoveries are not made by groups. They are made by
individuals, in a flash of insight that is then fleshed out by logic and study. Toynbee’s
initial insight about civilizations was like this.
“If we mean by synthesis in history or other social sciences a discovery, formulation and
then empirical corroboration of respective uniformities with their preliminary
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hypotheses, then there are three stages in that work. The first two stages are the work of
the respective capable person, graced by this creative intuition and by a well-developed
rational mind, but the third stage requires in most cases teams of co-workers, especially
when they may be arranged to work over the points of empirical verification, outlined
and determined clearly by the master, who conceived the respective idea” (113),
“It is the purpose of the comparative study of civilizations not merely to give an
ideographic description of various ideographic details whether Babylonian, Minoan or
Greek or the ideographic biography of Caesar or Antony or Ignatius Loyola or some
other person, but the discovery, formulation and corroboration of uniformities” (113).
Toynbee answers: “I agree with Dr. Sorokin that one must start with intuition and then
test the intuition in the light of the detailed facts. One will get nowhere if one tries to
start with an infinite number of facts and, by assembling these, to arrive at general
ideas.” Toynbee then calls for approaches that are as intellectually provisional as those
of science are; any scientist may advance a hypothesis but then must be willing to
discard it if it proves untenable. One should act in the same manner with approaches to
history, whether they be Jewish, Christian, Islamic or Marxian. We should treat these
approaches “not as dogmas, to which the facts must be made to conform, but as
hypotheses, which open up the way to the facts, but which in themselves must be
modified, and very drastically modified, by the light which the facts throw on them”
(114-115).
Sorokin agrees that intuition is never enough (115).
Toynbee says that it is difficult to persuade the specialist historian that civilizationists
are not enemies, that in fact “we are necessarily allies.” Every specialist works within a
framework of generalization, whether or not he realizes it. “Every generalist ought to be
a bit of a specialist; every specialist ought to be a bit of a generalist. We ought to work
together.” This “civil war between the specialists and the generalists is really as foolish
as an atomic third world-war would be” (115).
Olagüe tries to steer the discussion to the issue of summation and teamwork (116ff). J.
Vogt maintains that there should be no talk of “inequality” between the specialists and
the generalists, for both are necessary to each other. Toynbee agrees and says that
Coulborn’s work would not have been possible if he had not been a member of a
research group. In the same sentence, Toynbee regrets that “Dr. Coulborn is not with
me” (118). The question of intuition comes up again and M. Rassem states that even
intuitions are based in one way or another on a “Weltbild” (122). Everything is
contextual.
B.J. Chu comments (124-126) that a major problem is that of bias based on one’s
national origin and the languages that one knows. For instance, few in the West know
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much about the history of Chinese science, and Chinese scholars have many gaps in
their knowledge of Western cultures. Chu mentions Joseph Needham at Oxford as
someone who, with a research team, is trying to put together the history of Chinese
science. We know that history tends to be written by the victors (125). We can
overcome some of these difficulties by working in teams.
E. Betti brings up the matter of the hermeneutic circle (126-135) and criticizes
Gadamer’s notion in Wahrheit und Methode. Gadamer, says Betti, relies too much on
subjectivity to get to objective historical truth.
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pp. 171-253 -- Day 3: Wednesday, 11 October. Civilizational encounters, chaired by
Joseph Vogt.
Four sections:
9) The problem of civilizational encounters in the past
10) The Indies, between the Islamic Orient and China
11) Orient and Occident [East and West]
12) The Soviet Union between the Orient and the Occident [The East and the West]
Anderle begins the day by saying that historically a majority of existing cultures have
encountered other cultures. There is a rich array of problems. We have chosen to
explore this problem concerning cultures of antiquity, such as the meeting of India with,
on the one side, the Islamic East and on the other side with the Far East, the meeting
between East and West, between the Near East and the Far East, and, in conclusion, the
difficult problem of how to interpret Russian history, placed as Russia is between the
runoffs from the Asiatic and the European world (172). 1
Olagüe thanks UNESCO and the UN for sponsorship.
Schachermeyr begins the substantive part of the discussions by talking about the ethnic
and cultural migrations out of Africa, the Near East, and Iran, migrations that were
complicated by the “superposition” of the Indo-European and Semitic peoples. Every
new civilization has its origins in the encounter with another civilization, and it is this
encounter that is the fertilizing element (173-177).
Schmid, departing from an observation by Toynbee in A Study of History, wants to
distinguish, in Russia, between an Orthodox Christian civilization and a Slavic one. He
is answered by Vogt, who doubts that a religious collectivity and a Slavic collectivity
can be classed as civilizations (183).
Olagüe comments on three historical facts or events:
There is the mosque at Cordoba, which was first a Roman temple, then a Christian
church, then an Arab mosque. The Reconquista made it into a Christian church again.
1

Missing from this catalogue is the New World, as it has been missing pretty much since the beginning of
the meeting. Even a strong civilization like that of India, with its multiple cultures, does not make a
central appearance in this conference in general. Africa is almost entirely absent. Whether or not a
civilization, a continent or subcontinent is represented seems to have more to do with the culture of origin
of the participants rather than with any prejudice against a particular geographical area or culture. [MPR’s
note].
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1) In the Middle Ages, particularly in the 11th century, three civilizations
peacefully co-existed in Spain: the Jewish, the Arab, and the Christian.
2) The tolerance that existed among these three civilizations was remarkable and
cannot be compared to any tolerance in the contemporary world. For instance,
in the USA, a Christian cannot simply declare himself to be a Moslem in
order to marry four wives. Law is above religion. But in the Spanish Middle
Ages, the laws that governed were the laws of each group. Yet each came
together for a common cause. For example, Alfonso El Sabio had a team of
astronomers working for him who were Jewish, Arab, and Christian. They
spoke three different languages at home and followed three different sets of
laws. For example, some of them were polygamous, some monogamous. How
does one explain that peaceful co-existence? (183-185)
3) Some barriers are insurmountable. For instance, pre-Columbian civilizations
and Australian aboriginal civilizations lived in isolation and could not take
part in the evolution of humanity. The facts are there and they seem to us to
be indisputable (185). Geographical barriers created isolation and geography
was either a barrier to civilizational encounter or a bridge for it. Some barriers
were more barriers than others. For the Romans, for example, the Pyrenees
were a barrier that they were able to traverse, but the Romans did not cross
the Atlantic; nor did they cross the Sahara. (185).
Technology can overcome geographical barriers (186).
From the 4th millennium to the Christian era there was a vast area of the world which
was a theatre of competition among all sorts of ideas in which new civilizations were
forged. This area was bounded by the valley of the Ganges, the Indian Ocean, the desert
of the Sahara, the steppes of Central Asia, and the shores of the Mediterranean.
The concept of miscegenation (métissage) [mestizaje] is important to understanding how
cultures evolve, from coming into contact with other cultures. The problem is how to
explain why some métissages are successful and fruitful and some are not (186).
Ideas can work like nature in that they can propagate in a successful climate and die in
an inauspicious one. Islam was able to take root in Spain because the ground had
already been prepared by certain Christian heresies like Arianism, which was antiTrinitarian and pro-monotheist. This didn’t happen all at once, as happened with the
discovery of classical texts; this happened over centuries (from the 4th to the 11th). Yet
these same ideas hit a wall in Asia Minor: the obstacle was not a mountain range but,
rather, the presence of Byzantine civilization which maintained a Trinitarian conception
of divinity (187).
As a civilization becomes technologically more advanced, the geographical barriers
between it and other civilizations become less important. Another civilization may

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2012

129

Comparative Civilizations Review, Vol. 66 [2012], No. 66, Art. 20

126

Number 66, Spring 2012

therefore physically root itself in this civilization, especially among the masses, and
from the shock a new conception might emerge (187). A certain amount of civilizational
change may take place through “pseudo-morphosis” (Spengler’s term), in which, as is
the case in geology, a new mineral is formed from another substance, though the outer
shape remains the same. For example, a Hellenized Jew like St. Paul wrote in Greek.
The language may be Greek but the spirit and world view expressed by New Testament
Greek are not Greek (this is an example of pseudo-morphosis) (188). There are certain
geographical zones which are fertile grounds for pseudo-morphosis to take place. For
instance, in Alexandria and its school the East and the West confronted each other and
became mixed.
Spain is a particularly fertile place for metamorphosis in this way, especially all during
the Middle Ages (189).
Civilizational encounters occur in two ways: (1) through the long-term penetration of an
“idée-force” which has insinuated itself across geographical barriers, as when Buddhism
crossed the Himalayas; (2) through the existence of zones of metamorphosis, situated
between two different cultures or two different civilizations. In the first instance, the
“idée-force” acts like a leavening agent; in the second, one is a witness to a new culture
or a new civilization (189).
Toynbee (190-192) affirms that contacts between civilizations are not only wellestablished historical facts but they are some of the most important. It is clear that
civilizations are not “Ganzheiten,” sort of windowless Leibnizian monads, but in fact
they do have windows to the outside world and to other civilizations. Civilizations do
disintegrate, and that proves they are not Ganzheiten: Egyptian, Sumerian, Chinese,
Peruvian all declined, even though for many years each remained “closed.”
“The era of closed civilizations is behind us, now we have to make a choice which will
be a momentous one. The whole future of the human race . . . may depend on whether
we can make a new integration, which, this time, will not be partial or local, but will
include the whole human race.” The question before us today is “whether a world
civilization, integrating the whole human race and all its past cultural treasures, can be
built up, or whether this is a task which is going to defeat the human race” (191).
Sorokin comments that simpler ideas have a greater chance of diffusing through a
culture, and influencing it, than complex ideas. This explains why best sellers are among
the simpler artifacts of a culture and why he (Sorokin) does not read best-sellers (193194).
E. Sarkisyanz (196-199) gives a detailed historical exposition of India’s place between
China and the Islamic Near East, saying that India was more changed by Islam and it
changed Islam; also that India did not expand militarily beyond the Himalayas and that
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its main export was Buddhism and trade. China, on the other hand, did expand, going
into Tibet and Vietnam.
W. Balekjian (199-204) brings up the example of the near-Eastern students who study at
the University of Vienna. This is a civilizational encounter which presents them with
many problems, as they do not understand such concepts as “academic freedom”, which
they experience simply as chaos and disorder. Also, they do not realize that the
advances in Western civilization are the result of hard work, achieved at great cost; the
near-Eastern students tend to see these advances as simply givens, attained without
much difficulty.
S.Y. Chu (205-208), [the only woman at the conference (?)] speaks: Discusses the
family and the status of women. Of the five human relations that Confucius spoke of,
three were about the family: father/son; husband/wife; brother/younger brother. The
other two are ruler/subject and friend/friend. In order to have good family relations, one
has to have good relations with oneself, in one’s own heart and mind. If the family is
well regulated, then the state is well regulated. Wisdom begins at home. “The
foundation of society is a disciplined individual in a disciplined family” (206).
“It has been said . . . that the culture of China was made mostly by women” (206).
Mencius’ mother was a model of motherhood (207). Westernization since the 1840s has
been destroying the internal cohesion of the Chinese family and thus has been
diminishing the importance of women within the family while giving them “equal
rights”. So one can ask if women are truly happy despite this “progress” (208).
B.J. Chu (209-211) discusses the impact that the West has had, since the 1840s, on
China’s economic development. Also, he states that “the meeting of civilizations may
not always mean the complete disintegration of one civilization in favor of another.
There was certainly some disintegration of Chinese civilization” which was the result of
some contact with the West, but the disintegration is “very incomplete” (211).
K. Yajima comments on the case of Japan (212-215): Japan is an excellent test case for
the comparative study of civilizations, east and west. Contemporary Japan is the result
of cross-cultural contact with two great cultures: the Chinese one, from the 6th century
on, with its major influence of Buddhism and the Chinese script. China (Confucian
thought especially) also influenced the Japanese way of thought [“Denkweise”].
Buddhism entered Japan not through Sanskrit but through the Chinese language and
through that language influenced Japanese culture, for many Buddhist texts in Chinese
were used as tools for teaching the script. Buddhism entered so easily because of its
elasticity as a religion and mode of thinking.
The second encounter was with the West: first, the encounter with Catholic missionaries
in the second half of the 16th century; then, the contact with European colonialism since
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the late 18th century; and third, the large-scale introduction of European culture after
1868, a policy that was adopted with the intention of protecting Japan against
imperialism. It is curious that Japan really needed only European technology to defend
itself yet also felt compelled to take over European intellectual foundations as well. This
take-over occurred with only a superficial understanding of the issues involved, for the
difference between the two cultures was too great. Since the beginning of the 20th
century, Japan has striven hard to understand the spiritual foundations of Europe. Japan
has much to learn from Europe.
What in particular can Japan learn from the West? In a word, it can learn about the idea
of man as a subjective being (214). Western thought, whatever its particular field,
presupposes the subjective nature of man as the foundation of its logic. Without that
subjectivity at the foundation, natural science in the Western sense cannot arise.
Similarly, rational thought, systematic philosophy, law and sociology come from this
understanding of subjectivity.
The subjectless quality of the Japanese mode of thought is probably related to the
general character of East Asian thought, and this is closely related to the fundamental
character of Buddhism. The origin of European subjectivity can be found in
Christianity. Especially in comparison with Buddhism, Christianity is a religion of
subjectivity. One stands before God as a person, as a subject, and salvation is personal,
whereas in Buddhism enlightenment is the understanding of oneself as part of the
Absolute (214). It was the subjective nature of Christianity that made possible the
progress of European culture and high culture. Protestantism, as Max Weber
understood, is the extreme form of subjectivity.
It has often been said that the fundamental characteristic of East Asian thought is
‘intuition’. Yajima understands this ‘intuition’ to be the result of an indivisible SubjectObject relationship. This fundamental characteristic of the East Asian mode of thought
was an obstacle to progress in the exact sciences. But Western subjectivity is also at a
dead end, for to the extent that the idea of subjectivity has spread around the globe, to
the same extent there have arisen crises between very different subjects. The possibility
of the integration of world cultures depends on East and West complementing each
other, completing each other (214).
S.Y. Hsiao answers (215-219): It is a mistake to believe that the Chinese are not able to
“think” because they do not have “logic”. It is true that the Chinese do not use
Aristotelian logic, but their mode of thinking is holistic, whereas the thinking of the
West is specialized, particularized. We Chinese [are not separate from nature or set
against it but on the contrary we speak of a] harmony between man and heaven (216). In
the West, the closest equivalent to that is the philosophy of macrocosm and microcosm.
Hsiao advocates holistic thinking as a way to cure the West of its overemphasis on
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specialization, on particularity. Eastern culture is more “feminine,” Western culture is
more “masculine” and “Faustian” (218).
K. Goldammer (219-225) breaks in to say that the idea that East and West are opposites
[Gegensätze] is a myth which has been foisted upon all of us by and since Herodotus. It
is more a necessity of historical writing than of historical fact. It does not correspond to
reality and should be eliminated as a topic of historical study. In its place one should put
“the true concretization of the history of humanity from the perspective on diverse
civilizations” (225: literal translation from the French summary).
J.M. Romein (225-228). “East-West” is a troubling concept because one can take
different geographical areas as “East.” For instance, I consider Africa, Latin America,
and Asia as all parts of “the Orient”. The Soviet Union is a difficult case, as is Latin
America, for it is hard to fit either of those civilizations anywhere in the contrast “EastWest”.
From here (228) to the end of the day (253), there is disagreement about how to consider
the Soviet Union: whether it is between East and West, whether it is a civilization of its
own, whether it was originally Byzantine and then, through communism, became
technologically Western (this is Toynbee’s position). Sorokin’s intervention (239-243)
concerns the over-exaggeration in the concepts of East and West, for they are too large
to mean much, so he prefers smaller concepts like “great culture,” and Russia is just
such a great culture, with influences from Asia and, since the 9th-13th centuries,
increasing Westernization, which really exploded in the time of Peter the Great and
continues to the present.
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pp. 255-314 -- Day 4: Friday, 13 October. The problem of universal history, chaired
by Edward T. Gargan.
Four sections:
13) The transcendent forces of culture: technology, economy, politics, ideology,
science, religion.
14) Current theories of universal history: comparison and critique
15) The perspectives from philosophy on history and metahistory
16) Universal history as a fact and as a duty (comme fait et comme devoir)
Gargan says that today’s task is more difficult than yesterday’s because of all the
paradoxical problems inherent in the discussion (256).
Anderle opens the discussion (256-257) by saying that the problem of universal history
is whether to consider it as history that is above and beyond the history of all individual
cultures, or to consider it as the sum of all individual cultures. How does it exist? And
what roles do technology, economics, politics, science, and religion play? Are these
forces that are above those of individual civilizations?
K. Goldammer (258-262): the comparative history of religion was one of the first to be
considered from the perspective of universal history. It played a role in Herodotus and it
became particularly important in the Renaissance, in Humanism, and above all during
the Romantic period. Yet the comparative history of religion is today one of the least
studied fields. It requires a philological knowledge that is beyond the reach of many
scholars on the one hand and, on the other, it is a field which attracts dilettantes and
superficial treatment. Yet many topics can be misleadingly compared. For instance,
“monotheism” is not the same in Judaism, Christianity and Islam, not to mention
Hinduism and a text like the Bhagavad-Gita (260). Pantheism in Greece is quite
different from pantheism in India. Mysticism is different in each tradition, as is the
concept of sin, etc. And yet there is in mankind a striving toward religion that is
“unifying”, based on a kind of archetypal revelation that speaks to the dignity and worth
of humanity.
Toynbee: the history of technology and the history of religion are two ways of looking
at the history of mankind above and beyond that of individual civilizations. Technology
has contributed to the spread of religions. There are three religions --Buddhism,
Christianity, and Islam -- that are missionary religions and “have broken down the
barriers between civilizations” (264). Today we are at the point where we must decide
whether to go beyond our own individual local communities, and our allegiances to
them, in order to go toward a new and greater unity of mankind, or whether we will
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return to a kind of localism that, because of atomic weapons, is very dangerous (263265).
E. Füter: there is no such thing as universal history at present although it is possible that
there might be such a thing in the future. The model is that of the natural sciences. There
may be something like “historical energies” which are energies that arise from a
collectivity or an institution and exert a quantifiable influence (266-269).
O. Köhler: At certain times certain societies possessed a sense of universal history. This
happened during the Middle Ages, when it was felt that the history of civilization was
the same as universal history. But contemporary man has lost this sense of unity (269274).
J. Vogt devotes his time to criticizing Karl Jaspers’ theory of the Axial Age. Jaspers
identifies history in its fullest sense – that is, history is of a conscious past— with the
development of writing and thus the transmission of heritages. He says that during the
Axial Age, myth yields to religion and philosophy, as prophet and philosophers like
Confucius, Lao-tse, Buddha and Zarathustra, the prophets of Israel and the philosophers
of Greece, become influential, for it was in this time that our basic philosophical
orientations were set and also the beginnings of our religious traditions -- which are still
in force today. This process of spiritualization, which has been known for more than 100
years (cf. the work of Ernst von Lasaulx) is made by Jaspers into the axis of world
history (274-278).
While no one would doubt that the appearance of these religious thinkers and
philosophers was important, the real question is whether the focus on them as the center
of all human history is justified, and therefore whether or not such a focus on the Axial
Age does harm to what came both before and after (278).
First of all, the conquest of myth by means of the logos took place before the Axial Age
itself, for instance in Egypt and in Babylon (cf. Amenhotep IV). So Jaspers is mistaken
in his “history.” Secondly, Jaspers says that the birth of modern science and technology,
which took place between 1500 and 1800, was a kind of second axial age which was
inspired by the forces of the Renaissance which went back to the antiquity of the
original axial age. But H. Butterfield and others have shown that the new spirituality
was already present in the English Middle Ages, with the 13th-century Franciscan
nominalists and in the 14th century with Nicholas of Cusa. Also, the great scientists of
the 16th and 17th centuries --Copernicus, Galileo, Kepler, Newton -- were all united in
believing that their work was an extension of God’s word in the Bible. If a deep
Christian spirituality leads to modern science, then Jaspers’ theory of the Axial Age has
to be suspect (278).
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Vogt: “I thought it advisable to critically examine this theory of the philosopher Karl
Jaspers before it is taken up as completely valid by our schoolbooks” (278).
Sorokin makes some concluding remarks about the day’s work (301-303): In order to
obtain a more adequate knowledge of the human past, present and future, scholars will
have to do a better job of solving three fundamental problems: that of the idiographic
knowledge of the human universe (that is, the accurate descriptions of actual events,
persons, characteristics, relationships); that of the nomothetic knowledge of the human
universe (that is, an explanation of relationships and uniformities; these are
generalizations based on idiographic descriptions); that of the metahistorical or
metascientific knowledge of the human universe (that is, the largest possible
understanding of human history, like that of Augustine, Hegel, Toynbee or Berdyaev).
We should not confuse this last kind of knowledge with scientific knowledge, for
metahistorical knowledge builds on the two former kinds of knowledge (idiographic and
nomothetic). It is not physical, chemical or biological knowledge.
Anderle objects to the term “nomothetic”, for it means something different in the
German tradition (304).
Then there was general discussion, without an emerging consensus, as to whether God
was present in history or not, and if we should study that. Taking part were Köhler,
Vogt, Fueter, Hsiao, and Anderle (306-314).
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pp. 315-397 -- Day 5: Saturday, 14 October. The future of civilizations, chaired by
Emilio Betti.
Four sections:
17) The possibilities of the principle of a futuristic historiography
18) Are civilizations open or closed processes?
19) The role of global forces: economy, ideology, religion
20) Perspectives on the future of the species ‘civilization’ in general and on its actual
representatives in particular
Toynbee begins by saying that the question of civilizations as “Ganzheiten” is central to
questions about prognostication. If civilizations are open systems, then prognostication
is impossible. If civilizations are closed systems, then prognostication is possible. “I
myself believe that civilizations are imperfectly closed systems” (316). We are in part
free and in part not. There are some things that we can control and some that we cannot,
or do not. The “frontier” is always fluctuating. “With our minds, we realize that, since
1945, war ceased to be the kind of institution that it was before 1945, that in future wars
there will be neither victors nor vanquished, but all will be vanquished. In fact, we
realize that the presuppositions on which wars were made in the past will no longer
apply” (317).
The comparative study of civilizations is extremely important in identifying and
explaining underlying patterns of history. But an understanding of these patterns does
not permit us to determine the future. The comparative study of civilizations is not like
astronomy, which is a predictive science. We, as comparative civilizationists, cannot
predict whether or not the world will be destroyed (318).
Spengler, says Toynbee, has a more determinist view of history.
E. T. Gargan (319-332) delivers a long speech concentrating on Tocqueville to the effect
that Tocqueville was able to see into the future, not with the exactitude of science, but
nonetheless with some accuracy because the history of the West is a working out of the
democratic revolution.
Sorokin says that predictions are possible, in a limited sense, and that he himself made a
number of detailed predictions, at the end of vols. 3 and 4 of “Social and Cultural
Dynamics” (pub. 1937), about what was going to happen to the family, the church,
political organizations, the fine arts and so on. His colleagues at Harvard thought that he
was “loon-ly” (sic: 335), that the predictions of terrible wars and so on would not come
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true. Only later, after the end of World War II, did they admit that he had been right. It
is (i) not possible to make predictions with regard to unique phenomena; it is possible
(ii) to make some approximate and generally correct predictions with regard to mass and
repeated phenomena; it is possible (iii) to make some predictions with regard to
Ganzheiten as to what they, as integrated and united systems, may pass through (335).
Anderle (336-339) tries to distinguish between two sorts of prognostication. (a) A total
prognostication, based on material evidence up to that point and following certain laws
of causality; (b) A partial prognostication based more on formal structural elements and
that corresponds to the prediction of events. Prognostication may be possible, but in the
case of history and society it is impractical because of the overwhelming complexity of
history and society.
M. Rassem wants to distinguish among diagnosis, prognosis and prophecy (340-344).
E. Fueter says that prognosis works in certain areas, like train schedules, governmental
budgets, and the like. Theoretically, a total prognosis might be possible, but in practical
matters it is not feasible. Hence it is superfluous (344-347).
F. Schachermeyr (347-352) says that he is speaking from his experience as a historian of
Greek culture. The question of prognosis must be related to the question of whether
civilizations are open structures or closed ones. Further, there are three kinds of
causality: (a) the timeless causality of experimental science; (b) the final causality,
which is biological, and the only variability in it is time or chronology (that is, when
something will happen, as it is inevitable that it will happen); and (c) historical
causality, which comes from our free will. In historical causality, a concrete situation
acts as a given, then that given is modified by a series of human actions. But the
modifications always occur within a certain structural logic, along a chain of events that
leads to results that are limited by the structural logic and by the chain itself.
Civilizations do have a future, but they will develop along certain lines and not others.
Toynbee, Anderle and Schachermeyr then argue about the predictability of human
events; they cite this or that prognosis, both for and against predictability (352-357).
Sorokin interrupts to say that he has conducted an experiment, asking groups of people
to predict their own behavior one day, two days, or one month ahead. They were asked
to schedule their time. The further one went from the present, the larger the errors were.
Simple things like food and sleep were predicted with much more accuracy than things
like reading, talking, visiting friends, etc.
S.Y. Hsiao (360) comments that prognosis was very important in Chinese history, as
Chinese emperors always hired prophets in their courts to advise them on whether or not
certain actions were to enhance or disturb the harmony between heaven and earth.
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A. Hilckman (360-361) remarks that the question of whether civilizations are open or
closed is related to the question of whether history is determined or not. This is not
something that can be decided by dogmatic declaration or argument. Rather, it all
depends on the empirical situation at hand.
B.J. Chu (361-362) interrupts to say that he is very uncomfortable with historians of
civilizations making any predictions at all. He cites the examples of the Mexican and the
Chinese revolutions of 1911. Neither of these revolutions was predicted by historians,
nor did they predict their results. No one could predict that the two revolutions occurring
in the same year would turn out so differently.
Anderle (363-364) says that one can’t decide, on the basis of argument, whether
civilizations are closed or open structures. Rather, one has to submit the question to
concrete civilizational examples, one by one.
A. Hilckman (364) agrees with Anderle and quotes Spengler with disapproval: “In
diesem Werke wird zum erstenmal der Versuch unternommen, Geschichte im voraus to
bestimmen”. (In this work, the attempt is undertaken for the first time to predict history.)
[Editor’s Note: In other words, Hilckman believes Spengler to be a bogus historian.]
After listening to the discussion of a number of issues, Sorokin comments: (374) “First,
I find the formulation of openness or closedness of systems of cultures or civilizations
not quite fortunate. Second, I would like to replace it by the term selectivity and
absorption by either a personality system or by organized social groups or by integrated
cultural Ganzheiten, all the external, incessant influences to which any personality, any
integrated cultural system, any organized group are incessantly subjected. Being
subjected to incessant bombardments of external influences, all of these integrated
Ganzheiten do not absorb all these influences but take in selectively only those which
are congenial to them and reject those which are uncongenial.” All cultural systems
fluctuate, ebb and flow toward greater or lesser coherence. Some of them disintegrated
and cannot be called “one logic-meaningful and causal unity” (375).
Anderle comments that in the argument about whether cultures are open or closed
systems, there is a great deal to be said in favor of considering cultures as closed
systems. Both Sorokin and Toynbee are agreed on the characterization of certain epochs
of high cultures, even as they disagree on other matters. There is such uniformity
concerning the development of high cultures that the argument for cultures as closed
systems makes sense (376). But even this uniformity does not permit one to conceive of
cultures as completely closed systems.
Toynbee comments that while in logic one may make the distinction between closed or
open, such a distinction is not feasible when one is dealing with human minds and
human history. A culture is really like a fruit with a soft exterior and a hard core, and
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several layers in between. The hard core would be the relatively closed part of the
culture; the rest would be part of the open part, which is softer and easier to penetrate. In
a way, this is how Western culture has penetrated Eastern culture, particularly in terms
of technological innovations; it has gone through the shallower depths, the softer parts
of the fruit. The hard core, however, is more difficult to penetrate (380-381).
Olagüe remarks that if cultures are truly closed, then we should all pack our bags and go
home, for then we cannot really communicate with one another. For Olagüe, cultures are
structures that are open, somewhat like houses that have windows. It is through those
windows that influences flow, in both directions (381-382).
Anderle defends the concept of closed cultures by appealing to Leibnizian monadology.
Monads are windowless. There is something mysterious and ultimately unknowable at
the heart of every culture, as there is in the heart of every stranger (382-383).
The moderator, Betti, interrupts the discussion and says, “let us take up the question of
point 19, that of global powers in economy, ideology and religion” (384).
In the modern age, says Quadri, we are caught between the forces of authenticity and of
conditioning (by this, Quadri means that man is controlled or conditioned by outside
forces). The modern era has not been beneficial for authenticity, as the process of
extinguishing the “I” has been decisive (384-387).
Goldammer follows Toynbee in arguing for the importance of religion concerning the
future of civilization but says that Toynbee in wrong in saying that civilizations in
decline will produce new religions. The religion of the future will be a kind of
humanism in the highest sense of that word (387-393).
Olagüe answers by saying that the followers of communism and scientific humanism
consider them to be true religions and that it is a mistake to interpret the future solely
from the perspective of religion (393-394).
E. Fueter replies that one of the principal functions of religion at the heart of a
civilization is to establish a rapport between the elite and the common folk. This is a
function that neither liberalism nor communism nor scientific humanism can fulfill;
therefore they will not supplant religion itself (395-397).
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pp. 399-454 -- Day 6: Sunday, 15 October. One world: The contribution of the
human sciences to peaceful unification of humanity, chaired by Shi-Yi Hsiao.
Two sections:
21) The role of the human sciences in the process of global integration
22) The theory and practice of international cooperation in the domain of the human
sciences
Anderle begins (400) by stating that this group as a whole has come to the provisional
conclusion that 5,000 years of Hochkultur history may be ending and that a new era is
beginning in which humanity is moving toward one world. It cannot be doubted that this
process is desirable, but we have to ask ourselves how we as civilizationists can
contribute to it. After all, we have come together as representatives of the disciplines of
humankind: history, sociology, culture, law, art, prehistory, philology etc. Each of us
has to ask ourselves what we can contribute from the vantage point of our particular
discipline (401). The discussion must be not only theoretical but practical.
S.Y. Hsiao comments that we are all as diverse as leaves on a tree but that we all belong
to the same tree. And it is high time that we look for what we have in common. With
that general thought, he turns to Toynbee (403).
Toynbee says: Most people in the room agree with Anderle that “the period of separate
regional cultures is drawing to an end, that the choice is now between either one world
or no world (403).
As unfortunate as the colonizing process has been, and Toynbee recognizes that he
belongs to a colonizing people, it nonetheless had “a positive and valuable legacy”: “the
almost compulsory unification of the World”. Although the Western domination of the
World is now evaporating, Westerners “have left behind a voluntary wish for unity
among all the peoples of the world” (404).
The unification of the world was made possible in the 15th and 16th centuries by the
technological development of Portuguese sailing ships which were able to stay at sea for
many months on end and therefore could travel the oceans of the world (404).
As we look at the process of unification, we can take the example of China into account.
China has many diverse cultures within its borders and has had a richly divisive and
warlike history, but it became unified and has remained unified for a long time (406).
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Just as in order to get to know someone we should know him as he was in the past as
well as in the present, so too should we study cultures. We cannot study only the present
(407-408). All human action “has a time-depth” (408).
Our problem as the human race is that we have come together technologically and
militarily, often against our will, but we have not come together enough in terms of
culture: religion, psychology, art, “and other things that unite the human race in a
positive way” (408). This enforced unification can lead to mass suicide (through atomic
weapons) because “we are still comparative strangers to each other, we are afraid of
each other, misunderstand each other, misapprehend each other, misrepresent each other
and therefore have an animosity towards each other” (408). We are still subject to such
mass misunderstandings that they threaten the very existence of the planet; we need to
cease being strangers to one another. Academics have a role to play in this situation.
(These remarks were greeted with prolonged and enthusiastic applause.)
Hsiao gives the floor to Sorokin: Sorokin takes up the same issues as Toynbee, but from
a more abstract perspective. He speaks of the transition from Ideational to Sensate
culture, which has been the culture that has dominated in world history for the past 500
years. Sensate culture is necessarily yielding, he says, to a “new Integral socio-cultural
order” (411) at the same time that the creative centers of the world are shifting from
Europe and North America to Central and South America, to India, China, and Japan,
and perhaps Russia, a shift which is the legacy of the death of colonialism.
At the same time, the view of “man” is shifting from that of a biological being to one
that is more complex, more fashioned from the “coincidentia oppositorum” (412) which
is human experience itself. We human beings are not merely biological and not merely
rational; we are also -- the best of us-- acquiring a super-rational dimension, a kind of
knowledge and wisdom which the Chinese call a “tao-no Knowledge”.
The main danger facing us is the misuse of non-sensate values (which are the values of
the great religions in their purest manifestations) for sensate purposes (413). Yet even
there we see an attempt by such masters of sensate cultures as scientists to lead
humankind “into a new era of creative history” in which everything would be united in
“one Integral system” in the service of the “great creative spirit of man” (414). (These
remarks, like those of Toynbee, were met with prolonged and enthusiastic applause.)
Toynbee agrees with Sorokin and says that now especially, “in the present atomic age
our first elementary moral duty is to mankind as a whole. This must override everything
else” 416).
These were the final substantive remarks by the two great lions in attendance.
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Shortly after the comments by Toynbee and Sorokin, S.Y. Hsiao takes the floor to state
that he is representing many at the conference not only in recommending that a full
conference report be transmitted to UNESCO but also that the following resolution be
adopted and transmitted to UNESCO as well:
“We would like to draw the attention of UNESCO to the meritorious activity of the
INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF
CIVILIZATIONS, undertaken in the interest of fostering an understanding among
peoples and the kind of interdisciplinary cooperation that has occurred all during the
first ‘Synopsis Congress’ which has just finished on ‘The Problems of Civilizations’ and
which has left all the participants deeply satisfied. In addition, we would like to request
that [UNESCO] encourage the continuation of this work by granting the corresponding
financial support for the establishment of ‘THE INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR
RESEARCH AND INFORMATION ABOUT THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF
CIVILIZATIONS’ (C.I.E.C.C.), to be located in Salzburg.” (427-428)
S.Y. Hsiao then declares that, while he is not yet a member of the ISCSC, he will
become a member immediately, a declaration that is met with applause. The resolution
is then adopted without opposition and unanimously (428).
A variety of topics are touched on during this last day: the threatening presence of
atomic weapons; Orwell’s 1984 as prophecy; the important contribution that China
could make to the comparative study of civilizations by encouraging the awareness of
holistic thought, which is more “circular,” as a counterweight to linear Aristotelian
thought; the importance of the comparative study of civilizations as a counterweight to
the emphasis on technology, for civilizational analysis is profoundly human and
humanizing; the role that UNESCO can play in advancing the comparative study of
civilizations (428-449).
The last intervention comes from an unknown person, identified only as “anonymous”:
this person, speaking in German, advocates a kind of phenomenological/hermeneutic
analysis in civilizational study through which better cross-cultural understanding can be
achieved by asking how Others see us and how we see Others (“wie sehen uns die
Andern, wie sehen wir die Andern”?) (450). S.Y. Hsiao answers that this question will
surely be taken up in the future but not now, and that because the conference is,
unfortunately, at an end (450). 2

2

Almost 25 years later, the question of “the Other” in civilizational perceptions was explored in a double
issue of the Comparative Civilizations Review 13/14 (1985-1986) that appeared both as a double issue
and as a book (with the ISCSC as publisher, 1985); it was entitled As Others See Us: Mutual Perceptions
East and West. Its editors were Bernard Lewis, Edmund Leites and Margaret Case.
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Sorokin himself closes the conference with some remarks that are autobiographical,
ceremonial, and congratulatory (450-454). He notes his initial reluctance to attend the
conference as well as his pessimism concerning its quality. But, happily, he has been
surprised by the improving quality and focus of the discussions. He is coming away
convinced, he says, of the necessity and importance of civilizational analysis, of the
need for congresses like this one, which he considers to have been unique. He hopes for
a good and well-funded future for the International Society for the Comparative Study
of Civilizations.
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Participants, Inaugural Meeting of the ISCSC [SIECC], Salzburg 1961
Othmar F. Anderle, Hon. Prof., Universität Salzburg, Director of Institute for the Theory
of History, Salzburg, General Sec of SIECC [Spoke in German]
Wahé H. Balekjian, Lecturer, Universität Wien, Simon Research Fellow, University of
Manchester [Spoke in German]
Emilio Betti, Prof., University of Rome, Director of the University’s Institute of Roman
Law and the Institute of the Theory of Interpretation, University of Rome [Spoke
in German]
Paul Bao-jen Chu, Principal, Workers’ Education Division, International Labor Office,
Switzerland [Spoke in English]
Phyllis Shu-yuan Chu, Prof., Universität Genf, Switzerland [Spoke in English]
Eduard Füter, Director, Swiss Institute for Research on Foreigners, Zürich, Switzerland
[Spoke in German]
Edward T. Gargan, Prof. of History, Wesleyan University, Connecticut [Spoke in
English]
Kurt Goldammer, Prof. History of Religion and History of Religious Art,
Philippsuniversität, Marburg [Spoke in German]
Heinrich Herrfahrdt, Emeritus Prof of Law, Philippsuniversität, Marburg [Spoke in
German]
Anton Hilckman, Prof., Joh. Gutenberg Universität Mainz. Director of University’s
Institute for the Comparative Study of Cultures [Spoke in German]
Paul Shi-yi Hsiao, Prof., Universität Peking, also affiliated with Universität Freiburg
[Spoke in German]
Georg Iggers, Assoc. Prof. of History, Roosevelt University, Chicago [Spoke in
English]
Oskar Köhler, Univ. Prof., Universität Freiburg [Spoke in German]
Herbert Kühn, Prof., Joh. Gutenberg Universität Mainz. Member, Academy of Science
and Literature, Mainz [Spoke in German]
Ignacio Olagüe, Independent Scholar, Vice-President, SIECC. Madrid, Spain [Spoke in
French]
Goffredo Quadri, Prof. Philosophy of Law and of Sociology, Universität Siena, Italy
[Spoke in French]
Mohammed Rassem, University Dozent, Universität München [Spoke in German]
Jan M. Romein, Emeritus Prof., Universität Amsterdam, Director of the Seminar for the
Theory of History, The Netherlands [Spoke in English]
Hans Rotter, M.D., Salzburg [Spoke in German]
Emanuel Sarkisyanz, Prof., Albert Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg [Spoke in English]
Fritz Schachermeyr, Prof. of the History of Antiquity, Universität Wien, Director of the
University’s Institute for Ancient History, Archaeology and Epigraphy [Spoke in
German]
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Heinrich F. Schmid, Prof., Slavic and East-European History, Universität Wien [Spoke
in German]
Pitirim A. Sorokin, Emeritus Prof., Harvard University. President of International
Institute and Congress of Sociology. President, American Sociological
Association. Member, American Academy of Arts and Sciences. President, SIECC
[Spoke in English]
Arnold J. Toynbee, Emeritus Prof., London University. Former Director of Studies, The
Royal Institute of International Affairs, London [Spoke in English]
Joseph Vogt, Prof. of History of Antiquity, Universität Tübingen. President of Mainz’
Academy of Science and Literature, Tübingen [Spoke in German]
Yoshiro Yajima, Prof. of Philosophy and the History of Social Thought, University of
Tokyo, Japan [Spoke in German]
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Book Reviews
Benjamin R. Foster and Karen Polinger Foster. Civilizations of Ancient Iraq.
Princeton University Press, 2009.
It is a pleasure to review Civilizations of Ancient Iraq by Benjamin and Karen
Foster. Ben Foster was my Akkadian professor when I attended graduate school at
Yale. I vividly remember his ability to convey the broad sweep of ancient
Mesopotamian cultures in an accessible, meaningful, and engaging manner. Together
with his wife, he has demonstrated that skill in this book as well.
Civilizations of Ancient Iraq provides “a brief historical and cultural survey of
Iraq from earliest times to the Muslim conquest in 637” (page xi). This survey helps
answer the questions, “Why study the civilizations of ancient Iraq? What is the value
of studying the civilizations of ancient Iraq to the study of civilization in general?”
The book’s Prologue offers an overview answer. “Iraq is one of the birthplaces of
human civilization. This land saw the first towns and cities, the first states and empires.
Here writing was invented, and with it the world’s oldest poetry and prose and the
beginnings of mathematics, astronomy, and law. Here too are found pioneering
achievements in pyrotechnology, as well as important innovations in art and
architecture. From Iraq comes rich documentation for nearly every aspect of human
endeavor and activity millennia ago, from the administration of production, surplus,
and the environment to religious belief and practice, even haute cuisine recipes and
passionate love songs” (page xi).
The basic features of the book are these: a Prologue is followed by ten chapters
and an Epilogue. There is a well-documented note section for each chapter (found at
the end of the book), a thorough and up-to-date bibliography, a helpful index, two maps
(more maps could have been provided, but this reviewer made ample educational use of
Google Earth to significantly supplement that deficiency), and 23 black and white
images of ancient artifacts such as cuneiform tablets, harps, stele, reliefs, vases,
statuettes, etc.
The narrative is delightful with strategically selected contextualizing quotations
from primary sources. These quotes artfully and expertly enliven the narrative, drive
home a point, illustrate key ideas, but most importantly, draw out the ancient voices of
lost cultures and peoples so that the reader feels as though he or she were silently
eavesdropping on ancient conversations. Civilizations of Ancient Iraq presents a
trajectory of the most important turning points in the cultures and civilizations of
ancient Iraq. This review will highlight some of the key ideas from each chapter.
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Chapter 1 discusses what constitutes the geographical region that we
interchangeably call Iraq or Mesopotamia (in Greek, Mesopotamia means “between the
rivers”, referring to the Euphrates and Tigris rivers that run through the region). This
chapter also traces the beginning of civilization from the domestication of plants and
animals to rise of small villages and towns (ca. 12,000-8000 before the present). The
authors then describe the migration of farmers and herders from the foothills into the
alluvial plains. They conclude this chapter with an overview of the Ubaid period of
civilization that pre-dated written records (ca. 6500-3800 BCE).
Chapter 2 explores the rise of Mesopotamian civilization, focusing specifically on
the city of Uruk (ca. 4th millennium BCE). During this time we see the development of
formal religion, the invention of writing, and social stratification. We do not know
exactly why, but Uruk become a model for other cities as we see physical culture from
Uruk diffused throughout the region. In fact, this diffusion of the Urukian model of
culture and civilization persisted among Mesopotamian city-states into the 1st century
CE.
Chapter 3 focuses on the earliest Mesopotamian city-states of Sumerian
civilization: Jemdet-Nasr, Ur, and Nippur (ca. 3rd millennium BCE). Sumerian
literature and religion began to flourish and royalty and kingship played an increasingly
dominant role in culture and society.
In Chapter 4, we learn that Akkadian speaking peoples took control over
Sumerian areas and shifted imperial control to Agade (late 3rd millennium BCE), a city
which archaeologists have still never found. The key rulers were Sargon, who created
what was probably the first true empire the world has known, and his grandson, NaramSin, who was known for opulent and grandiose living. Naram-Sin was the first
Mesopotamian king to claim divinity, perhaps because of his military conquests,
successes in crisis management, and clever abilities with imperial administration.
Chapter 5 reviews one of the most influential and famous of ancient
Mesopotamian rulers, Hammurabi. Hammurabi’s time (18th century BCE) is wellknown for literature including his eponymous law code, which has striking similarities
to case-law found in the Hebrew Bible, and the transformation of Sumerian poems
about the legendary ruler Gilgamesh into an Akkadian literary masterpiece known now
as “The Epic of Gilgamesh.” Hammurabi established the Babylonian Empire that
despite its heady fame was actually short-lived.
Chapter 6 covers the Kassite period of Babylonian history (ca. 1530-1150 BCE).
Originally from the Zagros Mountains to the east of the Mesopotamian alluvial plain,
the Kassites overtook Babylonian areas and culture after Babylon was destroyed by
Hittites. They expanded the military class and introduced horse-drawn chariots to the
region.
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During this period, there were several co-existing empires with which the Kassites
carried on extensive trade and diplomatic correspondence, addressing each other on
equal terms (using the term “brother”). These foreign empires were Egypt, Mitanni
(the Hurrians in Syria), Hatti and Arzawa (in central and western Turkey), Alashiya
(modern day Cyprus), and Assyria (in northern Iraq). The Kassites promoted
technology, medicine, and science, especially the art of divination.
Chapter 7 focuses on the rise of Assyria from its earliest days (ca. late 3rd
millennium BCE) down to the Neo-Assyrian imperial age of (8th-7th centuries BCE)
when they were eventually annihilated by foreign conquerors. Much of what we know
about the Old Assyrian period (ca. 2300-1800 BCE) is from tablets discovered at
Assyrian trading colonies established in Turkey (e.g., Kanesh).
The Early Middle Assyrian period (ca. 1350-1200 BCE) saw the rise of militarism
and imperialism. But this came to a screeching halt when near 1200 BCE there was a
general collapse of society throughout the Ancient Near East that also affected Assyria.
Years later, the Neo-Assyrian Empire emerged with the rise of Adad-Nirari II (ca. 911
BCE). Forging an expansionistic policy with fierce militaristic determinism, NeoAssyria was known throughout the broader Near East for its fear-inspiring efficient
military machine. The Neo-Assyrian policy of internationalization and assyrianizing
the empire resulted in the displacement of possibly a million people. This policy
influenced subsequent Judeo-Christian history and tradition as represented in the story
of the 10 Northern Tribes being brought into Assyrian captivity and thus subsequently
lost to the annals of history. In addition to a militaristic society, the Neo-Assyrians kept
extensive libraries and records. In fact, the largest library to survive from the ancient
world was the library of Assurbanipal at Nineveh.
Chapter 8 returns to Babylon in its Neo-Babylonian years (ca. 612 – 539 BCE),
which many consider to be its glory days; it was a dynamic, prosperous time. After the
fall of the Assyrian Empire to Median and Babylonian armies, Nebuchadnezzar II
“transformed Babylon into the greatest city of the age, enjoying a peace and prosperity
she had not known for centuries” (page 130). Streets, palaces, and temples were
refurbished and the period was known for education, literature, and science. “Educated
Babylonians of the time were well aware of the great antiquity of their civilization.
The study of ancient history flourished in professional circles, producing a new
style of chronographic literature” (pages 134-135). Religious patronage also continued.
“The great temples in Babylonia were centers of religious, economic, and
intellectual life. The temple of Ishtar at Uruk, for example, had a staff of
hundreds, including scores of craftsmen, and controlled at least 17,000
hectares of agricultural land and extensive date orchards, many of which it
leased out to citizens for a share of the crop” (page 140).
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Economically we see the rise of chattel slavery, especially during the reign
of Nabonidus. Eventually, the Neo-Babylonian Empire fell to the Persians.
The Persian rulers borrowed liberally from Babylon. In fact, “When Darius
commemorated his rise to power in a long narrative carved on a sheer cliff
face at Behistun, Iran, he used three languages, Elamite, Persian, and
Babylonian, all written using cuneiform characters.
This trilingual inscription helped make possible the decipherment of
cuneiform writing in the nineteenth century” (page 146).
Chapter 9 turns our attention to the culture and history of Mesopotamia after the
conquests of Alexander the Great and the wars of succession. The Seleucids finally
won power in the Mesopotamian region and a form of Greek culture eventually came to
predominate. But because Greek scholars were not so interested in Babylonian culture
(except for mathematics, astronomy, and divination), the Babylonian culture and
traditions waned. Additionally, the Seleucids built their capital about 30 miles away
from Babylon, which also contributed to the erosion of Babylonian primacy.
Eventually the Seleucid kingdom fell to Parthians, who moved the capital to
Ctesiphon. Rome and the Parthians were engaged in conflict over many years. This
was devastating to the region, and led to the further loss of ancient Mesopotamian
culture due to economic collapse and the lack of patronage of the old ways of doing
things. The end of Mesopotamian civilization can be dated to the 1st century CE, i.e.,
during this period of ongoing conflict between the Romans and the Parthians.
The last datable astronomical tables from ancient Mesopotamia date to 75 CE.
Foster and Foster conclude “We may take these texts as the effective terminus of
Mesopotamian civilization, after well over three thousand years. The ancient cities
were mostly in ruins, with the occasional Parthian fortification atop the debris.
This is not to say that Mesopotamian civilization left no legacy. We see its
survival in many contexts down to the present day—from literature and metaphor to
geometry and astronomy, from cultic and magical practices to art and iconography”
(page 167).
Chapter 10 concludes the historical review of ancient civilization of Iraq. When
the Parthian state fell, the Persian Sassanid Empire inherited the area and ruled for over
400 years from ca. 224 to 637 CE, when the Islamic conquerors toppled the Sassanid
state. The Sassanids were known for religious tolerance. Their empire encompassed a
rich diversity of religions including: Manichaeism, Christianity, Mithraism,
Gnosticism, Greek and Roman religions, traditional Mesopotamian religions,
Zoroastrianism, and Judaism. The Sassanian Empire had the structure in place to be a
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successful empire, but long-term conflict with the Byzantine Empire meant that both
empires exhausted themselves, devastated the Mesopotamian region, and deeply
diminished its productivity.
Thus was the region left relatively wide open for the Arabs who had for the first
time in their history united around a common cause—Islam. Within a few years the
Muslim invaders had conquered huge swaths of the Middle East and Mediterranean
basin. The Islamic conquests bring to a close the survey of ancient civilizations of
Iraq.
The Epilogue describes the centuries of historical and academic interest in ancient
Iraq. The Fosters describe the stages of rediscovery of ancient Mesopotamian
civilizations, the decipherment of cuneiform and the many languages that it
represented, the development of philology and archaeology, the development of
institutions, especially museums, to retain the cultural memory of ancient
Mesopotamia, and the more recent and very sad destruction of so much knowledge
about ancient Mesopotamia because of ongoing wars and conflict in the region,
especially since 1990.
Civilizations of Ancient Iraq can be a bit daunting to a novice in the field due to
the hundreds of names, dates, and locations mentioned throughout the book.
I found it indispensible to use Google Earth and Wikipedia to visually and
geographically supplement what I was reading. When locations were mentioned, I
would look up their GPS coordinates on Wikipedia (coordinates are usually found in
the upper right of the page) and would then paste those coordinates into Google Earth.
Sometimes Wikipedia coordinates were incorrect (such was the case with the city of Ur
in southern Iraq). But for the most part, I was able to find the ancient locations I was
seeking.
So simply by mapping all of the major locations mentioned in the book, and
saving them in my own personal Google Earth folders, I was able to quickly see an
interactive, contextualizing visual display of the reality of where Mesopotamian history
occurred, especially when the “Panoramio pictures” features on Google Earth is
enabled. This exercise of using Google Earth to learn about and “see” the ancient past
is, I propose, the next best thing to actually visiting the ancient locations discussed in
the book (certainly it is much cheaper and safer than visiting Iraq today).
In summary, I highly recommend Civilizations of Ancient Iraq to anyone seeking
a concise, up-to-date, informative survey of the history and culture of ancient
Mesopotamia.
Taylor Halverson

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2012

151

Comparative Civilizations Review, Vol. 66 [2012], No. 66, Art. 20

148

Number 66, Spring 2012

D. Bahat, Israel: Past & Present. Rome: Vision, 1998.
Israel: Past & Present is a little book that introduces readers to several
historical sites and the major time periods in the land of Israel. The book provides a
helpful map behind the front cover and each site listed in the book is highlighted with a
red dot on the map. Next to the map is a breakdown of time periods corresponding to
the history of the land of Israel.
The book is divided in the following way. The opening chapter provides a high
level overview of the history of the land of Israel starting with the most ancient
evidence of human habitation in the area and ending with Zionism and its Realization.
The other major periods covered include the Canaanite Period and the Israelite
Settlement, the Israelite Conquest, the Hellenistic Period, Roman Rule, Christianity, the
Arab Conquest, the Crusades, the Mamluks, and the Ottomans.
Because of the high level nature of treatment of each period, some major issues
are given only cursory mention, not mentioned at all, or presented in black and white
terms that do not convey the rich, variegated and nuanced approach that scholars would
expect. But such is to be expected of an overview book that devotes a meager 22 pages
to the entire history of Israel from the dawn of civilization down to the present day.
The book presents the history of Israel with reliance on a positive view of the Bible as a
reliable source of historical evidence and commentary.
The sites described and visually displayed in the book include The City of
David (with additional pages devoted to the related topics of Jerusalem during the 2nd
Temple Period, The Robinson Arch, and the Cardo in Jerusalem), Caesarea, Masada,
The Church at Mamshit (in the Negev desert, southeast of the Israeli city of Dimona),
Beit She’an (including the Cardo and the Theater), Belvoir (Kokhav Hayarden),
Hammat Gader, The Church at Kursi, The Synagogue in Capernaum, Kala’at Namrud,
Tiberias, and Megiddo. Colorful pictures are interspersed throughout the text of
archaeological artifacts and locations. One of the unique features of this book, seldom
found in other media on this subject, are artistic renditions of ancient sites that can be
laid over modern day photographs of the same locations. This feature helps the reader
to imagine what ancient sites would have looked like in their day from a modern
vantage point.
With the advent of the internet, Wikipedia, and hand-held Internet devices, nearly
all of the content of the book can be easily accessed online. What is the value of such a
book when its content and so much more can be found for free elsewhere? Hence
because of this book’s encyclopedia-type entries on just a few select sites throughout
the land of Israel, the utility of this particular book has become obsolete in the Internet
age, unless you are a book purist.
Taylor Halverson
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E. Borgia, Jordan: Past & Present. Trans. A. Potter. Rome: Vision, 2001.
Jordan: Past & Present is a book similar to Israel: Past & Present, providing
engaging encyclopedic type entries, photographs and maps of several notable ancient
sites in Jordan. The three main sites covered are Petra, Jerash, and Amman.
The opening pages provide a historical overview of the major periods of history
from the dawn of civilization in the Jordan region down to the modern day. The book
is artfully designed with compelling text and photographs. Like the book Israel: Past
& Present, the unique feature of this book is the artistic overlay upon the modern
background of what an ancient site may have looked like. However, as was seen with
the book Israel: Past & Present, due to the advent of the Internet and smart devices, a
book like this is essentially superfluous. These two books are likely created for the
tourist market and I wouldn’t be surprised to find copies available at any of the
locations depicted herein.
For each of the sites covered, the book provides the basic outlines of human
history at the site, a variety of color pictures and orienting maps. Though this
information only conveys the barest of details, one can quickly discern the sweep of
human activity and civilization at these intriguing sites. The text provides the context
for why the sites developed as they did and why they are in their current state of repair
or disrepair.
Petra

Highlighted features of Petra include an overview of the city plan, the Theater,
the Colonnaded Street, the Nymphaeum, the Temenos Gate, the Qasr el-Bint (or Castle
of the Pharaoh’s daughter), and the famous funerary architecture, with specific attention
given to the Obelisk Tomb, the Palace Tomb, and the Sextius Florentinus Tomb.
Of course, a book like this would not be complete without including pictures
and text of the Khaznat el-Faroun (or Treasury of the Pharaoh) made famous in the
movie Indiana Jones and the Last Crusade.
Jerash

After providing background history for Jerash and the city-plan (primarily from
the Roman time period), the book provides special focus on the following features of
Jerash: The Arch of Hadrian, the Sanctuary of Zeus, the Southern Theater, the Oval
Forum, the Nymphaeum, and the Sanctuary of Artemis (patron deity of the city).
Amman (ancient Philadelphia)
Of the three major ancient sites highlighted in the book, Amman (ancient
Philadelphia) receives the shortest amount of attention. Similar to the introduction to
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the other sites, the book provides a short historical overview of the founding and
occupation (or lack thereof) of the site throughout human history. Then the book
provides focused attention on the Temple of Hercules.
The book draws thoughtfully upon the latest archaeological findings and
conclusions, even if at a high level. A book like this would perhaps be useful for a selfguided tour of any of the sites listed, though the amount of information is limited and
could easily be supplemented or surpassed by access to the Internet or prior
downloadable content.
Taylor Halverson
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John Rogerson, Chronicle of the Old Testament Kings: The Reign-by-Reign
Record of the Rulers of Ancient Israel. London: Thames and Hudson, 1999.
The Chronicle of the Old Testament Kings, written by John Rogerson, professor
of biblical studies emeritus at the University of Sheffield, provides an accessible and
engaging academic summary treatment of the major leaders found in the biblical text.
The target audience is the general, interested reader. Biblical scholars would likely not
turn to this as a source book for their own research. But for the arm-chair hobbyist it
could be a valuable addition to one’s collection. The book has been artfully designed.
Over 260 illustrations and images (including images of ancient artifacts) are
thoughtfully and strategically placed throughout the book to accompany the text and
enhance the reading. The artwork depicting ancient leaders or biblical events is drawn
from diverse artistic genres (Byzantine, Renaissance, Neo-Classical, etc.). In addition
to illustrations and images, side bar call-outs provide focus and insight on topics of
interest.
Even though the title of the book highlights Old Testament kings, this book
reviews many notable ancient Israelite leaders who do not fit the definition of an Old
Testament king either because they were not a king or they lived after the time period
of the Old Testament. Hence, in addition to Old Testament kings, the book discusses
ancient Israelite ancestral leaders (such as the patriarchs, Moses, Joshua, and the
Judges) as well as the rulers of Israel during the 2nd temple period (such as the
Hasmoneans and Herod the Great).
In the preface, Rogerson engages the reader with thought provoking questions.
Do we really “know” the leaders of Israel? Are the stories about them in the Bible
myths and legends? In the introduction, he presents some of the problems scholars
encounter with the Bible. Is it reliable as history? How do we account for
discrepancies in biblical chronology? Though outside archaeology and texts can help
to corroborate details in the Bible, the general rule is that the further back we go in
biblical history, the more guesswork that is involved. Hence, the dates and details
assigned to the various kings and leaders of ancient Israel are provisional.
After the preface and introduction the book divides the discussion of ancient
Israelite leaders according to this outline: From the Ancestors to the Judges: ?1450 – c.
1020 BC; The United Monarchy c. 1020-931 BC; The Divided Monarchy: Israel, 931722/1 BC; The Divided Monarchy: Judah c. 931-539 BC; and The Second Temple
Period.
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This latter period is divided into the following sub-periods: Under the Persians
539 – 333 BC; Under the Ptolemies 333 – c. 200 BC; Under the Seleucids c. 200 – 166
BC; The Hasmonean Dynasty 166 – 37 BC, and The Roman Period 63 BC – AD 70).
Rogerson devotes the substance of the book to reviewing each leader,
presenting relevant chronological information, providing a summary of the leader’s life,
and including pertinent biblical citations. Using a version of the historical-critical
approach, Rogerson also highlights intriguing questions from challenges or
inconsistencies found within the Bible or triggered by competing extra-biblical
evidence. He then offers reasoning for how to deal with these issues. Primarily his
conclusions to these challenges express the general opinion of many biblical scholars.
Though I recommend the book to any casual reader as an informative and
educating experience, I have two general criticism of the book. First, the historicalcritical approach that some biblical scholars employ to provide scientific and objective
interpretations for biblical data can lead to academically condoned speculative
theories—this has become so commonplace that few acknowledge the speculative
nature of such reasoning, even if this reasoning is sound and compelling. Second,
modern feminist thought may have over-sensitized some scholars in their interpretative
treatment of male and female characters, maximizing the “negative” features of the
male characters and foregrounding the “positive” features of female characters.
I’ll begin with the first challenge. Many biblical scholars assume that in order
to produce “objective” biblical interpretation one must accept that many biblical stories
are legendary. Furthermore, the assumption is that the stories preserved tell us more
about the history, values, and culture of those who preserved and transmitted the
biblical text rather than about the history, values and culture of the people who are the
focus of the stories. This has long been the mode of some biblical scholarship, to try to
account for why a later group would tell a story from an earlier past. One example of
this trend in biblical interpretive scholarship is how Rogerson concludes the section on
the stories of the patriarchal ancestors. The next three paragraphs are quoted from
pages 18-20 in Rogerson’s book.
“A starting point for addressing these questions [how to account for differences
between the religion of Abraham and that of later Israel, as presented in the Old
Testament] is the observation that, although the Old Testament is concerned
primarily with an entity named Israel, the story begins not with the founding
father of Israel, namely Jacob…, but with Jacob’s putative grandfather
Abraham.
“Further, many of the Abraham stories are set in the area of Hebron, which was
the ancient chief city of the kingdom of Judah. In other words, the story of the
Hebrews begins with a figure who was believed to be the founding father of
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Judah. Now Judah was much smaller than its northern neighbor Israel, was
populated later than Israel, and was initially less significant in the development
of Old Testament religion. Why, then, does the overall story begin with the
ancestor of the initially smaller, less important country? The likely answer is
that the story began to receive its final form at a time when Israel no longer
existed as a political entity and Judah alone survived, representing itself as
Israel. This could have been at any time after the destruction of the kingdom of
Israel by the Assyrians in 722/1 BC. Three possible moments are the reign of
either Hezekiah (c. 728-698 BC) or Josiah (640-609 BC), both kings of Judah,
or the post-Exilic period (from 539 BC).
“Any attempt to narrow the chronological possibilities further can only rest on
plausible rather than probable theories. Hezekiah certainly had pressing needs
for an overall story in which the founding father of Judah (i.e. Abraham) was
also shown to be the founder father of Israel. He had seen the destruction of the
northern kingdom, Israel, by the Assyrians in 722/1 BC and he was trying to
preserve the independence of his own kingdom against Assyria by extending his
influence into the former kingdom of Israel, as well as by forming alliances with
other rulers of small kingdoms in the area.
Josiah was in a similar position a century later. In favor of the post-Exilic
period it can be said that Abraham’s links with northern Mesopotamia in the
biblical story may indicate that he was identified with the interests of those who
returned from Exile in Babylon, and who argued that they, and not the people
who had remained in Judah, constituted the true people of Israel.”
I agree with Rogerson that the biblical data present a challenge in making firm
historical conclusions regarding the patriarchal ancestors. However, I am not
convinced that “inventing” new scenarios—for which we have no confirming
evidence—to account for the production and transmission of the stories helps us to
answer the original question. Instead, we have perpetuated the very problem we say the
Bible presents to us—lack of solid, confirming, historical evidence. Such reasoning
appears to be academically condoned speculation without much support.
Replacing one legend lacking unassailable historical validity with another does
not solve the academic problems presented by the Bible. Just because the story of an
ancestor places that ancestor in locations such as Northern Mesopotamia or in a specific
village of the hill country of ancient Israel does not mean that later writers were trying
to appeal to groups living in those locations to coalesce together around a shared
narrative. When literacy rates in ancient Israel were possibly less than 10%, and the
likelihood of these written stories to be widely promulgated was low, why would
anyone believe that such a tenuous connection between the remote past and a specific
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geographical location would be personally meaningful to Israelites living in a later time
period?
Would not, instead, the main themes and messages of the stories be the
inspiration and reason for telling the stories? Is not that one of the primary reasons that
the biblical text still has staying power today? Not because the stories resonate with the
majority of readers due to a connection with ancient Israelite political affiliations,
geographical centers, or religious practices. But rather, the stories represent humanity
and life as we all know it—difficult, challenging, unjust, inequitable—and yet fraught
with the hope of a better life, perhaps through divine intervention.
Certainly stories are told and preserved because they have relevance to those
telling, hearing, and preserving them. But most biblical stories and figures have sparse
or incomplete details. Much of what we know of ancient Israelite history lacks full and
robust historical concreteness. Therefore, it is not a stretch of the imagination to see
that many of the biblical stories could be reasonably fit into a wide variety of time
periods. This fact should curtail any confidence we might have in firmly concluding
that a particular story was composed or preserved at a specific historical juncture in
time.
The second challenge detected was Rogerson’s treatment of some male and
female characters. His dealings with the female judge Deborah (and the woman Jael,
both in Judges 4) are curious. His interpretation of the story demonstrates that despite
our best attempts at historical objectivity, it is difficult to avoid infusing our own
culture or values into the interpretative process. First, Rogerson takes as certain that
Deborah sat under a palm tree. Reasoning that it would be highly unusual for a palm
tree to grow in the area between Bethel and Ramah, he concludes it would be a wellknown spot (ostensibly a famous location where the people would know to find
Deborah).
But how does Rogerson know that a palm tree would be rare in such a location?
Do we know enough about ancient botany to make a determination with such certainty?
When so many other details in the biblical text are considered to be later projections or
fanciful legend, why does Rogerson suddenly think that a palm tree was truly
historically accurate to the story of Deborah?
Rogerson goes on to say that Deborah “no doubt” was a capable judge “based
on her skill, insight, and impartiality” (p. 46). Are we now projecting our expectations
of a judge upon her? Is there any evidence, Biblical or otherwise, of her skill, insight,
and impartiality? Or is it possible in the aftermath of the modern women’s liberation
movement, feminism, and feminist studies, which have had such a profound effect on
the academy, that there is now a tendency among scholars to highlight and speak well
of women, especially women from the past who are so underrepresented in the
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historical record? Curiously, Rogerson concludes about Deborah and Jael that “We
need not doubt their deeds, even if the exact circumstances are less easily discerned” (p.
48). Why would Rogerson make these claims of “no doubt” for women in the biblical
record and not for men?
When Rogerson reviews stories of Moses, Joshua, Joseph, or Abraham
everything is called into doubt. He does not treat the stories as “historically true” but
simply representative of ideas and events from a later time period that are retrofitted.
This “inequality” of treatment of men and women that Rogerson practices, though it
may sound honorable from a feminist perspective, is not academically appropriate.
Compare Rogerson’s presentation of these women to his presentation of another
judge who was a man—Samson. After reviewing Samson’s deeds he concludes, “What
history, if any, lies behind these extraordinary events?” (p. 61) and “Whether Samson
really did kill a lion with his bare hands, or became weak once his head had been
shaved, is improbable” (p. 63). Why are the details about Deborah’s account generally
construed to have historical validity while the figure of Samson and the stories
surrounding him are called into question altogether?
I’m not advocating for the historicity of any specific items in the Samson
narratives, but the uneven skepticism Rogerson brings to the biblical record I think says
more about modern academic values and sensitivities than it does about the validity of
various biblical details as being historically accurate. There is no escaping the fact that
women throughout history have often been marginalized, though there are rare
exceptions (Deborah and Jael may be representative). But that does not mean we go
beyond academic and scholarly constraint in recounting a woman’s experience just as
now we try not to do so with men.
In conclusion, this is a delightful, informative book. Besides some academic
perspectives that could be tweaked in some instances, the book cogently demonstrates
the Bible’s strengths and weaknesses as a primary source on the lives of ancient
Israelite leaders. Because the western civilized tradition is a blended fusion of ancient
Greek and Israelite values, knowing something of the ancient leaders that led the
Israelite culture for nearly two millennia is important. Rogerson’s book provides a
nuanced, though introductory, perspective for understanding one strand of influence in
the tradition of Western heritage.
Taylor Halverson
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Pyburn, K. Anne, editor. Ungendering Civilization. New York: Routledge,
2004.
This book is a collection of essays which, as the author states, began as a seminar
at Indiana University. It addresses the issue of cultural evolutionism in archaeological
work.
The two major points of the book are: 1) it provides a scrutiny of the role of
women in the evolution of states, critically addressing traditional views of male and
female roles; and 2) it demonstrates that archaeologists, many of whom would
characterize themselves as feminists, inadvertently support a sexist view of the world
by labeling poorly tested assumptions as science.
All but one of the contributors are or were all affiliated with Indiana University
where the author, Anne Pyburn, is an Associate Professor of Anthropology. She is the
director of the Chau Hiix Project which investigates the political economy of an ancient
Maya community. There are nine contributors including Pyburn, all of whom are
involved with archaeology -- five PhD candidates, one PhD graduate, one who studied
for a time at Indiana University and one professor from the University of Mississippi.
Each performed research in a different part of the world for a particular group, so the
archaeological data comes from Zimbabwe, Peru (Moche), pre-dynastic Egypt, Sumer,
North America (Cahokia), India (Harappan), Mediterranean (Minoan), Scandinavia
(Vikings), and Central America (Maya). The individual authors do not provide data on
the size of the groups, either by population or geography.
Pyburn’s goal was to look at the evidence of status distinctions when they are first
recognizable in the material record and test the assumption that women constituted a
subordinate class. As the participants worked through the literature and their own data,
it became clear that that assumption, when related to ancient cultures, provides an
excellent example of how the typological reasoning of cultural evolutionary
explanations predetermines and limits what we can know about the past. This
collection shows that cultural evolutionism is not benign; it sustains political views
about gender, race, and political economy that are not supported by research.
The authors have each taken a distinct body of archaeological data in order to
determine what the available data may or may not really show about past societies.
They discovered that there is not absolute evidence of the long-assumed male
dominance/female subordination that has characterized archaeological study. The
cross-cultural parallels found in the status and treatment of women are more the result
of history than of human nature or human biology. Many researchers look at the
evidence with pre-determined assumptions in mind, interpreting the data from the
viewpoint of women’s subordination and imposing more recent conditions on early
societies. Some of the essentialist assumptions are: men as public producers, women as
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private reproducers; men as actors, women as acted upon; men as innovative, women as
static; men as central, women as incidental (50).
Factors that the authors looked at using the archaeological data were wealth,
activity level, opportunity, ceremonies, food, labor, sexuality, and politics. Research
and interpretation by them indicates that there is evidence for the agency of women,
gender equality, un-gendered economies, ornamentation, women’s work and roles as
leaders, healers, and laborers. The contributors critically address traditional views of
male and female roles and argue for the possibility that the root cause of gender
subordination in the modern world was the loss of kin-based power structures during
early state formation, rather than “innate” tendencies to domesticity and child-rearing in
women and leadership and aggression in men.
Therefore, many assumptions made about social organization and division of
labor in ancient societies are not correct or at least should be studied more with the
evidence available. All researchers bring their own biases to their work and I wonder
if, to some degree, these authors were preconditioned to look at the evidence in a
certain way. Nonetheless, the encouragement to examine or re-examine archaeological
data from various views is important to the broader intellectual discussion.
Pyburn provides a good introduction titled, “Rethinking Complex Society”. She
refers to Wolf’s book, Europe and the People without History, which is about cultural
essentialism. She states that “Wolf’s critique of anthropological constructions of
culture works perfectly as a critique of anthropological constructions of gender.”
Pyburn critiques the notion that the status of women, though clearly not uniform across
time and space, is nevertheless thought to be uniformly subordinate throughout human
history.
Just as historians and cultural anthropologists have sought to study women in
more objective and reflexive ways, now archaeologists are encouraged to do it more in
their work. As Joe Watkins from the University of New Mexico states, “Contemporary
archaeologists should use this excellent volume as an example of the direction
archaeology should go to maintain its relevancy to existing societies” (back cover).
Connie Lamb
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Richard Rudgley, Lost Civilisations of the Stone Age. Arrow Books Ltd, 1999.
Having just finished reading this book, I found in the morning newspaper an
article about an amazing find in the Ethiopian desert—several hippo bones with
indications that the bones had been smashed by a human tool—by homo erectus, our
first ancient ancestors. Of course, the anthropological community is up in arms with
fierce debate over the interpretation of the discoverers.
Lost Civilisations of the Stone Age was written a decade ago by this British
cultural anthropologist with a distinguished trail of scholarship. He won the British
Museum Prometheus Award for his book The Alchemy of Culture: Intoxicants in Society
(British Museum Press, 1993). He also wrote Wildest Dreams: An Anthology of Drug
Related Literature (Little Brown, 1999) and Secrets of the Stone Age (Century, 2000,
which has become a TV series (History Channel, I believe). But this book, Lost
Civilisations, must be creating even more furor among his more conservative
colleagues, but for us as outsiders to the discipline, it is enlightening to learn how
contentious ideas can be among specialists.
Rudgley makes the point that “despite the fact that prehistory makes up more than
95 percent of our time on this planet, history, the remaining 5 percent makes up at least
95 percent of most accounts of the human story.” He believes that the prehistory of
humankind is no mere prelude to history; rather it is history itself.
Anthropologists themselves have had a bad record in this regard, according to
Rudgley. The famous early anthropologists (1863 London) had some unsavory
skeletons in their closets—and may not have behaved any better than notoriously
disrespectful colonialists. Richard Burton, for example, used anthropology to
sensationally discuss sexual issues not possible in proper British society (and his proper
British wife burned his papers when he died). Others were involved in criminal grave
robbing, selling body parts, and one even fashioned a gavel in the form of an African
head. How different is this from the making of lampshades from human skin (under the
Nazis), he asks?
Rudgley attacks the whole notion of history blooming 5,000 years ago out of a
cloud of dust, without antecedents. He also takes on the notion that modern man has
evolved and invented astonishing institutions from that point forward. And he questions
the notion that all of these innovations made life better for us all. “That the average
Stone Age individual may have enjoyed greater freedom than the serf (or even the
average citizen of a modern democratic state) is simply ignored in this version of the
human story, in which we ascend to ever greater heights and only look back in order to
congratulate ourselves on how far we have come.”
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He examines the most basic sign of any society’s success—the health of its
members. Anthropologists have found that our hunter/gatherer ancestors had far better
health than their agricultural successors. Agriculture was not an improvement for the
mass of peasants throughout history—although it certainly helped to make populations
explode and those elites at the top flourished with better health. This is one area in
which progress was a mixed blessing.
Many historians still regard ancient Egypt as some sort of miracle, arising out of
primeval darkness. The more ideological among them believe that there had to be some
“outside” influence (the space alien theories) because these people couldn’t possibly
have invented it. But newer anthropologists (such as Rudgley) see that Egypt’s great
culture emerged out of impressive indigenous prehistoric cultures—including elaborate
tombs, religious motifs, and religious themes.
Writing has always been considered the hallmark of civilization—beginning with
the Egyptian hieroglyphics and the Mesopotamian writing (which seem to be
independent of each other). New findings trace writing systems ever earlier in human
existence, as our own colleague, Donald Burgy, has shown in his series of “Reading
Paleolithic Writing” articles printed in the Comparative Civilizations Review. Although
a contentious proposition, there are others, in addition to Burgy, who are finding writing
systems—astonishingly as early as Homo erectus. They claim that we have misread the
brain capability of these early ancestors (just as we used to do with Homo
Neanderthalensis).
In a brief tour of this book, Chapter 2 deals with The Mother Tongue (an idea as
old as mankind) — that there was an ur-language very long ago out of which all of our
languages have come. I think of the story of the Tower of Babel in the Bible indicated
somebody’s awareness of an original mother tongue.
Chapter 3, A New Rosetta Stone, traces writing systems (and counting systems)
much farther back in history than we thought — with modern archeology providing
increasing evidence for this. In Chapter 4, we are given examples of writing (and prewriting) in “old Europe,” with many illustrations and plates of these finds. Chapter 5
takes on The Paleolithic Origins of Writing. Anthropologist Paul Bouissac “sees the
resistance to the serious investigation of the possibility of Paleolithic writing as partly
due to an entrenched tradition of viewing Ice Age paintings and other forms of
prehistoric art as simple representations of the objects that they depict.” He and others
of his school are proposing other ways to look at this art.
Chapter 6, which addresses Paleoscience, astonished me most. Science and
technology did not begin 5,000 years ago, which is evident from the wonderful stoneage constructions we find around the world—the Stonehenges and their relatives. I
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visited one in Malta and was struck by its builders’ obvious skill. And ten years ago, an
11,000-year-old sophisticated temple complex was found in Turkey, built by huntergatherers well before the advent of agriculture.
But much older than these are the tools and weapons ingeniously developed by
ancestors as old as Homo erectus. The hand axes demonstrate keen observation,
practiced skill, and transmission of this technology down hundreds of generations.
Furthermore, even our most ancient ancestors counted. Ridgley discusses and illustrates
the work of Michel Dewez (1970) who found 10,000 year-old animal bones with clearly
marked counting systems engraved on them.
Chapter 7, From Footprints to Fingerprints, follows the antiquity of man as
detective. Hunters have always been noted for their observational skills (tracks, broken
branches, tufts of hair, entangled feathers, odors) and modern anthropology detectives
themselves now maintain that contrary to the belief that these skills only emerged
40,000 years ago, they were much older than that. Our Paleolithic ancestors were not
just lucky scavengers; they were also hunters and transmitters of these skills.
Chapters 8, Under the Knife, and 9, Surgery, provide numerous examples of our
most ancient ancestors performing surgeries from which their patients survived
(trepanning and amputations), and considerable knowledge of pharmacology. Chapter
10, Pyrotechnology, provides evidence of much earlier taming of fire than we had
thought.
The rest of the book deals with the antiquity of religious ideas, themes, and motifs,
all far predating 5,000 years ago.
This book would have delighted our late, great colleague, Stedman Noble, who
claimed to be bored by anything later than 300 AD. Before his death, he was working
on the antiquity of seagoing—and his numbers, increasingly, were getting earlier.
Finally, there is a work of art, a sculpture reproduced on the cover of the book,
which shows an amazing predecessor of the famous19th century “The Thinker.” This is a
book worth reading—and I will order his other works as well.
Laina Farhat-Holzman
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Sjoberg, Andree, Dravidian Language and Culture: Dravidian University,
Kuppam 2009
When we discuss contemporary Dravidian peoples we are generally referring to
over 200 million people, from diverse groups across the India sub-continent area, who
speak languages belonging to the Dravidian language family and who very often are
characterized by darker skin color than that of first language Hindi speakers. The term
Dravidian comes from the Sanskrit term Dravidian, meaning “Tamil.” Therefore, what
is often depicted as “Dravidian” reflects a variety of customs popularly seen as “South
Indian”, though the presence of Dravidian speakers extends into central India,
Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.
The origin of the Dravidians has been a subject of much controversy. And a great
deal of that has been focused on the relative extent to which the Dravidians have been a
major primary creator of the larger Hindu civilization of the Indian sub-continent or the
recipients of outside enrichments to which they have added the residuals of their more
ancient ways.
A fundamental premise of this book–a collection of diverse essays by Prof.
Andree Sjoberg, a long-time active member of the International Society for the
Comparative Study of Civilizations, is that there is a significant under-appreciation of
the contribution of Dravidians to present day more generalized Indian Hindu culture;
further, key elements of Hindu culture are often excessively attributed to the Aryan
groups who entered India, pushing back the more ancient Dravidian populations in the
process.
But while Sjoberg makes a strong case that the preponderance of evidence seems
to attest to the major formative role of Dravidian speakers in the molding of Hindu
civilization, many of the specifics remain imprecise, as she herself clearly notes. For
example, she notes that the linguistic and biological evidence often seems contradictory,
because many of the specifics of linguistics point to an origin in Central Asia and Asia
Minor for Dravidian groups while other biological and cultural aspects seem more
oriented to the southeast and even a Proto-Australoid or Australoid past. This
publication by Pravadea University provides an excellent exposure to how Dr. Sjoberg’s
own thoughts and research are important contributions to the resolution of many of
those contradictions.
Pravadea University’s publishing of Sjoberg's work, Dravidian Language Culture,
represents a type of activity frequently produced by specific institutions and
organizations of a highly localized nature and whose subject matter is often perceived to
be esoteric or highly specialized in contrast to the interests and presentations of reigning
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majority concerns, conceptions and dynamics. In India, of course, the concept of
“minority” must be understood as only relative, given the size of minority populations
and the richness of local cultures. Yet those outside the obvious intended audience for
such works who do take up the challenge of navigating through the concentrated
localized content are often rewarded with profound insight - like sweet grapes picked
through the labor of arduous workers who select from rarer and more mature vines than
those used for more general mass distribution. Such is the case with Sjoberg’s book.
Sjoberg uses what she identifies as the process of “elimination” to support her
thesis that Dravidian culture has profoundly influenced what is characterized as presentday Hindu Indian civilization. However, because the evidence is so very scattered and
varied, she makes the case that such a large presence of evidence, even if imprecise,
justifies attribution of cause specifically because there is far less evidence to support a
contrary position. In short, in cases where there is a lack of solid evidence, accepting the
preponderance of evidence is the acceptable default criterion.
From a religious perspective, she notes how the core concept of Shakti (power or
energy), so central to Hinduism, is clearly pre-Aryan and mainly Dravidian. Culturally,
she notes the strong case for seeing the great India epics -- the Ramayana and the
Mahabharata -- as having dominating Dravidian origins. Linguistically, she observes the
strong influence of Dravidian on non-Dravidian languages such as Marathi.
Materially (128), she notes the evidence of large Dravidian urban settlement prior
to the coming of the Aryans.
These are just small samples of the myriad of examples she provides and analyzes.
In fact she offers so many that one begins to wonder why she feels that there is even a
burden of proof being imposed on those arguing for the recognition of the massive
Dravidian contribution to larger Indian Hindu civilization. Ironically, this is the question
that Dr. Sjoberg does not address and therefore leaves the unacquainted reader not fully
aware of its import. Why, if the preponderance of the evidence through a process of
elimination is fairly clearly on the side of demonstrating the importance of the Dravidian
language and culture to greater Indo-Hindu civilization, does she and others she
collaborates with have to bear the burden of so demonstrating? Why is it not those who
claim otherwise that have that burden?
Sjoberg addresses where the Dravidian peoples and language came from but not
the origins of that debate itself. Yet it is this question that may be of most interest to an
audience concerned with issues of the rise and evolution of human civilizations per se.
The fact is that the debate itself comes directly from that combination of racism,
conquest and colonialism that, in discovering the incredible depth, profundity and
creativity of the world east of the Ganges, found it logical to ascribe Indo-Hindu
magnificence to the influence of “Caucasian Aryan” people - and found allies in so
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doing among the descendants of the population with self-ascribed ties to previous
Persian mogul invaders.
A fascinating example of how this Dravidian–Aryan influence debate has served
this purpose can be found in a very unlikely place: a speech that was given by President
Leopold Sedar Senghor, first President of Senegal, a member of the Académie Française
and a renowned poet, in 1974 at the International Institute of Tamil Studies.
Noting that Southern India is in the same latitude as Senegal, that the Indian subcontinent was formerly attached to East Africa, that Tamil legends refer to the existence
of once flourishing cities now buried under the sea, Senghor in promoting an alternative
Afro-Dravidian connection added supporting references from assorted other sources,
including Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Leo Frobenius, D. Westermann and A.
Sathasivam.
Senghor noted that “in Wolof (the predominant native language of Senegal)
‘xanjar’ means bronze; and in Telugu “xancara,” work in bronze; in Bambara “numu,’”
forge, and in Telugu “inumu,” iron; in Wolof “kamara,” name given to the blacksmith’s
caste, and in Telugu “kamara,” name given to the blacksmith’s caste... the Wolof use of
the eec, producing yarn from raw cotton, …compared with the Pengo verb ec, meaning
“to card cotton,” the Wolof word “konko,” a curved hoe, is exactly the same as the
Naiki word “konki,” a curved hoe, the Wolof “kuti,” a pup with the Tamil word “kutti,”
a pup, …Wolof “xar,” sheep, and in Barahui “xar,” a ram; (and) in Wolof “nag,” cow, in
Sere “naak,” in Poular “nagge” and in Tamil “naaku,” a female buffalo.
Senghor, who was not a linguist, wasn’t trying to take sides in the Aryan –
Dravidian debate from a Hindu perspective. Rather, for him the debate itself was one of
“racism” and the failure to recognize the contribution of the darker skinned people of
the world to the dynamic of ever evolving civilizations around the world.
Moreover, he felt that the attempt of all reigning hegemonic groups to impose a
belief in their predominance as the source of high civilization was antithetical to a true
understanding that, in his words:
… it is miscegenation which has led to the development of civilizations that
history has known, whether Egypt, Sumer or India. A civilization with no
admixture is a cultural ghetto. …And this is the ideal of every great civilization.
…It is the ideals of Pan-Human Civilization which is being hammered out
…with the participation of all nations.
As is inherent in most academic research, the researcher must tailor his or her
contribution to the frame of the institutions and peer group with whom he or she is most
directly engaged. This is the case with Dr. Sjoberg’s work and the result therefore is a
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precise and sharp focus on particular issues and evidence rather than grand theory or
expansive speculation. Inevitably the price paid, however, is a presentation that will
directly only engage a limited audience.
But this should not be seen in any way as a diminution of the value of Dr.
Sjoberg’s work. To the contrary, her efforts provide the substance on which credible
theory rises or falls. Her essays are each highly honed discussions. Most importantly,
each is not only a scholar’s contribution to the specific area of concern over Dravidian
influences on Hinduism but also a needed nail in the coffin of epistemologies built on
the conscious or unconscious exclusion of others and a denial of the process of
civilization as a manifestation of a myriad of sources in a dynamic swirl of mutual
transformations.
Sjoberg deserve thanks and appreciation for this book distilled from her toils
among the rarer settings of scholarship in comparative civilization and in pursuit of the
expansion of our understanding of how human civilizations, and their manifestation in
particular forms and places, are the products of a myriad of influences, often from
underappreciated peoples – in this case the Dravidian-speaking people of the Indian subcontinent.
John Grayzel
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Call for Papers
International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations
42nd annual international conference, June 6-9, 2012

DeVry University’s Crystal City (Arlington) campus, Washington D.C.
THEME: The Coming Clash of Civilizations: China versus the West?
The grand ascendance of China and the onset of an Asian-centered world order will
undoubtedly be one of the great dramas of the twenty-first century. China's
extraordinary economic growth and active diplomacy are already transforming East
Asia, and future decades will see even greater increases in Chinese power and influence.
But exactly how this drama will play out is an open question.
Suggested topics for paper presentations
•

Will the Western-oriented world order come to be replaced by one increasingly
dominated by China? What can the United States do to maintain its position as China
rises? How likely is a war with Taiwan? What role will the “Chinese overseas
population” play in the clash of civilizations? Has China any plans for world
domination? Or is China a fragile communist regime desperate to survive in a society
turned upside down by miraculous economic growth and a stunning new openness to the
greater world?

•

China’s New Model of Development in Africa versus the West’s “failed” Aid projects.
Environmental fall-out of rapid Chinese industrialization How do the Chinese handle
their ethnic minorities? Japanese and Korean reactions to the rise of China. What about
the rise of India and Brazil? Was Huntington’s thesis on the “clash of civilizations”
correct, after all?

Other themes are welcomed
•

The “Arab Spring”. Neo-Conservatism and the creation of a global democratic order.
The West: a shared tradition of ideas and values? Immigration and the resurgence of
ethnic nationalism in Europe. An Anglosphere Future? Mexifornia and America’s
National Identity. The role of Hindu, Hispanic, Russian, or Islamic Civilizations in a
global age.

•

Scholarly
presentations
in civilizational
theory,
comparative
civilization
studies, philosophy of history, world history, futurology, and other related fields.
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Suggested formats for presentations:
•

Research papers, round-table proposals, position papers, and book review presentations
are welcomed. Papers and abstracts will be published in the refereed Proceedings of the
Society, and selected papers in the journal Comparative Civilizations Reviews.

Email abstracts to: Ricardo Duchesne, rduchesn@unb.ca
ISCSC website at www.wmich.edu/iscsc for conference information

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol66/iss66/20

170

Review: Full Issue

Membership Information
If you are not a member if the ISCSC please consider joining. For a
$50 yearly membership fee members receive a one year subscription to
this journal, are invited to attend the annual conference, receive the
ISCSC Newsletter, and may participate in ongoing dialogues.
Membership is open to all interested in civilizations. Visit
www.wmich.edu/ISCSC for further information and to join the Society.

To Obtain Issues of This Journal
Soft cover issues of this journal may be purchased from Amazon.com,
bn.com or from other Internet booksellers. CD and other electronic
copies of this issue may be obtained from the H.W. Wilson web site at
www.hwwilson.com or the ProQuest website at www.proquest.com.
Coming soon to EBSCO Electronic Journals Service.

Upcoming 2012 ISCSC Conference
The 42nd Annual Meeting of the International Society for the
Comparative Study of Civilizations will take place on June 6-9, 2012 at
DeVry University, Crystal City, VA. Against the backdrop of
Washington DC, the Society will host an international conference on
the ascendance of China. See conference information and the Call for
Papers Inside for details.
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